



Reimagining Public Safety Task Force

REIMAGINING PUBLIC SAFETY TASK FORCE SPECIAL MEETING

Thursday, April 29, 2021
6:00 PM

District 1 - Margaret Fine	Youth Commission - Nayo Polk
District 2 - Sarah Abigail Ejigu	Police Review Commission - Nathan Mizell
District 3 - boona cheema	Mental Health Commission - Edward Opton
District 4 - Paul Kealoha Blake	Berkeley Community Safety Coalition - Todd Walker
District 5 - Dan Lindheim	Associated Students of U. California - Alecia Harger
District 6 - La Dell Dangerfield	At-Large - Alex Diaz
District 7 - Barnali Ghosh	At-Large - Liza Lutzker
District 8 - Pamela Hyde	At-Large - Frances Ho
Mayor - Hector Malvido	

PUBLIC ADVISORY: THIS MEETING WILL BE CONDUCTED EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH VIDEOCONFERENCE AND TELECONFERENCE

Pursuant to Section 3 of Executive Order N-29-20, issued by Governor Newsom on March 17, 2020, this meeting of the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force will be conducted exclusively through teleconference and Zoom videoconference. Please be advised that pursuant to the Executive Order, and to ensure the health and safety of the public by limiting human contact that could spread the COVID-19 virus, there will not be a physical meeting location available.

To access the meeting remotely using the internet: Join from a PC, Mac, iPad, iPhone, or Android device: Use URL <https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81585065097>. . If you do not wish for your name to appear on the screen, then use the drop down menu and click on "rename" to rename yourself to be anonymous. To request to speak, use the "raise hand" icon on the screen.

To join by phone: Dial **(669) 900 9128** and Enter Meeting ID: **815 8506 5097**. If you wish to comment during the public comment portion of the agenda, press *9 and wait to be recognized by the Chair.

Please be mindful that all other rules of procedure and decorum will apply for Commission meetings conducted by teleconference or videoconference.

AGENDA

Preliminary Matters

1. Roll Call
2. Public Comment (*speakers will be limited to two minutes*)
3. Approval of Minutes
Draft minutes for the Commission's consideration and approval
 - Regular Meeting of April 8, 2021

Discussion/Action Items

The public may comment on each item listed on the agenda for action as the item is taken up. Public comments are limited to two minutes per speaker.

1. Community Survey discussion – David White, Deputy City Manager
Shamika Cole, Analyst
2. Calls for Service Analysis – City Auditor
3. Calls for Service Analysis Framework – NICJR
4. New and Emerging Models of Community Safety Report (NICJR and team)

Adjournment

This meeting will be conducted in accordance with the Brown Act, Government Code Section 54953. Any member of the public may attend this meeting. Questions regarding this matter may be addressed to Mark Numainville, City Clerk, (510) 981-6900.

Any writings or documents provided to a majority of the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force regarding any item on this agenda are on file and available upon request by contacting the City Manager’s Office attn: Reimagining Public Safety Task Force at rpstf@cityofberkeley.info, or may be viewed on the City of Berkeley website: <http://www.cityofberkeley.info/commissions>.

Written communications addressed to the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force and submitted to the City Manager’s Office by 5:00 p.m. the Friday before the meeting will be distributed to members of the Task Force in advance of the meeting. Communications to the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force are public record and will become part of the City’s electronic records, which are accessible through the City’s website. Please note: e-mail addresses, names, addresses, and other contact information are not required, but if included in any communication to the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force, will become part of the public record. If you do not want your e-mail address or any other contact information to be made public, you may deliver communications via U.S. Postal Service to the secretary of the task force. If you do not want your contact information included in the public record, please do not include that information in your communication. Please contact the secretary for further information.



COMMUNICATION ACCESS INFORMATION:

To request a disability-related accommodation(s) to participate in the meeting, including auxiliary aids or services, please contact the Disability Services Specialist at (510) 981-6418 (V) or (510) 981-6347(TDD) at least three business days before the meeting date.

Reimagining Public Safety Task Force Contact Information:

David White and Shamika Cole
Co-Secretaries, Reimagining Public Safety Task Force
City of Berkeley
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Berkeley, CA 94704
rpstf@cityofberkeley.info (email)



Reimagining Public Safety Task Force

REIMAGINING PUBLIC SAFETY TASK FORCE Meeting Minutes

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Roll Call: 6:01 p.m.

Present: Cheema, Dangerfield, Ejigu, Fine, Ghosh, Lindheim, Mizell, Harger, Diaz, Lutzker, Ho

Absent: Walker, Blake, Malvido, Opton, Hyde, Polk

Commissioner Blake present at 6:06 p.m.

Commissioner Opton present at 6:06 p.m.

Commissioner Malvido present at 6:09 p.m.

Commissioner Hyde present at 6:11 p.m.

Commissioner Walker present at 7:51 p.m.

Public Comment on Non-Agenda Matters: 1 speaker

Minutes for Approval

Draft minutes for the Commission's consideration and approval.

Action: M/S/C (Mizell/cheema) to approve the minutes of 3/11/21. Vote: Ayes – Fine, cheema, Dangerfield, Hyde, Harger, Lindheim, Ghosh, Ejigu, Opton, Blake, Malvido, Mizell, Diaz, Lutzker, Ho; Noes – None; Absent – Walker, Polk.

Commission Action Items

1. Special Task Force Meeting Dates (April 29, 2021, *Tentative Dates for discussion: May 19, 2021 and June 30, 2021*)

Action: 2 Speakers. M/S/C (cheema/Mizell) to approve and establish April 29, 2021, May 19, 2021 and June 30, 2021 as Special Meeting dates.

Vote: Ayes - Malvido, Mizell, Opton, Fine, cheema, Ejigu, Lindheim, Blake, Hyde, Diaz, Lutzker, Walker, Harger, Ghosh; Abstain - None; Noes – None; Absent - Dangerfield, Polk, Ho.

2. Subcommittee Discussion

Action: M/S/C (Fine/Mizell) to establish the Community Engagement Subcommittee

Subcommittee Members: Harger, Ejigu, Fine, Blake, Malvido, Lutzker

Vote: Ayes - Malvido, Mizell, Opton, Fine, cheema, Ejigu, Lindheim, Walker, Blake, Hyde, Diaz, Lutzker, Ghosh; Dangerfield, Harger; Abstain - None; Noes – None; Absent - Polk, Ho.

Action: M/S/C (Mizell/Blake) to establish the Policing, Budget and Alternatives to Policing Subcommittee

Subcommittee Members: Dangerfield, Lindheim, cheema, Mizell, Hyde, Harger, Ghosh, Opton

Vote: Ayes - Malvido, Mizell, Opton, Fine, cheema, Ejigu, Lindheim, Walker, Blake, Hyde, Diaz, Lutzker, Ghosh; Dangerfield, Harger; Abstain - None; Noes – None; Absent - Polk, Ho.

Items for Future Agenda

- Community Engagement Survey discussion (continued)
- Subcommittee discussion

Adjournment

Action: M/S/C (cheema/Mizell) to adjourn the meeting.

Vote: All Ayes

Adjourned at 10:16 p.m.

Next Meeting – April 29, 2021.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct record of the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force meeting held on April 8, 2021.

Respectfully Submitted,

David White – Commission Co-Secretary
Shamika Cole – Commission Co-Secretary

Communications

Communications submitted to the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force are on file in the City Manager's Office at 2180 Milvia Street, 5th Floor, Berkeley, CA and are available upon request by contacting the City Manager's Office at (510) 981-7000 or rpstf@cityofberkeley.info.

Análisis de la Respuesta Policial de la Ciudad de Berkeley

Características Destacadas del Reportaje


22 de abril de 2021



Hallazgos

- Desde el año 2015 al año 2019, oficiales de la policía de Berkeley respondieron a un promedio de 72,048 eventos por año.
- Diez tipos de llamadas fueron el 54 por ciento de todos los eventos: parada de vehículo, disturbio, alarma sonora, reportes de ruido excesivo, revisión de seguridad, revisión de salud/bienestar, infracción de estacionamiento, circunstancia sospechosa, infracción de propiedad privada, y robo.

Los 10 Tipos de Llamadas más comunes para eventos, 2015-2019



Fuente: Análisis de datos del sistema de solicitudes de asistencia policial (Computer Aided Dispatch) del departamento de Policía de Berkeley.

- Acciones iniciadas por agentes policiales fueron 27 por ciento de los eventos documentados, mientras 55 por ciento fueron el resultado de llamadas a la línea de no-emergencia y 18 por ciento fueron el resultado de llamadas al número de emergencia (911).
- Encontramos que la mayoría, 78 por ciento, de paradas de tráfico iniciadas por la policía fueron paradas de vehículo, y la mayoría ocurrieron entre las horas de 9:00pm a 12:00am. La mayoría de las paradas de tráfico no resultaron en un cateo, y la mayoría de paradas resultaron en una advertencia.
- Eventos con un nivel de prioridad de 0 a 2, cuales requieren que personal se manden dentro de 20 minutos después de la llamada, fueron 56 por ciento de todos los eventos. Cuarenta y cuatro por ciento de eventos tuvieron un nivel de prioridad

Objetivos

- ¿Cuáles son las características de las llamadas de asistencia a las que responde la policía de Berkeley?
- ¿Cuáles son las características de paradas de tráfico iniciadas por oficiales de la Policía de Berkeley?
- ¿Cuánto tiempo dedican los oficiales de la policía en responder a llamadas de asistencia?
- ¿Cuántas llamadas de asistencia son relacionadas a situaciones de salud mental o la falta de vivienda?
- ¿Puede la Ciudad mejorar la transparencia de llamadas a la policía a través el Portal de Datos Abiertos en línea (Open Data Portal) de la Ciudad de Berkeley?


