Response to Civil Unrest:

A Review of the Berkeley Police Department's Actions and Events of December 6 and 7, 2014

Response to Civil Unrest:

A Review of the Berkeley Police Department's Actions and Events of December 6 and 7, 2014

December 6, 2014 Facts

An incident action plan was prepared to define the mission, tactics, contingency plans and staffing.

Mission

The mission of the Berkeley Police Department is to provide for the safety and security of the general public, while both monitoring and facilitating any peaceful demonstration. We will allow for the peaceful expression of First Amendment Rights, including but not limited to assembling, marching, carrying signs, making speeches, or other lawful activity designed to express or advocate political, religious, or social opinions. While recognizing the above rights, the Berkeley Police Department will make every attempt to quickly identify and or arrest only those specifically involved in criminal activity or violence. Citizens' rights are of the utmost importance and our goal is to ensure a safe environment for everyone involved. Should the crowd reach a point where its focus becomes criminal or violent; the Department will provide and document dispersal orders. Once the dispersal orders have been given, the crowd will be allowed to leave. Those failing to disperse will be arrested. Unless exigent circumstances exist, or doing so would place officers or the public at risk, a dispersal order shall be given prior to using force to disperse the crowd. Use of force will be controlled by departmental policy.

Incident Objectives
  • Monitor the protest from its origin
  • Wen needed, initiate traffic control to facilitate a safe march
  • When needed, address law enforcement and order maintenance issues within past practice and policy
  • Return involved units to service as soon as practical
Priorities
  • Life Safety
  • Incident Stabilization
  • Property Protection
Intent

Prepare and implement a plan to monitor this event and respond to any contingencies that may occur. Allow for First Amendment activities and provide for the safety and security of the general public. (Quoted from the IAP for Dec. 6, 2014.)

Facts

When an unusual occurrence may become, or is already, beyond the control of local law enforcement resources, the chief of police or designee may request assistance from the Operational Area Mutual Aid Coordinator. (California Office of Emergency Services Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations)

The Department determined that because of the potential for unrest and likely high attendance, staffing resources above and beyond what BPD could field would be needed. BPD requested additional police resources from the Alameda County Office of Emergency Services. The County arranged for most mutual aid responders to arrive in Berkeley prior to the start of the event.

In response to a request for mutual aid by a chief of police, the sheriff will coordinate law enforcement resources from within the Operational Area. This includes the response of law enforcement resources from unaffected municipalities, local CHP and other state agencies, as well as his/her own resources, to assist the affected chief of police. "The responsible local law enforcement official of the jurisdiction requesting mutual aid shall remain in charge." The mutual aid program requires that "the integrity of responding forces and the policies and procedures of their departments must be maintained." (California Office of Emergency Services Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations)

The Berkeley Police Department uses the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) to manage mutual aid. SEMS is a scalable incident management protocol that is utilized statewide to manage large scale incidents that require mutual aid. The use of SEMS is required by California Government Code for managing response to multi-agency and multi jurisdictional emergencies. SEMS provides a common understanding of management protocols that would allow a jurisdiction to set up a temporary and organized response to a major event using outside agency mutual aid responders. Agencies responding to mutual aid requests are deployed into the field and managed based on these standardized practices. (Click here for more information on SEMS)

The 2100 block of McKinley Ave. was utilized as a staging area for responding mutual aid. The Department realized that normal parking area inside the PSB would be inadequate to accommodate the equipment and vehicles of mutual aid resources. Mutual aid would need to arrive, check in, deploy into the field and return to the station for breaks and supplies. Securing the staging area without impacting the neighbors was a significant challenge. Throughout the evening, protesters snuck into the block and tweeted information about mutual aid staff arriving at the staging area.

On December 6th, officers responded to BPD's mutual aid request for assistance from agencies throughout the region. At approximately 3:00 pm, mutual aid resources began to arrive in Berkeley. A briefing was conducted at 3:30 pm for all Berkeley police personnel and all mutual aid personnel already on scene. A BPD commander assigned to coordinate mutual aid resources gave a briefing to each team of outside agency officers that arrived after this main briefing.

At approximately 4:45 pm, over 150 police personnel were on scene in Berkeley and deployed into the field.