Por Qué es Importante Esta Auditoría

Debido al asesinato de George Floyd por oficiales de la policía de Minneapolis en mayo 2020, y manifestaciones posteriores en todo el país, se generó una conversación al nivel nacional sobre la actuación y vigilancia policial. El consejo municipal de la Ciudad de Berkeley inició un proceso comunitario robusto para reimaginar la actuación policial en Berkeley, y aprobó una propuesta solicitando el análisis de datos sobre respuestas policiales. Este reportaje ofrece un resumen amplio para la administración y el público en general sobre llamadas de asistencia, paradas de tráfico iniciadas por oficiales de la policía, y la respuesta policial, para informar el conjunto participativo de la comunidad que consta del trabajo para reimaginar la actuación policial en Berkeley.

más bajo, requiriendo que personal fueran mandados dentro de una hora a 90 minutos después de la llamada inicial.

- Reiterando hallazgos previos por el Centro de Actuación Policial Equitativa (Center for Policing Equity), que fueron basados en datos hasta el año 2016, nuestro análisis mostró que la policía paró a gente afroamericana a un nivel significativamente más alto que la representación general de la población (34 por ciento comparado a 8 por ciento), y que fueron más altas las probabilidades de que la policía hiciera una cateo a personas afroamericanas e hispanas durante una parada de tráfico.
- El departamento de policía despachó por promedio a 1.8 agentes policiales por cada evento. En 40 por ciento de eventos, el Centro de Telecomunicación del Departamento de Policía despachó tres o más personal, incluyendo policía y personal no policiales.

Cantidad de respuestas de personal por cada evento, 2015-2019



Fuente: Análisis de datos del sistema de solicitudes de asistencia policial (Computer Aided Dispatch) del departamento de Policía de Berkeley.

- La cantidad de eventos que incluyen situaciones de salud mental o la falta de vivienda, y el tiempo que la policía toma para responder a estos eventos, no es cuantificable debido a falta de datos.
- El Portal de Datos Abiertos en línea (Open Data Portal) de la Ciudad de Berkeley proporciona información limitada al público sobre los eventos a los que responde la policía de Berkeley. Hay oportunidades para que el Departamento de Policía mejore la transparencia al aumentar el tipo y el alcance de los datos disponibles en el portal.



Recomendaciones

Recomendamos que el Departamento de Policía de Berkeley identifique todas las llamadas de asistencia que tengan un componente aparente de salud mental y/o falta de vivienda. También recomendamos que el Departamento de Policía de Berkeley amplíe los datos de llamadas de asistencia disponibles en el Portal de Datos Abiertos de la Ciudad para incluir todos los tipos de llamadas de asistencia, y los otros variables del sistema de solicitudes de asistencia policial, durante tantos años como sea posible. La Gestión de la Ciudad estuvo de acuerdo con nuestros hallazgos, conclusiones, y recomendaciones.

La auditoría no propone recomendaciones con respecto a las actividades policiales o la asignación de personal. Existe un proceso comunitario continuo y separado para reinventar la seguridad pública y la actuación en la Ciudad de Berkeley.



BERKELEY CITY AUDITOR

Traducido por Alejandra Barrio Gorski

Para leer el reportaje completo en inglés, visite:

<http://www.cityofberkeley.info/auditor>

Audit Report
April 22, 2021

Data Analysis of the City of Berkeley's Police Response



BERKELEY CITY AUDITOR



Data Analysis of the City of Berkeley's Police Response

Report Highlights


April 22, 2021



Findings

- From 2015-2019, Berkeley police responded to an average of 72,048 events per year.
- Ten call types accounted for 54 percent of all events: traffic stops, disturbance, audible alarm, noise disturbance, security check, welfare check, parking violation, suspicious circumstance, trespassing, and theft.

Top 10 Most Common Call Types of Events, 2015-2019



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

- Officer-initiated responses were 27 percent of event responses, while 55 percent were the result of calls to the non-emergency line and 18 percent were from 911 calls.
- The majority, 78 percent, of officer-initiated stops were vehicle stops, and most of them occurred between 9:00pm and 12:00am. The majority of vehicle stops did not lead to a search, and most stops led to a warning.
- Events with a priority level of 0 to 2, which require personnel to be dispatched within 20 minutes of the call, made up 56 percent of all events. Forty-four percent were lower priority events and required personnel to be dispatched within an hour to 90 minutes after the initial call.

Objectives

1. What are the characteristics of calls for service to which Berkeley Police respond?
2. What are the characteristics of officer-initiated stops by Berkeley Police?
3. How much time do officers spend responding to calls for service?
4. How many calls for service are related to mental health and homelessness?
5. Can the City improve the transparency of Police Department calls through the City of Berkeley's Open Data Portal?

Why This Audit Is Important

In response to the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police in May 2020 and subsequent protests across the nation, a national conversation ensued about policing. The Berkeley City Council initiated a robust community process to reimagine policing in Berkeley, and passed a proposal requesting analysis of Berkeley's police data. This report is intended to give decision makers and the public a broad overview of calls for service, officer-initiated stops, and police responses and to help inform the community engagement process around reimagining policing in Berkeley.




Recommendations

We recommend that the Berkeley Police Department identify all calls for service that have an apparent mental health and/or homelessness component in a manner that protects the privacy rights of individuals involved. We also recommend that the Berkeley Police Department expand the current calls for service data available on the City's Open Data Portal to include all call types and data fields for as many years as possible. City Management agreed with our recommendations.

The audit does not propose recommendations with regard to police activities or personnel allocations. There is a separate, ongoing community process for reimagining public safety and policing.

- Mirroring prior findings by Center for Policing Equity, which were based on data through 2016, data we reviewed showed that BPD stopped Black people at a significantly higher rate than their representation in the population (34 percent compared to 8 percent), while BPD was most likely to search Black and Hispanic people following a stop.
- On average, Berkeley Police Department dispatched 1.8 patrol officers per event. In 40 percent of events, the Communications Center dispatched three or more personnel, including officers and non-Berkeley Police Department personnel.

Number of Personnel Response per Event, 2015-2019



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

- The number of events that involved homelessness or mental health and the amount of time police spent responding to these events are not quantifiable due to insufficient data.
- The City's Open Data Portal provides the public with limited information about events that Berkeley Police Department responds to. There are opportunities for Berkeley Police Department to improve transparency by increasing the type and scope of data available on the portal.



BERKELEY CITY AUDITOR

For the full report, visit:
<http://www.cityofberkeley.info/auditor>

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I. Introduction

Following the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police in May 2020, a national conversation ensued about policing, race, and the proper level of resources cities should devote to law enforcement in relation to other services and approaches. The Berkeley City Council held several meetings throughout the spring and summer to discuss a variety of proposals related to policing, and hundreds of community members provided input through public comment, phone calls, and emails.

Among the items discussed was a proposal by Councilmember Ben Bartlett to analyze data on police activities in the City of Berkeley and initiate a public process to discuss various potential changes to policing in the City. The City Auditor offered to conduct analysis of police data requested as part of this proposal. Mayor Jesse Arreguín incorporated the call for this analysis into the Safety for All: The George Floyd Community Safety Act, a broader item on policing that City Council passed in July 2020.

In this audit, we present the results of our analysis. It is intended to give decision makers and the public a broad overview of calls for service, officer-initiated stops, and police responses and to help inform the community engagement process around reimagining policing in Berkeley, which is currently underway. It is also intended to provide information to the broader community around events that involve police personnel. This report is the first in a series of audits on policing. Analysis of the police budget is forthcoming.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We answered the following audit objectives, the first three of which were requested in the Safety for All: The George Floyd Community Safety Act:

1. What are the characteristics of calls for service to which Berkeley Police respond?
2. What are the characteristics of officer-initiated stops by Berkeley Police?
3. How much time do officers spend responding to calls for service?
4. How many calls for service are related to mental health and homelessness?
5. Can the City improve the transparency of Police Department calls through the City of Berkeley's Open Data Portal?

We analyzed Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data from 2015 to 2019. The full list of CAD data fields are in Appendix A. We explored various models for categorizing and characterizing data on police activities and consulted a range of stakeholders, including the Berkeley Police Department (BPD), the National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform hired by the City to lead the reimagining policing process, other City departments, community stakeholders, and subject matter experts to inform how we characterized the data. The purpose of this process was to ensure that we presented the data in a way that is as accurate, clear, and as easy to understand as possible.

The audit does not propose recommendations with regard to police activities or personnel allocations. There is a separate, ongoing community process for reimagining public safety and policing. Given the timing of that process and the scope of this report, we did not do an in-depth analysis of alternative policies or approaches to policing. However, we do make recommendations aimed at making data more transparent and available to the public.

The following describes the scope and limitations of data included in this report:

- **Focus on 2015 to 2019 time period.** Given the anomalies in patrol team staffing and other impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, we analyzed data from January 01, 2015 to December 31, 2019.
- **Responses that include sworn BPD officers.** We analyzed data for responses that have at least one sworn BPD officer. Some responses also include other units in addition to sworn BPD officers, such as non-sworn BPD personnel, or non-police personnel from other City departments.
- **Emphasis on patrol officers.** The CAD data source primarily documents responses by patrol officers who are usually the first and primary responders to calls for service. As such, our analysis focuses on the patrol functions of the Berkeley Police Department. There are additional activities within BPD that are not captured in the CAD data and therefore were outside the scope of this audit.
- **Partial snapshot of response from other non-patrol units.** We show data about other units involved in calls, but only if they are documented in CAD. As such, we do not include all calls by these other units, such as the Mobile Crisis Team.
- **Call types are not proof of a crime.** In CAD, dispatchers assign calls for service to a call type based on the nature of the call. In many cases, the assigned call type may reference a certain type of crime. However, assigning calls to these call types does not constitute proof of a crime. Further, any type of call may result in a crime report from the primary BPD officer assigned to the event.
- **Geography not included.** We did not conduct a geographic analysis. Patrol officers are assigned to work in a specific geographical area, called a beat, typically with up to 10 or 11 officers and two sergeants on each patrol team. A deep dive geographic analysis would have required significant additional time and was beyond the scope of our audit.
- **Caller may be from any jurisdiction.** The callers and individuals involved in events may or may not be Berkeley residents.
- **Does not include number of calls received for each event.** This report does not include the number of calls that were made to the Communications Center for each individual event. Data about individual callers is excluded from the report because we did not receive this information in the data. However, we describe the type of call source, such as whether a call came from the emergency line or was initiated by the officer.

For more information on our methodology, see [page 62](#).

II. Background

Organizational Context

Berkeley's City Charter established the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) and its functions, which operate under the direction of the Chief of Police and the administrative direction of the City Manager. According to its website, BPD's mission is to safeguard Berkeley's diverse community through proactive law enforcement and problem solving, treating all people with dignity and respect.¹

BPD's fiscal year 2020 budget includes 285.2 full-time equivalent positions including 181 who are sworn in as law enforcement officers (sworn officers) and another 104.2 professional employees, serving a city of over 120,000 people.

Figure 1. Berkeley Police Department Organization Chart




Source: Berkeley Police Department

BPD personnel that respond to calls for service may be sworn officers or professional personnel, and the latter are also referred to as “non-sworn” or “civilian.” According to BPD Policy 102, sworn officers take or affirm an oath of office expressing commitment and intent to respect constitutional rights in discharging the duties of a law enforcement officer as specified in the California Constitution. The California penal code grants sworn officers the authority to wear a badge, carry firearms, and make arrests in performing their police duties as authorized and under the terms specified by their employing agencies.

¹ Berkeley Police Department Mission, Vision, and Values: https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Police/Home/About_Our_Department.aspx

Event Response Personnel

BPD Patrol Teams. BPD patrol teams are the primary responders dispatched to events. They provide services 24 hours a day, seven days a week. BPD policy states that the function of patrol teams are to respond to calls for service and reports of criminal activity, act as deterrent to crime, enforce state and local laws, identify community needs, provide support and assistance to the community, and respond to emergencies. Patrol officers may also self-dispatch based on their geographic proximity or seriousness of the event depending on priority level.



BPD Communications Center. The call takers and dispatchers working in the BPD Communications Center have the important role of answering emergency and non-emergency calls and dispatching police officers to events. Call takers accept and process inbound 911 and administrative calls for police, fire, and medical services as well as other services such as animal control. They also input call information into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system and transfer the information to fire and police dispatcher staff. Dispatchers coordinate all police-related calls requiring a response from law enforcement and enter all officer-initiated incidents into CAD such as pedestrian and traffic stops. They also maintain radio contact with field staff.

Other Units. Other personnel may be dispatched as needed to support patrol officers responding to an event. Other units can include other BPD personnel such as Area Coordinators, Bike Unit Officers, Parking Enforcement Officers, and Crime Scene Technicians. Other personnel dispatched to support patrol teams may also include non-BPD personnel such as Animal Control, the Mobile Crisis Team, and University of California Officers.² As an example, if the Communications Center receives a call about a situation that involves a person experiencing a mental health crisis, they may dispatch BPD officers and also dispatch the Mobile Crisis Team of non-police mental health professionals from the City's Mental Health Division.

All other units are described in greater detail on [page 45](#).


² While some calls may involve the Berkeley Fire Department, we do not have data on Fire personnel who responded to these BPD events.

³ We conducted this analysis based on data pulled from CAD, but we did not verify the error rate of data in CAD. We did not attempt to match up the thousands of records in the system with other internal and external documents.

Process for Responding to Calls

BPD’s process for responding to events reflects the interactions between community members, the Communications Center, and the responding BPD officers. The response process heavily influences the integrity of the data that informs this report.³ BPD uses a CAD software system to prioritize and record events, track the status and location of officers in the field, and effectively dispatch personnel. It is crucial to remember that the response process involves situations that are evolving and often require fast action before all the information about the situation is known. CAD is not optimized to give responders all the information they need before arriving at the scene. There are several roles responsible for entering data into CAD throughout the response process. We detail the police department’s response process in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. Berkeley Police Department’s Response Process



Note: We did not analyze responses by Berkeley Fire Department, Emergency Medical Services, or other such units that may provide support for BPD patrol officers that were not included in the dataset provided by BPD.

Source: Berkeley City Auditor

Event. In context of this report, “events” refer to situations that are entered in the CAD system that resulted in a response by at least one sworn officer. There are several ways an event is initiated. Community members initiate events by calling the 911 emergency or non-emergency lines, or by flagging down an on-duty officer. Police officers may initiate events on their own. Events are also initiated when an alarm goes off or when CHP transfers a call. It is possible to have multiple incoming calls for one event.

Pre-scene. When someone calls 911 or the non-emergency line, a dispatcher receives the call and collects specific information, such as the address of the event, the possible issue, if there is a weapon, and the people involved to begin dispatching the appropriate personnel to the scene. The initial call taker enters this information into the CAD database. Dispatchers assign a call type and priority, then dispatch officers accordingly. The dispatcher has the ability to enter narrative data at any time to provide ongoing information to the officer regarding the nature of the event.



Information entered into CAD at this stage may not always match the information entered later in the response process. By the time an officer arrives, a burglary may no longer be in progress, a noisy party may have dispersed, or, if the delay between call and response is long enough, the caller may have left the location.

On-scene. Police officers notify a dispatcher when they are on their way to the scene and when they arrive. Due to the changing nature of events, the police officer assigned as the primary unit also collects additional information on scene. The CAD event will be updated as information becomes available by either the officer or dispatcher, however, the call type is final once the officer arrives and a responding officer cannot change the call type in CAD. The evolving situation of a call may lead to a dispatcher assigning additional police or other units to the scene, or officers nearby may self-dispatch to provide backup.

Post-scene. Once the event is closed, the primary officer on scene completes an incident report if required by the severity of the event, and updates the CAD file with any new information. Those reports are submitted to the patrol shift supervisor and either approved or revised. Typical revisions include clarifying dates, police codes, or providing additional details. According to BPD, disposition codes are most often entered by an officer. However, an officer may also radio into the Communications Center about the event and a dispatcher will enter disposition information.

Quality control. Each day, a records clerk reviews the BPD Communications Center reports for clarity and completeness. This includes verifying call codes, addressing typos, confirming addresses using Global Positioning System (GPS), and identifying where there may be missing information. Once the record has met their quality control requirements, the call is uploaded into the separate Law Enforcement Records Management System (LERMS) where it is stored along with the raw CAD file from the call.

Assigned Call Types

Dispatchers at the BPD Communications Center assign each event a call type that describes important information about the events unless the event is officer-initiated. BPD uses many call types. Some describe a potential crime (e.g., robbery, assault, gambling), while others describe the location (e.g., fall on city property), people involved (e.g., missing juvenile), or a situation that may not be related to crime (e.g., welfare check, vehicle stop). In addition, the Communications Center uses call types in order to assign priorities and resources to the event, as discussed further in the section on priority levels. Call types for events are assigned prior to arrival of BPD staff, and they may differ from the actual event that took place after the event has concluded.

Call Type Classifications

According to the data, BPD used 138 unique call types. We consolidated these call types into nine descriptive categories for reporting purposes. Similar call type classifications have been used to organize call for service data for reporting purposes in similar jurisdictions such as Portland,⁴ Austin,⁵ and Oakland.⁶ Building on these efforts, we organized BPD's call types into categories through input from external subject matter experts, the BPD Communications Center, and BPD officers with relevant experience (Table 1).