At 4:54 pm, a group of protesters gathered at Sproul Plaza on the UC Berkeley campus and quickly swelled in numbers as they marched through the South Campus area and into downtown. Demonstrators rerouted and made their way to the Berkeley Public Safety Building (PSB). At the intersection of Shattuck Ave. and Allston Way the crowd stopped and held a "die in" where members lay down in the street symbolic of death caused by police. Bicycle officers monitored the crowd while motorcycle officers blocked traffic to facilitate the march.

When the crowd reached Milvia St., one block east of the Public Safety Building, bicycle officers observed and reported via radio, that some crowd members had put scarves, bandanas or other masks over their faces. This can signify that these crowd members intended to commit illegal acts and avoid being identified. According to California Penal Code section 185, wearing masks or personal disguises for the purpose of evading or escaping discovery, recognition, or identification in the commission of any public offense is a misdemeanor.

When the crowd arrived at the PSB, they gathered in a group of approximately 800 in front of the main entrance at Center Street. Officers had prepared a row of low metal barricades on Martin Luther King (MLK) to prevent access to the west sidewalk and the building. The Public Safety Building is critical infrastructure for the City of Berkeley. It houses the City's Emergency Operations Center, the Berkeley Police and Fire 911 Emergency Call Center, the City Jail and Fire Department Administration as well as Police Operations. Protecting the building is vital to maintaining critical City of Berkeley emergency services. Generally, this means closing the public lobby and stationing officers behind barricades. Officers were positioned between the barriers and the building. The crowd took over the intersection of Center St. and MLK and expressed themselves peacefully while sitting down.

Officers assigned to building security assessed the crowd size. Believing security at the north end of the PSB was insufficient; they requested additional officers to support security. Additional units, staged two blocks away, moved to the north end of the block and took up a position blocking MLK at Addison St. Two squads were deployed in skirmish line formation and stood at the ready with helmets on and batons drawn.

Note: Videos were sourced from a combination of internal and internet. Video captions were added by BPD unless otherwise noted.

Eventually the crowd began to move northbound on MLK towards the skirmish line. A skirmish line is used to deny access or reroute a crowd. In order to maintain a skirmish line, officers use several techniques. Officers are required by policy to avoid getting involved in unnecessary dialog or debates with crowd members. Officers give verbal commands for the front of the crowd to stay back, if that is ignored, they may use an open handed push or a two handed push with a baton or other techniques as reasonably necessary. Use of force decisions are made individually by each officer, based on this policy, to keep the crowd at a safe distance from the line.

Officers create and maintain a safety space between themselves and protesters. This space allows time for the officer to perceive and react to potential threats from the crowd. This perception time allows for the officer to protect themselves from assault and to see a deliberate attack coming. Maintaining a reasonable distance is intended to reduce the use of force and to help to prevent officers from using force unnecessarily or on the wrong person. Officers maintain a safety space in routine police work when they are interacting with agitated subjects. An officer should never allow a person to get into his or her personal space without asking the person to move back or physically moving the person back. Failing to maintain a safety space in crowd control can result in assaults on officers and the line being overrun.

Note: Videos were sourced from a combination of internal and internet. Video captions were added by BPD unless otherwise noted.

This report discusses use of force in several situations and from several perspectives. We were not tasked with evaluating the reasonableness of individual uses of force. This report is focused on making recommendations that may reduce the potential for violent conflict and use of force in similar circumstances in the future.

At MLK and Addison St., some members of the crowd encroached on the police line and failed to back away when directed. Officers used their hands and batons to push those who did not comply with verbal orders out of safety zones. After several minutes, a Commander on the northern perimeter determined that the roadblock was causing conflict with the crowd and was unnecessary. The Commander had officers release most of the north bound lanes of MLK to allow the crowd to flow northbound. Those officers who opened the line created a protective bubble on the west side of MLK, so as to not be pushed against the barriers by the passing crowd.

As people filed by, officers directed people to stay back. When some crowd members disregarded these directives and walked into the officers' safety zones, officers responded by pushing them with their hands or batons. During this time, officers were being hit with rocks and other objects. It was not always possible for officers to identify press. Some members of the press were more identifiable by their specialized equipment, such as television lights and cameras. Others were less obvious, using camera phones and not displaying press passes of any sort. As a consequence, a few members of the press who failed to follow directions were pushed away from officers and in a couple of instances hit with batons.