The City Auditor call type classifications are descriptive. They do not, by themselves, imply a recommended policy change. Further, assigned call types under the crime classifications may not necessarily mean a crime has taken place. Each specific call type within each classification is listed at the end of the report under Appendix G. For more information on the methodology used to classify call types, see [page 63](#).

⁴ City of Portland Police Bureau, "Introduction to Calls for Service," <https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/676725>

⁵ AH Datalytics, "Assessment of Austin Police Department Calls for Service," <https://austinjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Analysis-of-Austin-Police-Department-Calls-for-Service-3.pdf>

⁶ Center for Public Safety Management. "Police Data Analysis Report," <https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CPSM-Oakland-CFS-Report-Dec-2020.pdf>

Table 1. Description of City Auditor Call Type Classifications

Classification	Description
Violent Crimes (FBI Part I Crimes)	Events that fall into the definition of Part I crimes by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program that are crimes against a person. The FBI UCR program defines these crimes as criminal homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Only assaults specifically identified as aggravated are included as a Part I offense.
Property Crimes (FBI Part I Crimes)	Events that fall into the definition of Part I crimes by the FBI UCR Report that are property crimes. These include arson, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny theft. This does not include theft by fraud, forgery, or embezzlement.
FBI Part II Crimes	FBI Part II crimes include all other crimes that are not included as Part I crimes. While some of these crimes are very serious, including kidnapping and child molestation, the majority of these crimes are crimes such as disturbing the peace and trespassing, which in some cases may be infractions and not actually criminal.
Community	<p>Calls that assist the community in managing events that pose a potential threat to safety or public order. They are most often not initiated by an officer. These include but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil matters where police presence is requested to ensure the situation does not escalate (e.g., advice, extra surveillance, civil standby). • Calls related to disturbances or other problems that result in a police response to assess and resolve the situation. • Contacts with the community, such as aid to citizen.
Medical or Mental health	Events primarily related to medical assistance to the community. They may involve a dispatch from Emergency Medical Services (EMS) for added support.
Traffic	Events that typically involve enforcement of traffic and parking laws, and management of traffic flows. In addition, these calls may involve events pertaining to vehicles, such as collisions or road hazards. This classification also includes pedestrian, bike, suspicious vehicle, and vehicle stops.
Informational or Administrative	Calls that are non-investigative assistance or administrative in nature, such as property damage or information.
Investigative or Operational	Calls that require investigative or operational input, such as a wireless 911 call or outside agency assist.
Alarm	Calls initiated by the activation of an audible, silent, duress, and/or monitored alarm of a vehicle, residence, business, or other premise. Example alarms include audible alarm, GPS tracker alarm, silent alarm, Pronet (bank) alarm, or video alarm.

Note: These are the events classified by call types, not the final report or crime.

Source: Berkeley City Auditor

III. Characteristics of Events

Analysis of 360,242 events from 2015-2019

This section offers an overview of the events in the City of Berkeley that resulted in a police response from 2015 to 2019. In context of this report, “events” refer to situations that are entered into the CAD system that resulted in a response by at least one sworn officer. We present information about the characteristics of events in Berkeley, including the frequency of events over time, types of events, how events are initiated, priority level, outcomes, and events that result in crime reports. The figures in this section draw from a sample of 360,242 events within the CAD files we obtained from BPD.

The City has averaged 72,048 events per year, and more occurred during summer months and on Friday and Saturday evenings. This report classifies most of those events, 73 percent, as Traffic, Community, and FBI Part II Crimes and those events have consistently been the majority from 2015 to 2019. Community and FBI Part II Crime events were mostly initiated by calls to the non-emergency line, and the non-emergency line accounted for 55 percent of the initiation calls. These most frequent call types include traffic stop, disturbance, and audible alarms. The most frequent officer-initiated events include traffic stop, security check, and pedestrian stop. While only six percent of events resulted in a Part I UCR crime report linked to a CAD event, larceny theft was by far the most common Part I UCR crime reported to the FBI. Audible alarms were the call type that resulted in the most arrests.

The characteristics of events shape the priority and extent of BPD's response. For instance, the number of officers that are available to respond to the call varies depending on the location, time of day and day of the week. Events vary in complexity, and can include anything from a request for a security check to a report of a serious crime. Characteristics such as the severity of the situation and number of people involved also influence the priority level and the number of officers dispatched, along with their sense of urgency about the situation. Additionally, the assigned call type for the events in this report may not necessarily be the actual event outcome since call types are assigned prior to personnel arriving on scene.


We review the following components related to events:

1. Overall Event Frequency
2. Events by Time and Day of the Week
3. Events by Call Type Classification
4. Event Initiation Source
5. Assigned Call Type
6. Priority Levels
7. Events that Result in an Arrest
8. Events that Result in a UCR Part I Report

Overall Event Frequency

Figure 3 demonstrates the total number of events in the City on a monthly basis, from January 2015 to December of 2019, in order to show seasonal changes in the frequency of events over time.

Figure 3. Events Captured in CAD by Month, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

The number of events for the City of Berkeley has hovered around an average of 72,048 events per year. The trend line indicates that more events occur in the summer, while events decline during the winter. In addition, the data show a notable decline in events in 2018. This drop in events is reflected in other time series throughout this report. We did not investigate the reason for the drop in the calls as this extended beyond the scope of analysis for this audit.

Events by Time and Day of the Week

Figure 4 shows all of the events from 2015 to 2019 in which the Communications Center created a CAD event to demonstrate the frequency of events by the time of day and day of week. The chart is organized by the time of day on the bottom (x axis) and the day of the week on the left side (y axis). The blue color reflects fewer events, while a deeper red reflects more events. The largest number of events occur on Friday and Saturday evenings with a spike between the hours of 9:00 and 10:00 at night. The majority of weekday events (Monday-Thursday) with a police response occur between the hours of 8:00 in the morning and 6:00 at night.

Figure 4. Number of Events by Time and Day of Week, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Events by Call Type Classification

In this section, we present events grouped by classification. We describe call types related to mental health and homelessness in more depth in section VI. Appendix G provides the full list of call types and their corresponding classifications.

Figure 5 shows the frequency of events organized by classification as discussed on [page 12](#). Note that while many crime call types fall within Part II crimes, the majority, or 60 percent, of the events are either disturbance or trespassing.


Figure 5. Events by City Auditor Classifications, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 6 shows the number of events that fall into each call type classification over the years. The figure demonstrates whether there have been changes in some of the call type classifications over the years. It is important to note that the BPD has the authority to add or eliminate call types. The removal or addition of call types can be a contributing factor in the increase or decrease of call types in the data. We did not assess the impacts of changing call types as this extended beyond the scope of analysis for this audit.

Figure 6. Events by City Auditor Classification and Year, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Event Initiation Source

As discussed in Section II, multiple callers may call in to the Communications Center to report an event. The data does not indicate the number of calls received by the Communications Center to report an event. However, according to BPD, dispatchers can add additional information from multiple callers to one CAD event record. If more than one CAD record is created for one event, the records will be merged into one record retaining all information. The CAD data we received does include the source of information that led to the event being created. Figure 7 breaks down the share of callers by three main categories: the emergency line, non-emergency line, officer- initiated, and other.

Figure 7. Initiation Source of Events, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)




Note: "Other" includes: some alarm calls, some cell phones, California Highway Patrol, Counter, OnLine, and Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Officer-initiated includes On View and traffic stops.

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 8 shows the initiation source for each of the call type classifications. The majority of traffic stops are officer-initiated. The Traffic classification includes call types in addition to stops, such as parking violations and traffic hazards.

Figure 8. Initiation Source of Events by City Auditor Classifications, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)




Note: Less than 1 percent of calls also come from an “other” source which includes: some alarm calls, some cell calls, California Highway Patrol, Counter, OnLine, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and Other. Officer-initiated includes On View and Traffic stops.

Source: Auditor’s analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 9 shows the initiation source for calls over a five year period. It reflects the consistent trend that the non-emergency line is by far the top initiation source, followed by officer-initiated, emergency line, and other.

Figure 9. Initiation Source of Events by Month, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Assigned Call Types

Figure 10 shows the ten most common call types, which describe about 54 percent of all events. This table includes data for both events initiated by calls to the Communications Center and officer-initiated events.

Figure 10. Top 10 Most Common Call Types of Events, 2015-2019 (n = 193,260 out of 360,242 events)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Table 2 breaks out the top calls by initiation source.