Shortly after the crowd began to move north, a masked crowd member threw an object at an officer who was positioned on the eastern portion of the protective bubble. Several seconds later, a different protester intentionally walked into the same officer. The officer used his baton to push the protester, who then tripped over his dog and fell to the ground. This incident further agitated the crowd. Some crowd members stopped moving north and instead gathered around the officers. One protester was heard yelling, "Kettle up. Kettle up," which was understood to mean, "surround them."

Note: Videos were sourced from a combination of internal and internet. Video captions were added by BPD unless otherwise noted.

A group of masked individuals made their way to the rear of the crowd facing the officers. Once in position, the masked individuals pelted officers with a traffic cone, bricks, rocks, metal pipes, a screwdriver and other objects, injuring five officers. One agitator emerged from the crowd and hurled a bag of gravel which hit an officer in the upper body dislocating his shoulder.

Note: Videos were sourced from a combination of internal and internet. Video captions were added by BPD unless otherwise noted.

Officers fired one less lethal foam baton round. They also rolled four smoke canisters into the crowd following the assault and got the remaining crowd moving northbound. Given the nature and severity of the attacks, there was no time to issue a dispersal order. This attack on officers was executed in a coordinated fashion and was a preplanned attack as evidenced by the objects such as bricks thrown at officers that were brought to the scene by violent protesters to throw at the police.

Note: Videos were sourced from a combination of internal and internet. Video captions were added by BPD unless otherwise noted.

BPD use of force is regulated by General Order U-2, Use of Force, which reads

"In crowd situations, less-than-lethal force and/or chemical agents shall not be used without the prior approval of the Chief of Police, or his/her designee, unless exigent circumstances prevent the request from being made and the delay would likely risk injury to community members or police personnel (e.g., rocks, bottles, or other projectiles are being thrown and immediate crowd dispersal is necessary)." (Excerpted from General Order U-02, section 18)

Although not an irritant, smoke is considered a chemical agent for the purpose of this policy. During the assault on officers at Addison St. and MLK, a field commander acted, based on exigent circumstances, and ordered two officers to roll smoke canisters to disperse the crowd and minimize injury. That order was made face to face and not over the radio. Smoke is generally not thrown through the air because the canisters are heavy and can cause significant injury if a person is hit in the head. As soon as the first canister began emitting smoke, a masked individual ran through the crowd, grabbed it and hurled it through the air back at officers. Because the order to use smoke was not over the radio, another commander who was unaware that we used smoke and only witnessed the smoke canister flying back at the line, thought that protesters were using their own smoke grenades against the police. He then radioed for officers to prepare to use CS gas. To prepare for gas officers began to systematically put on their gas masks. The smoke, however, was effective in moving the remaining crowd northbound and away from officers. Consequently, CS gas was not used at MLK and Addison St.

The crowd then made its way north to University Ave. Officers were still near the PSB preparing for the use of CS gas. At Trader Joe's, rioters broke out large windows causing thousands of dollars worth of property damage. Garbage and large plastic food delivery trays were strewn about in the street. A man confronted a masked crowd member and they started fighting. Some masked members of the crowd vandalized and looted the store through the broken windows and stole or smashed over $1,200 worth of alcohol.

While many crowd members looked towards the store and cheered the destruction, a group of masked men fanned out forming a loose perimeter and provided security for the vandals. They confronted people who appeared to be recording their actions. They prevented others from breaking up the fight. At the same time, protesters were trying to expel the violent elements from their protest. A woman with a camera confronted a masked man screaming expletives at him to leave. Our group later spoke to a protest leader who decided to leave the protest at this point because it had become too dangerous. One of the vandals who used a skateboard to smash the windows at Trader Joe's was arrested the next day.

Note: Videos were sourced from a combination of internal and internet. Video captions were added by BPD unless otherwise noted.

The bulk of the crowd began moving west on University Ave. As officers were still arriving at University Ave. and MLK, a group of rioters were looting Radio Shack at Jefferson St. and University Ave. Officers did not maneuver formations to either location quickly enough to mitigate the damage or arrest those responsible. Vandals and looters smashed the store windows while employees were inside, entered the store, stole items and vandalized the west side of the building.

Note: Videos were sourced from a combination of internal and internet. Video captions were added by BPD unless otherwise noted.

A riot is defined in the California Penal Code Section 404, which states:

"Any use of force or violence, disturbing the public peace, or any threat to use force or violence, if accompanied by immediate power of execution, by two or more persons acting together, and without authority of law, is a riot."