Table 2. Top 10 Call Types of Events for Officer-Initiated and Phone Lines, 2015-2019

Total Emergency and Non-Emergency Events		Total Officer-Initiated Events	
1. 415 - Disturbance	35,145	1. T - Traffic Stop	44,767
2. 1033A - Audible Alarm	19,812	2. SEC - Security Check	14,933
3. 415E - Noise Disturbance	15,699	3. 1194 - Pedestrian Stop	9,135
4. 1042 - Welfare Check	14,560	4. FLAD - Officer flagged down	5,183
5. SUSCIR - Suspicious Circumstance	11,380	5. PRKVIO - Parking Violation	4,710
6. 602L - Trespassing	10,926	6. 1196 - Suspicious Vehicle	4,347
7. 484 - Theft	10,277	7. 1194B - Bike Stop	2,782
8. W911 - Wireless 911	9,898	8. 1124 - Abandoned Vehicle	1,007
9. PRKVIO - Parking Violation	8,902	9. AID - Aid to Citizen	550
10. ADVICE - Advice	8,383	10. FOUND - Found Property	531

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Priority Levels

Dispatchers are responsible for collecting adequate information in order to determine the appropriate response action based on the nature and priority of the event, and the available resources. Dispatchers assign all events a priority level which aligns with guidelines for how soon the Communications Center should dispatch police personnel to the event based on the urgency or severity of the circumstances. For an event with a priority level of one, dispatchers are expected to dispatch officers within one minute, whereas they have up to 90 minutes from the time of the initial call to dispatch an officer to a priority level four event.

According to BPD, priority levels are one of several factors that inform the number of personnel that are dispatched to an event. Other factors include call types, officer's proximity to the event, and officer's discretion. BPD authorities stated that dispatchers have the authority to dispatch officers to events, but they do not play a role in reducing or diverting officers from responding to an event.

Priority levels range in urgency from Priority 1 as the most urgent to Priority 9 as the least. Priority 0 is used when officers initiate a stop and they are already on scene. Priority levels 4 through 9 each have the same time frame of 90 minutes, but the additional levels allow dispatchers to prioritize resources among lower level calls. Table 3 lists all the priority levels and corresponding dispatch times.

Table 3. Priority Level Guidelines for Time Between Initial Call and Dispatching Units⁷

Priority Level	Time
0	0 Minutes
1, 1F	Immediately
2	Within 20 minutes
3	Within 60 minutes
4	Within 90 minutes
5	Within 90 minutes
6	Within 90 minutes
9	Within 90 minutes


Source: Berkeley Police Department

⁷Priority level 1F indicates an event with a fire and that Berkeley Fire Department personnel were dispatched as well.

Priority level recommendations are coded into the CAD system based on call types, but a dispatcher can change the priority if there is reason to based on the information they have. For example, a dispatcher may assign a family disturbance event as a priority level 1 or 2 depending on the circumstances and their professional judgement. Additionally, dispatchers' assessment of priorities can diverge from the guidelines due to additional information gathered about the event. For instance, in their list of call types and priority codes, BPD lists disturbance with a typical assignment of priority one or priority four. Nevertheless, disturbance is listed in the CAD data with call types ranging from 0, F1, 1, 2, to 3. Appendix B provides a list of priorities for each call type as they appear in the data.

Figure 11 breaks down events by the assigned priority level.


Figure 11. Events by Priority Level, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 12 shows a breakdown of events by classification and priority level.

Figure 12. Events by Auditor Classifications and Priority Level, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)



Note: Priorities that rounded to 0% of each category (0.4% or less) were excluded from the chart for readability.

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Events that Result in an Arrest

Table 4 shows the top ten call types and how many arrests were made for each of those call types from 2015 to 2019, but does not include all arrests BPD made during this time. CAD data only records arrests made during the event, but arrests can take place after dispatchers close the event. An event like a robbery, for example, could result in no arrest during the event, but lead to an arrest several days later. That arrest would be recorded in the Law Enforcement Records Management System, but is not included in the CAD data we received.

Table 4. Top 10 Call Types of Events and Arrest Outcomes, 2015-2019

Call Types	Arrests	Total Events	Arrests (% of Total)
1. T - Traffic Stop	1,259	44,797	2.8%
2. 415 - Disturbance	529	35,697	1.5%
3. 1033A - Audible Alarm	2,581	19,921	13.0%
4. 415E - Noise Disturbance	12	15,773	0.1%
5. SEC - Security Check	212	15,268	1.4%
6. 1042 - Welfare Check	122	15,030	0.8%
7. PRKVIO - Parking Violation	5	13,613	0.0%
8. SUSCIR - Suspicious Circumstance	157	11,547	1.4%
9. 602L - Trespassing	123	11,058	1.1%
10. 484 - Theft	101	10,556	1.0%

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Events that Result in a UCR Part I Report: Violent and Property Crimes

In this section, we present data on events that result in a report of certain violent or property crimes.

BPD officers are required to file a report when events involve certain violent and property crimes. BPD tracks a set of crimes, known as Part I crimes, through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, which is separate from the CAD system. The Federal Bureau of Investigation developed the UCR Program to standardize how law enforcement agencies categorize and count crimes, and report crime statistics. BPD analyzes the relevant crime data and provides statistical reports to the California Department of Justice to be included in state and national crime data.

We received data on some events that resulted in a Part I crime report. UCR orders Part I crimes from most severe to least severe, with criminal homicide being the highest in the hierarchy and arson being the lowest. Part I UCR crimes are listed below:

1. Criminal Homicide
2. Forcible Rape
3. Robbery
4. Aggravated Assault
5. Burglary
6. Larceny-theft (except motor vehicle theft)
7. Motor Vehicle Theft
8. Arson


Additionally, there were 26 events that resulted in the reporting of hate crimes between 2015 and 2019. UCR standards require participating law enforcement agencies to report hate crimes as separate from and additional to the crimes listed above. According to the UCR handbook, hate crimes are not distinct crimes, but are traditional crimes motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnic or national origin group. Consequently, BPD collects hate crime data by capturing additional information about crimes they already report to the UCR program.

The CAD data does not include all the Part I UCR crime reports BPD filed because not all instances of these crimes took place during an event or involved dispatching police personnel. Further, an event classified as a Part I crime in CAD does not necessarily mean that a crime was ultimately charged or committed.

Altogether, from 2015 to 2019, a total of six percent of events in CAD with a police response resulted in a Part I UCR crime report. As of this writing, we do not have detailed information on Part II crime reports as this information was not available to us.

Figure 13 shows the number of events in CAD that resulted in a Part I UCR crime report from 2015 to 2019.

Figure 13. CAD Events with a Part I Crime Report, 2015-2019 (n = 21,544 out of 360,242 events)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Table 5 shows how the Part I UCR crime reports from 2015 to 2019 are classified for the purposes of this report.

Table 5. Auditor Classification of Events that Resulted in a UCR Part I Crime Report, 2015-2019 (n = 360,242 events)

Auditor Classification	Number of UCR Reports Filed	Total Events	UCR Reports Filed as % of Total Events
Property Crime (FBI Part I Crimes)	16,413	26,421	62%
Community	1,594	88,128	2%
FBI Part II Crimes	1,588	77,822	2%
Violent Crime (FBI Part I Crimes)	1,469	2,465	60%
Alarm	245	21,318	1%
Traffic	105	98,503	0.1%
Investigative or Operational	82	10,351	1%
Medical or Mental Health	59	22,797	0.3%
Information or Administrative	20	12,437	0.2%

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Table 6 shows how many of the top ten call types in CAD resulted in a Part I UCR crime report, from 2015 to 2019.

Table 6. Top 10 Call Types of Events that Resulted in a UCR Part I Crime Report, 2015-2019

Call Type	Number of UCR Reports Filed	Total Events	UCR Reports Filed as % of Total Events
1. T - Traffic Stop	11	44,797	0.02%
2. 415 - Disturbance	211	35,697	0.6%
3. 1033A - Audible Alarm	227	19,921	1.1%
4. 415E - Noise Disturbance	4	15,773	0.03%
5. SEC - Security Check	33	15,268	0.2%
6. 1042 - Welfare Check	40	15,030	0.3%
7. PRKVIO - Parking Violation	1	13,613	0.01%
8. SUSCIR - Suspicious Circumstance	751	11,547	6.5%
9. 602L - Trespassing	21	11,058	0.2%
10. 484 - Theft	5,241	10,556	49.6%

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

IV. Characteristics of Officer-Initiated Stops

Analysis of 56,070 officer-initiated stops from 2015 to 2019

In this section, we provide an overview of the data we obtained on officer-initiated stops including the types of stops police make, stop trends over time, and stops that result in enforcement or searches. We also breakdown some of this information by race and age. In the context of this report, the number of officer-initiated stops refers to the number of individuals detained by BPD. This means that there could be more than one individual stopped per CAD event. For example, if an officer initiates a vehicle stop and detains two individuals, this is counted as one event with two stops.

We review the following components related to stops:

1. Officer-initiated stops by stop type
2. Time of day when stops occur
3. Dispositions, including:
 - a. Stops by race and age
 - b. Enforcement outcomes
 - c. Searches

State law authorizes Berkeley police officers to enforce state and local traffic laws to promote public safety. Officers enforce traffic laws by stopping drivers who may be violating traffic laws. Pedestrians and cyclists may also be stopped. Officers are required to record the results of all stops. In this report, we refer to these events as officer-initiated suspicious vehicle stops, vehicle stops, pedestrian stops, or bicycle stops.⁸ All Berkeley police officers, whether assigned to the Traffic Bureau or not, are directed to participate in traffic enforcement and to be on the lookout for speeding, pedestrian safety concerns, and drivers under the influence.

Our stop analysis is the most recent effort to analyze police stop data in the City of Berkeley, but another organization also examined police stop data.⁹ In 2015, BPD contracted with the Center for Policing Equity (CPE) to conduct an analysis of Berkeley's police stop data. Their analysis covered an observation period of 2012 through 2016.

⁸ According to BPD, vehicle stops are different from suspicious vehicle stops. Vehicle stops can include stops for traffic violation enforcement or investigation of suspected criminal activity, and are initiated by officers. A suspicious vehicle stop is similar, but is typically dispatched by the Communications Center in response to a call for service.

⁹ According to its website, the Center for Policing Equity is a nonprofit organization that “produces analyses identifying and reducing the causes of racial disparities in public safety and advocates for large-scale and meaningful change.”


All of the charts in this section reflect officer-initiated stops for a total of 56,070 individuals from 2015 to 2019. A significant portion of information about stops draws from disposition reports submitted by officers and other traffic enforcement units. These disposition reports summarize information including race, sex, and age of the individuals involved in the event, the reason for the stop, the enforcement action, and whether or not BPD conducted a search. As such, this section does not include information for 4,961 stops that did not have accompanying disposition data. We did not determine the methods BPD typically uses to determine individuals' race, sex, or age as that was outside the scope of our audit.

While the time period we analyzed overlaps and extends beyond the time period examined by CPE, our analysis uncovered a number of the same general patterns in stops, searches, and dispositions.

We found that the majority, 78 percent, of officer-initiated stops were vehicle stops, and most of them occurred between 9:00pm and 12:00am. The majority of vehicle stops did not lead to a search, and most stops led to a warning.

With regard to race, our data mirrored data by CPE in that BPD stopped Black and Hispanic individuals at higher rates than their representation in the population, Black individuals significantly so. BPD stopped White and Asian individuals at lower rates. We did not conduct an analysis regarding how this data should be interpreted, but simply note that these patterns are consistent with what CPE found in the data they examined.

Figure 14. Race and Officer-Initiated Stops



Note: For the purposes of this figure for Berkeley populations, the U.S. Census categories of American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone, and Two or More Races are summed for Other; White is White alone, not Hispanic or Latino.


Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data and 2019 US Census data

Further, like CPE, we found that Black and Hispanic individuals are more likely to be searched after being stopped, yet searches of these groups are less likely to result in an arrest than searches of White and Asian individuals. However, we did not do a full comparative analysis between the data set that is the subject of this report and the data reviewed by CPE because it was outside the scope of this overview report. More data on stops and searches are included in the following sections and in Appendix C and D.

Overall Stops

Figure 15 shows the percentage of different types of officer-initiated stops from 2015 to 2019.¹⁰

Figure 15. Officer-Initiated Stops by Type of Stop, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)




Note: Figures 14 to 29 do not include information for 4,961 stops that did not have accompanying disposition data.

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

¹⁰ According to BPD, vehicle stops are different from suspicious vehicle stops. Vehicle stops can include stops for traffic violation enforcement or investigation of suspected criminal activity, and are initiated by officers. A suspicious vehicle stop is similar, but is typically dispatched by the Communications Center in response to a call for service.

Figure 16 shows the number of any type of officer-initiated stop from 2015 to 2019. Because officers initiate stops, the number of stops they make depends largely on their availability. If an officer is busy responding to a high number of community-initiated calls, they are less likely to proactively initiate stops.

Figure 16. Officer-Initiated Stops by Month, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Stops by Time of Day

Figure 17 is a heat map that adds up all of the events from 2015 to 2019, based on the time in which an officer initiated a stop. The chart is organized by the time of day on the bottom (x axis) and the type of stop conducted on the left (y axis). The colors in each row represent the number of stops as a percentage of all stops for each category. The blue color reflects fewer events, while a deeper red reflects more events.

Figure 17. Officer-Initiated Stops by Time of Day as a Percentage of Each Stop Type, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Stop Dispositions

BPD tracks information about stop dispositions. This information includes the officer reported race, sex, and age of the individuals involved in the event, the reason for the stop, the enforcement action, and whether or not BPD conducted a search. BPD's General Order B-4 required officers to provide stop disposition data after making any stop during the audit period of 2015 to 2019.

In 2015, the California legislature passed the Racial and Identity Profiling Act (RIPA) which supersedes General Order B-4. The goal of RIPA is to have more robust and reliable data to understand the demographics of those stopped by the police in California. RIPA requires law enforcement agencies to collect additional information about stop dispositions including contraband or evidence recovered during the stop, basis of a search if conducted, actions taken during the stop, and officer years of experience and assignment. While BPD stated that these requirements were mandated to start in 2022, BPD started collecting the data required by RIPA in October 2020. According to BPD and the City's Department of Information Technology, officers do not collect personally identifying information as part of meeting RIPA requirements.

All the stop disposition data presented in this report was reported under the guidelines of General Order B-4 and before BPD implemented RIPA.


Stops by Race and Age

In this section, we present an overview of officer-initiated stops by race and age. BPD records demographic information for people stopped by the police, including their race, sex, and age. Until October 2020, officers used a six-digit disposition code to record information on the race, sex, and age of the person or people involved in stops, as well as the type of stop, the outcome, and if the officer performed a search. In October 2020, the BPD transitioned to collecting stop data in accordance with the RIPA using an app installed on each officer's City-issued smart phone.¹¹ Officers are now required to collect the same information as the disposition code used previously and additional information on the stop.

¹¹ Memo to City Council, October 13, 2020, https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Clerk/Level_3_-_General/RIPA%20data%20101320.pdf

Figure 18 shows the percentage and number of stops by race from 2015 to 2019. BPD uses five groups to document the race of people involved in stops: Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, and Other.


Figure 18. Officer-Initiated Stops by Race, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 19 shows stops by age and race from 2015 to 2019.


Figure 19. Officer-Initiated Stops by Race and Age, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 20 shows the distribution by race within each type of stop from 2015 to 2019.


Figure 20. Type of Officer-Initiated Stops by Race, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 21 shows the monthly distribution for all types of stops by race from 2015 to 2019.

Figure 21. Officer-Initiated Stops by Race and Month, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Enforcement

Officer-initiated stops sometimes result in enforcement outcomes. The four possible enforcement actions are arrest, citation, warning, and no enforcement. BPD's General Order T-03 guides how officers are expected to use enforcement, including when to provide a verbal warning or a citation, in accordance with the California Vehicle Code. The general order directs officers to use their professional judgement in deciding whether to issue a warning instead of a citation. It also directs officers to issue a correctable citation for certain violations such as equipment or registration. Additionally, the general order directs officers to interact with the individuals and observe if there are signs of intoxication, visible guns, open alcohol containers or drugs, or other indicators of a crime.

Figure 22 shows the breakdown of types of enforcement actions of arrest, citation, warning, and no enforcement. It also includes the total number of no enforcement action from the stop.


Figure 22. Enforcement Actions of Officer-Initiated Stops, 2015- 2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 23 shows the number of enforcement actions, broken down by type of enforcement and stop, from 2015 to 2019.


Figure 23. Enforcement Actions of Officer-Initiated Stops by Stop Type, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 24 shows the number of stops by enforcement action and month from 2015 to 2019.


Figure 24. Enforcement Actions of Officer-Initiated Stops by Month, 2015-2019 (n= 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 25 shows the stop enforcement actions by race from 2015 to 2019.

Figure 25. Enforcement Actions of Officer-Initiated Stops by Race, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data


Searches

The following section provides information on whether BPD conducted a search during vehicle, bike, suspicious vehicle, or pedestrian stops. We break down all types of searches and resulting enforcement actions by race.

The stop disposition data during the 2015 to 2019 audit period did not include information on whether the officer asked for consent to search the person, and if so, whether the individual gave consent. The data also does not indicate the basis for the search, nor the type of contraband or evidence that was recovered, if any.

Figure 26 shows individuals stopped by type and search outcome from 2015 to 2019. Out of 56,070 stops, 8,965 (16 percent) result in a search.


Figure 26. Searches Resulting from Officer-Initiated Stops by Stop Type, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 27 shows stops by search outcome by month from 2015-2019.


Figure 27. Searches Resulting from Officer-Initiated Stops by Month, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 28 shows stops by search outcome and race from 2015 to 2019.


Figure 28. Searches Resulting from Officer-Initiated Stops by Race, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 29 shows searches and resulting enforcement outcomes by race from 2015 to 2019.

Figure 29. Enforcement Outcomes of Searches Resulting from Officer-Initiated Stops by Race, 2015-2019 (n = 56,070 individuals stopped)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

V. Characteristics of Police Response

Analysis of 646,958 responses from BPD sworn officers and other units

This section presents an overview of data about personnel that responded to events. Personnel dispatched to respond to events can include non-police personnel in addition to BPD personnel. All events in this CAD analysis include a response by at least one BPD sworn officer, though the Communications Center can also dispatch additional non-police personnel to certain events as needed. BPD Communications Center staff also play an important role in how BPD responds to events.