The crowd continued west on University Ave. Once Trader Joe's was secured and cleared, squads of officers returned to their vehicles and tried to stop the crowd from taking over the freeway. Disruptions of freeways and commerce are viewed by protesters as a way to get their message out to a wider audience. However, abruptly stopping traffic on a freeway is extremely dangerous for the protesters and motorists. The potential for causing a serious collision with protesters or between motorists is high. At approximately 7:30 pm, BPD and CHP set up a skirmish line at University Ave. and Sixth St. overpass to block protesters access to the freeway. The skirmish line was successful. The protesters eventually turned back eastbound when they could not get onto the freeway.

Squads were unable to effectively maneuver into position to stop and disperse the crowd, due to the earlier damage and violence, as it moved through the west end of Berkeley. When officers arrived and attempted to set skirmish lines, the crowd was able to leave before all avenues of exit were blocked.

Command was challenged to maneuver mutual aid resources to the crowd in a timely manner because of a delay in communication with mutual aid commanders through BPD pathfinders (Berkeley officers assigned to ride with mutual aid commanders to assist with navigation and communication). Larger groups of officers had difficulty maneuvering in the area around the severe congestion caused by the march on University Ave.

At approximately 7:41 pm, the crowd had made its way to San Pablo Ave and Francisco St. There, crowd members threw bottles at officers. By approximately 8pm, the crowd had reached Berkeley Way just east of West St. Crowd members there hurled rocks at officers. At approximately 8:20 pm dispersal orders were given via a public address system.

One part of the crowd went through the rear yards of private homes, destroying a cyclone fence in order to evade officers attempting to stop them. No additional businesses were looted as officers followed the crowd. Officers monitored crowd activity as it continued to march through the city.

A dispersal order can be declared in the case of a riot, rout or unlawful assembly. The Incident Commander at any crowd situation shall make the determination as to when or if a crowd whose behavior poses a clear and present danger of imminent violence will be declared an unlawful assembly. (General Order C-64) The dispersal order must be audible and the crowd must be given reasonable time to comply with the order.

Tactical Command was physically located at the station in the Department Operations Center (DOC). Situational awareness in the DOC was hindered by several factors. First, because of the amount of communication on the primary radio channel, communication was bogged down by too much radio traffic. Second, there was a delay in live stream internet video coverage that command was following. This delay varied between two and five minutes due to bandwidth restrictions. (All live stream video coverage was from public open sources.) Command relied on news helicopter and protester "live" feeds. Although there were CHP and Oakland Police helicopters in the air supporting mutual aid officers from Oakland PD, local regulations prohibit Berkeley Police from helicopter use in this situation. (A 1982 Berkeley City Council Resolution 51,408 - N.S. limits the use of helicopters by the police department, with the approval of the City Manager or Chief of Police for: disaster assistance, rescue efforts (excluding hostages) and locating missing persons.)

The lack of situational awareness, coupled with conditions that slowed maneuver, allowed the crowd to move on foot faster through Berkeley than the police could observe and coordinate resources to effectively stop them and issue additional dispersal orders. Eventually, the crowd made its way up University Ave., through downtown and up Bancroft Way to the south campus area.

As the crowd moved towards the South Campus, Command had an increasing concern that there would be more looting, vandalism and violent riotous behavior in the Telegraph Ave. business district if the crowd was allowed access and ordered the officers to attempt to kettle the crowd in order to issue an effective dispersal order. When officers moved into position to stop the crowd at Telegraph Ave. and Bancroft Way, they left their vehicles a block away on Durant Ave. and further south on Telegraph Ave. At approximately 9 pm the decision was made to stop the crowd on Bancroft between Dana St. and Telegraph Ave. and again issue dispersal orders using a loudspeaker. Officers recorded video from both sides of the crowd to ensure that the dispersal orders were clear and audible to the entire crowd.

An arrest team was sent into the crowd in an attempt to arrest a suspect for inciting the crowd to riot and repeatedly refusing to back away when ordered. When officers caught the suspect, several protesters advanced on officers in an attempt to free the prisoner from their custody. This is a violation of California Penal Code section 405a as: "The taking by means of a riot of any person from the lawful custody of any peace officer." The arrest team used force to overcome his resistance and to prevent the crowd from taking him from its custody. Another protester was arrested at that location for assaulting an officer. Once the dispersal orders were given, the crowd was allowed to disperse, as required, westbound on Bancroft Way.