We review the following components related to police response:

1. Response by personnel unit type
2. Number of personnel responding to events
3. Personnel time spent responding to events

Patrol officers represented 82 percent, or most of the personnel that responded to events, and personnel from other units accounted for 5 percent of total personnel that responded to events. Parking enforcement officers and bike units accounted for over half of the personnel responses from other units. On average, BPD dispatched 1.8 patrol officers per event. The majority of personnel time, 71 percent, is spent responding to events classified as Community, FBI Part II Crimes, and Traffic. The data, which includes the classification or call type assigned to the event prior to BPD arriving at the event, may not reflect the actual event that takes place.

Primary BPD Response Personnel

Our analysis primarily reflects work conducted by the Communications Center and patrol teams to respond to events in the Berkeley community, with some information about additional supportive units. We provide a summary of each of these units below.


Patrol Teams. The Berkeley Police Department provides patrol services 24 hours a day, seven days a week. These teams of sworn officers are usually the first and primary responders to calls for service. According to BPD's Policy 400, the function of a patrol team is to respond to calls for assistance and reports of criminal activity, act as deterrent to crime, enforce state and local laws, identify community needs, provide support and assistance to the community, and respond to emergencies. Their duties may also include directing traffic, providing mutual aid, and responding to calls for help. The police responses tracked in the CAD data are largely from patrol teams and their supervisors.¹²

¹² Patrol teams may include reserve officers who serve in a part-time capacity, and supplement and assist regular sworn police officers in their duties. Reserve officers can be dispatched to similar assignments as full-time patrol officers with the exception of some felonies and more serious offenses and are required to get patrol sergeant approval when making arrests.

Communications Center. The Communications Center is part of the Support Services Division of the Berkeley Police Department, overseen by a sworn police captain. The Communications Center serves as Berkeley's 911 public safety answering point, receiving all emergency and non-emergency police, fire, and medical calls in the City, and dispatching public safety personnel to respond as appropriate. The Communications Center is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year by a team of dispatchers. Dispatchers are highly trained professionals, who gather essential information from callers and dispatch the appropriate response team to the scene. They take control of situations that may be chaotic, stressful, confusing, and traumatic. Dispatchers are often described as "first responders" as they make primary contact with the person reporting the emergency. As described in Section II, the Communications Center is integral in directing and characterizing these responses. For more information about the Communications Center, see [911 Dispatchers: Understaffing Leads to Excessive Overtime and Low Morale](#), which the City Auditor's office released in 2019.

Other personnel units. A small portion of the data involves BPD personnel in units other than patrol teams that responded to events, as well as personnel from other city departments outside of BPD. Our data set did not include personnel dispatched from the Berkeley Fire Department, which may respond to an event that includes a BPD personnel. Other units may include the personnel described in the following sections.

Figure 30. Percentage of Personnel Responses by Type of Unit, 2015-2019 (n = 646,958 responses)



Note: The category with 527,556 patrol officer responses includes 3,105 reserve officer responses. Patrol supervisors include sergeants, lieutenants, and captains.

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Other BPD Response Personnel – Sworn Officers

In addition to patrol officers, BPD employs a core group of individuals who are sworn in as law enforcement officers. State law grants sworn officers the authority to enforce the law, including traffic law. According to BPD, no other personnel are granted the same authority at this time. The following sworn positions responded to events:

Area Coordinators. Area Coordinators are within the Community Services Bureau. These are officers on a special assignment in this unit. The Area Coordinators act as liaisons to the patrol officers in their assigned area and collaborate with other city departments or community organizations to solve long-term problems.

Bike Unit. Bike Unit personnel are officers on special assignment who travel by bike. They work in a focused geographical area and initiate stops related to their work, but they often self-dispatch to support patrol officers.

Special Enforcement. Special Enforcement officers are officers focused on detecting, apprehending, and prosecuting persons engaged in narcotics, vice, and organized crime. This Special Enforcement Unit was established in 2000 and most recently operated under investigations. BPD disbanded the drug taskforce within the Special Enforcement Unit in 2016.

Motor Unit. Motor unit officers operate within the Traffic Enforcement function of the Traffic Bureau. BPD staffs four motor officers who manage, investigate, and report on traffic-related events such as towed vehicles or collisions. The motor unit additionally supports the car seat education and installation program for the Berkeley Traffic Bureau.

Sworn, non-patrol officers. Some officers dispatched to events are sworn officers who are not assigned to patrol teams, such as when they are assigned to investigations or special assignments when they respond to a call.

Other BPD Response Personnel – Professional Personnel

In addition to patrol officers and other sworn personnel, BPD employs individuals who are non-sworn. The following non-sworn positions responded to events:

Community Service Officers. Community Service Officers (CSO) are specialized professionals performing a wide variety of technical support duties in the department. CSOs work most often in Berkeley City Jail, evidence, and investigations. According to BPD, while CSOs rarely appear in the CAD data, they may appear in cases when they need assistance from BPD officers in the jail.

Crime Scene Technician. Crime Scene Technicians are part of the Crime Scene Unit/Investigation, and are CSOs. The Crime Scene Supervisor oversees four Crime Scene Investigators who collect and document evidence at crime scenes. Crime Scene Technicians support patrol officers of all ranks and all detectives with searches for evidence but are ultimately responsible for managing evidence in major or complex crimes.

Parking Enforcement Officers. Parking Enforcement Officers operate within the Parking Enforcement Unit of the Traffic Bureau. Parking Enforcement Officers enforce local and state parking laws and regulations. Their functions include responding to parking issues as reported by the community, working traffic control posts during police incidents, and helping to manage traffic and parking at special events, such as the 4th of July, the Solano Stroll, and UC Football games. Berkeley Municipal Code authorizes non-sworn parking enforcement officers to issue citations for violations of state and local parking laws, but not traffic violations.

Non-BPD Response Personnel

University of California Officers. BPD dispatches these officers when they are partnered with a BPD officer as part of a special program in which BPD has the lead.


Animal Control. Animal Control are members of the City of Berkeley Animal Care Services. They are responsible for enforcement of city ordinances related to animals, removal of killed or injured animals, impoundment of stray pets, and investigation of animal-related neglect, cruelty, nuisance, and bite cases.

Mobile Crisis Team. The Mobile Crisis Team (Mobile Crisis) are staff in the City's Mental Health Division who may accompany BPD officers to calls related to individuals experiencing a mental health crisis. This team aims to reduce the impact of mental health emergencies through immediate response to crisis situations at the street-level and through coordination and consultation with local public safety organizations, hospitals, and other community groups.

Response to Events

Figure 31 shows the number of other personnel units that responded to events from 2015 to 2019. For example, BPD dispatched patrol officers to respond to events 527,556 times during this time period with multiple officers being dispatched to some events. Patrol officers include eight patrol teams and reserve officers. Supervisors include police sergeants, lieutenants, and captains. Other units include Animal Control, Area Coordinators, Bike Unit, Crime Scene Techs, Community Service Officers, Dispatchers, Mobile Crisis Team, Parking Enforcement Officers, Police Aides, Special Enforcement, Traffic Bureau, and University of California officers.

Figure 31. Responses to Events by Other Units, 2015-2019 (n = 33,300 out of 646,958 personnel)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

The number of personnel who respond to an event varies depending on the call type. Table 7 shows the average number of personnel who responded to an event by the most frequent call types. Appendix G provides the average personnel responses for all call types.


Table 7. Top 10 Call Types of Events by Personnel Response, 2015-2019 (n = 646,958 responses)

Call Type	Average Personnel Responses per Event	Total Number of Personnel Dispatched
1. T - Traffic Stop	2	70,192
2. 415 - Disturbance	1.5	66,511
3. 1033A - Audible Alarm	1.7	34,044
4. 415E - Noise Disturbance	2.6	29,783
5. SEC - Security Check	1.9	29,172
6. 1042 - Welfare Check	1.8	26,757
7. PRKVIO - Parking Violation	3.1	21,594
8. SUSCIR - Suspicious Circumstance	2.3	18,593
9. 602L - Trespassing	1.1	17,933
10. 484 - Theft	1.7	17,379

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 32 shows a breakdown of events by the number of responding personnel from 2015 to 2019.

Figure 32. Number of Personnel Response per Event, 2015-2019 (n = 646,958 responses)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

BPD Patrol Teams

BPD has eight patrol teams, as shown in Figure 33. Each team is made up of 5 to 11 officers and two supervising sergeants. Four lieutenants oversee two patrol teams each. According to BPD, patrol teams often fall short of the number of assigned officers when officers are out due to sick leave, training, or injury, and officers do overtime to make the minimum staffing of 8-9 officers per team. The number of officers dispatched to an event will vary depending on the call type. On average, BPD dispatches 1.8 patrol officers per event. Appendix G includes the average personnel responses for each call type.