At the same time, crowds had formed on all sides of the officers holding the intersection of Bancroft Way and Telegraph Ave. A second group of approximately 100 protesters were on Telegraph Ave. between Bancroft Way and Durant Ave. and refused to disperse.

While officers were attempting to disperse the crowds at Telegraph Ave. and Bancroft Way, a much larger crowd estimated between 1000 and 1500 strong had begun to form at Telegraph Ave. and Durant Ave. The crowd to the west of the Telegraph Ave. and Bancroft Way intersection had for the most part moved westbound then southbound through an alley to link up with the crowd forming on Telegraph Ave, south of the officers.

As officers ordered the crowd located south of the intersection of Telegraph Ave. and Bancroft Way to move south on Telegraph Ave. the crowd briefly stood their ground. Officers advanced southbound in a skirmish line while repeatedly ordering the crowd to move south, and used batons to move them south.

When some in the crowd attempted to comply with the order to move south, individuals could see another line of officers blocking their path at Durant Ave. When they approached the line, officers told them to stay back. They responded, "They just told us to go this way!" The southern line was ordered to allow the remaining crowd to pass. The west half of the line opened allowing the group to join the larger crowd at Telegraph Ave. and Durant Ave.

More than 23 dispersal orders were issued over 54 minutes using a loudspeaker beginning on Telegraph Ave. before officers took measures to disperse the crowd. The dispersal was read from a pre-prepared script:

The crowd must disperse to comply. They must leave the area and cease to assemble. They are not to remain together as a crowd or in the area. The dispersal order does not allow them to remain assembled and move as group to another location. Penal Code section 409 applies to any person remaining at an unlawful assembly following an order to disperse, whether or not that person is involved in the violent or illegal activity that precipitated the order. In order to arrest those who remain, officers need probable cause to believe they were present, could hear the admonition, and willfully remained after a reasonable time had been given to disperse. "The plain objective of section 409 is to enable law enforcement officers to defuse riotous situations by ordering persons to remove themselves from the area without need to distinguish between rioters and bystanders whose very presence aggravates the problem of restoring tranquility." (People v. Cipriani, 1971) This has been further interpreted by the courts to apply to assemblies which are violent or pose a clear and present danger of imminent violence.

Rather than dispersing, the crowd size significantly increased at Telegraph Ave. and Durant Ave. Officers on Telegraph Ave. found themselves surrounded on all sides and cut off from their vehicles. When officers deployed a skirmish line, a crowd of protesters and onlookers quickly formed behind the officers. The crowd waited to see what officers would do. A motorist was trapped by the crowds in the middle of the crowd in the intersection at Telegraph Ave. and Durant Ave. and had to abandon the vehicle where it sat. Masked individuals smashed windows, flattened tires and spray painted marked police vehicles that had been left unattended at Durant Ave. and Telegraph Ave.

The crowd at Telegraph Ave. and Durant Ave. refused to comply with the dispersal orders. Rioters threw rocks and bottles, injuring four more officers.

Field commanders determined that ratios of protesters to officers were too high to safely make mass arrests. The number of potential arrests would by far have exceeded the capacity for custody and transport. Field Commanders ordered officers to disperse the crowd south on Telegraph Ave. Field Commanders sought approval to use CS gas to avoid forcibly dispersing the crowd with batons if the crowd would not disperse. After exploring and rejecting alternatives to its use, the Chief of Police approved the use of CS gas as a last resort. Prior to advancing towards the crowd, officers were told to prepare for the deployment of CS gas. Officers took several minutes to don their gas masks. Rather than dispersing, the crowd watched intently while rocks and bottles were thrown from the back of the crowd at officers. When officers advanced toward the crowd ordering people to move back, the front of the crowd refused to move. Once it became clear the crowd was going to stand its ground, CS gas was used.

CS gas is considered a preferable option to the use of batons as it is less likely to cause injury. CS gas is considered an intermediate use of force by the courts on par with batons, less lethal munitions, and pepper spray. Batons have drawbacks for dispersing large crowds. Batons can cause bruises, contusions, abrasions, break the skin, and break bones. Batons also are only effective for dispersing people within the officers reach.

CS gas in contrast causes irritation to the eyes, nose and throat. The remedy for CS gas is to leave the area in search of fresh air. CS fired from a less than lethal launcher has a short range of approximately 10-15 feet and allows officers to target smaller groups than CS gas canisters. CS gas canisters are hand deployable burning devices that emit CS gas. (For more information on CS gas, refer to attached General Order U-02 - Use of Force in Appendix).

All police officers trained in a State of California POST Basic Academy are required to undergo exposure to CS gas and OC Spray (Pepper Spray). This includes officers with asthma. This exposure gives officers an understanding of the physical effects on the body that this use of force entails. Once exposed to fresh air, a subject exposed to CS gas quickly recovers. A drawback to the deployment of CS gas is that it is less discriminate than batons and anyone exposed to it will feel its effects.

Everyone within earshot of the loudspeaker was given the warning about the potential use of force including less lethal munitions as part of over 23 recorded dispersal orders beginning at Bancroft Way and Telegraph Ave. They had over 54 minutes to comply. CS gas was deployed within range of hearing repeated warnings. No CS gas exposure injuries or medical complications have been reported to BPD by local hospitals.

The use of CS gas was effective in getting the crowd to disperse from the area.

Note: Videos were sourced from a combination of internal and internet. Video captions were added by BPD unless otherwise noted.

As the crowd moved away from the CS gas, vandals damaged several police cars parked on Telegraph Ave., breaking windows and side view mirrors.

As the crowd dispersed south into Oakland, numbers diminished significantly. Many members of the original large crowd exited on side streets. At Telegraph Ave. and Parker St., one member repeatedly flicked lit cigarettes at an officer on the skirmish line, hitting an officer once in the face shield, once in the chest and once in the shoulder. An arrest team was sent into the crowd to arrest. He fought and punched officers, while members of the crowd unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the arrest and free him from police custody. As the crowd moved south, volleys of rocks and bottles continued to be thrown at officers. Additional CS gas was used in response to these ongoing attacks on officers.

Two squads of officers remained behind at Telegraph Ave. and Channing Way to secure seven police vehicles that were significantly damaged and not drivable. One police vehicle was burglarized with uniforms and equipment stolen. While officers coordinated tows for the damaged vehicles, a skirmish line was set to deny access to the police cars. Eventually, a crowd began to form at the skirmish line. Officers on scene requested additional units as the crowd to officer ratios became unmanageable. Officers walked back to the South Campus to support the squads left securing vehicles. Many crowd members who had been in the original crowd and had dispersed into the south campus neighborhood east and west of Telegraph Ave. had returned once the CS gas cleared from the air.

The crowd at Telegraph Ave. and Channing Way again grew to approximately 500-600. Dispersal orders were issued over the loudspeaker once again. Small crowds formed behind the lines of officers to the east and west of Telegraph Ave. These crowds hampered custody vans from maneuvering into the area. Due to the size of the crowd, mass arrests were not safe if the crowd became violent. When officers moved to disperse the crowd ordering them to move southbound for a second time, officers were met with resistance. Crowd members refused to comply with dispersal orders. Projectiles were also thrown at officers. To overcome that resistance, batons and CS gas were used to disperse the crowd. The crowd eventually diminished in size to fewer than 100. Despite a multitude of exit routes down side streets between Channing Way and Alcatraz Ave., the crowd stayed to engage the police. Members of the crowd threw rocks and bottles at officers from a distance as officers moved south. The crowd eventually dispersed and officers were able to return to the PSB at 1:38 am.

On the 6th, officers faced a significant challenge. Violent protesters in the crowd wearing masks first attacked officers then looted businesses, attacked other protesters and vandalized property. They would join the crowd and blend into it, making arrests difficult or impossible. They would launch assaults from the back of the crowd and splinter off from the main group to loot and vandalize. Police Command was unaware that these elements were not always welcomed by other members of the protest. Protest members and organizers tried to control or expel these elements from their midst without success.

In addition to these violent elements, much larger contingents of protesters refused to disperse and physically resisted lawful orders, choosing instead to stand their ground and confront officers. These protesters, by their sheer numbers, prevented the police from addressing the most violent offenders. Through refusing to disperse, large groups of protesters, who may have considered themselves peaceful, protected, facilitated and enabled violent elements as they launched assaults on officers and non-violent community members within the crowd.

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