Figure 33. Example of Police Patrol Team Staffing

	Monday-Thursday				Friday-Saturday			
	Team 1	Team 2	Team 3	Team 4	Team 5	Team 6A	Team 6B	Team 7
Lieutenants	👮		👮		👮		👮	
Sergeants	👮👮		👮👮		👮👮		👮👮	
Officers	👮👮👮 10-11		👮👮👮 10-11		👮👮👮 10-11		👮👮👮 10-11	
Shift Time	6:00a - 4:00p		3:30p - 1:30a		6:00a - 6:30p		2:00p - 2:30a	
	11:00a - 9:00p		8:30p - 6:30a		11:30a - 12:00a		6:00p - 6:30a	

Source: Berkeley Police Department

Figure 34 shows the dates when more than 50 personnel were dispatched to one event during the five-year period, including the call type that was assigned to each respective event.

Figure 34. Events with Responses from More than 50 Personnel, 2015-2019 (n = 1,134 out of 646,958 responses)



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Time Spent Responding to Calls


In this section we present information about the time BPD spends recording, dispatching, and responding to calls. The CAD data includes time stamps that correspond with the steps that occur throughout the call and response process. These time stamps enable an understanding of the amount of time that is dedicated to different portions of responses to events. We use the time between when a call is dispatched and cleared to indicate the amount of time that an officer or other personnel spends responding to an event. We use the time between a call being created and an officer being dispatched to denote the time in which the Communications Center assesses resources and dispatches officers.

The CAD system only records the time of a police event, which is an approximation of the time that officers and other personnel spend responding to events. Therefore, the data does not include information about how they spend their time outside of responding to events. Typical police activities that are not recorded in the CAD system include training, proactive policing activities, and report writing.

The time that BPD officers and other personnel take to respond to events can be longer than expected for several reasons. It could be because dispatchers forget to close out a call. Officers may have moved to another call, or are working on a report. Officers may also close out a call and continue to work on a report, so that they can be dispatched if needed.

Figure 35 shows the total number of BPD officers and other personnel dispatched to events by event priority level from 2015 to 2019.

Figure 35. Number of Personnel Responses by Priority Level, based on Time Between Call and Dispatch After a Call is Created, 2015-2019 (n = 646,950)



Note: Fire dispatch times are not included in this graphic.

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Table 8 shows the median time personnel spent responding to the ten most frequent call types from 2015 to 2019. Time spent responding is defined as the time between when the Communications Center dispatches personnel and closes the event in CAD, indicating that personnel are no longer on scene.


Table 8. Median Time Spent on Event after Dispatch for Top 10 Call Types, 2015-2019

Call Type	Median Time Spent on Event after Dispatch (Minutes and Seconds)	Total Number of Personnel Dispatched
1. T - Traffic Stop	6:46	44,797
2. 415 - Disturbance	6:46	35,697
3. 1033A - Audible Alarm	8:39	19,921
4. 415E - Noise Disturbance	7:42	15,773
5. SEC - Security Check	6:38	15,268
6. 1042 - Welfare Check	6:46	15,030
7. PRKVIO - Parking Violation	4:52	13,613
8. SUSCIR - Suspicious Circumstance	6:47	11,547
9. 602L - Trespassing	6:46	11,058
10. 484 - Theft	6:59	10,556

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 36 shows an overview of the time BPD officers and other personnel spent responding to events for each call type classification. This is represented as percentages of the total time that all officers and other personnel spent responding to events.

Figure 36. Percent Personnel Time Spent Responding to Events Out of Total Time Responding to All Events by Auditor Classification, 2015-2019



Note: The figure excludes 36 responses that were missing start or end time stamps in the data.

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

VI. Finding 1: Berkeley Police Department can better track mental health and homelessness calls.

There has been much discussion by City Council and the community around BPD resources in response to events related to mental health and homelessness. City officials have estimated that BPD dedicates significant resources to responding to calls about people experiencing mental health issues or homelessness,¹³ and the City Council requested data to gain a better understanding of BPD's response to these events.¹⁴ As such, we assessed the available data about the number of events and officer-initiated activities that relate to mental health and homelessness.

Currently, it is difficult to determine the full extent of BPD officers' encounters with people who are experiencing a mental health issue or homelessness from the data set. We identified as many of these events in the data as possible, but they are undercounted, likely significantly, because BPD does not identify all calls related to mental health or homelessness. Better tracking of all events where mental health or homelessness are apparent would provide more complete understanding about BPD's response and inform decisions about the appropriate resources to dedicate to these events.

Events Related to Mental Health and Homelessness are Undercounted

BPD receives many calls that involve individuals who are experiencing a mental health issue or homelessness, but there are some challenges that make it difficult to identify these events in the CAD data.

First, call types in CAD reflect the primary reason for a call which may not capture events where the individuals involved are experiencing a mental health issue or homelessness. CAD has some call types to identify when the primary reason for the call is a mental health issue, such as a suicide attempt or "5150" for someone experiencing a mental health crisis. However, if the primary reason for the call is another issue, dispatchers are trained to assign those to call types that reflect the primary reason, such as family disturbance or pedestrian stop, which do not capture an accompanying mental health issue. According to BPD, if the event involves a potential crime, dispatchers will always log it using a corresponding crime code and not a mental health call type. For example, if the Communications Center receives a call about a disturbance in progress, dispatchers will assign a call type related to a disturbance. Officers may arrive on scene and find the individual involved is experiencing a 5150 mental health crisis, but the call type would not reflect this. Similarly, there is one call type specifically for events related to homelessness, but dispatchers may assign these events to other more general call types such as welfare check or person down depending on the information they receive about the primary reason for the call.

¹³ Berkeleyside article, "Mental health calls #1 drain on Berkeley police resources." <https://www.berkeleyside.com/2015/04/16/mental-health-calls-are-1-drain-on-berkeley-police-resources>

¹⁴ Mayor's Omnibus Motion on Public Safety Items: https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Clerk/Level_3_-_Commissions/2020-07-14%20Mayor%20Supp%203%20Police%20Items.pdf

Second, disposition codes used to describe basic information about the event do not always capture when there is a mental health or homelessness component. For instance, out of 29,031 events with a mental health term in the narrative, only 23 percent were assigned the mental health disposition code. According to BPD, officers most often are the ones to enter disposition codes unless they call into the Communications Center and provide information for dispatchers to enter the code. BPD stated that officers do not consistently use this code for events with an apparent mental health component. Additionally, CAD does not have a disposition code that indicates whether an individual in an event is experiencing homelessness. Even if CAD did have such a disposition code, BPD stated that officers tend to only ask individuals for information that is directly relevant to the event and may not gather information about housing status if it is not relevant. BPD should only include this information if it is apparent during the event.

Third, the narrative description for an event in CAD may not identify events with a mental health or homelessness component. In addition to logging call types and dispositions, dispatchers enter narrative information about the event in a description field. In our analysis, we found that the information in the description field does not always match the call type. For instance, dispatchers assigned over 20,950 events to a mental health call type. Of those events, mental health key words were only present in about 48 percent of the narrative descriptions. Using only the narrative description to identify 5150 calls would have excluded many of those calls. For events related to mental health or homelessness that do not have a designated call type, the description field may contain the only information that may identify those events as mental health or homelessness.

Lastly, the data shows when the Mobile Crisis Team responds to events related to mental health, but this alone is not a reliable way to identify these events. The Communications Center may not dispatch the Mobile Crisis Team if the responding officer does not request assistance. There are also some events that the Mobile Crisis Team would normally respond to but cannot because they are unavailable. There is no equivalent response personnel indicator for events related to homelessness.

We developed a method to identify as many events with a mental health or homelessness component as possible, which we describe below, but it is evident that our analysis significantly undercounts these events because of the data limitations we identified.

Transparency and accessibility of information about BPD's response to calls related to mental health or homelessness is an important part of the City's public safety reimagining process. In 2020, City Council passed the Omnibus Motion on Public Safety which called for the reimagining process to consider the police response to mental health and homelessness-related calls. To increase the availability of data on BPD's response to events that relate to mental health or homelessness to the extent that it is known, it is important that these events are identified in the CAD data. While there are challenges to identifying all these events, there are opportunities for BPD to capture more complete information by identifying events where it is apparent that individuals involved are experiencing a mental health crisis or homelessness, regardless of call type. This will result in more complete information about BPD's response and the outcomes of the events. This information can also inform decisions about the most appropriate way to respond to these events.

Identifying Events Related to Mental Health

Mental health events we identified in the data do not represent the total number of events that may have had a mental health component because of the data limitations described above. We used the following components of the CAD data to identify 42,215, unduplicated events with a mental health component, or nearly 12 percent of all events.

- **Call types.** Call types related to mental health include suicide (1056), mental illness (5150), and welfare check (1042). While dispatchers can select call types related to mental health, they can assess a situation and opt to select a different call type that reflects the nature of the event.¹⁵ Events with a call type that indicated the presence of a mental health issue accounted for 20,950 of the mental health calls identified.
- **Mental health disposition code.** According to BPD officials, the data includes a disposition code that is used to reflect events involving a mental health issue. This is a field that can be checked by BPD officers in addition to an assigned call type.
- **Narrative description.** The data includes narrative fields that dispatchers use to document details about the call that extend beyond the other CAD data entry options. These descriptions can vary depending on the dispatcher and not follow standardized language to describe mental health-related situations. In order to identify mental health-related terms within the narrative data, we consulted with officials from Berkeley Mental Health and the Mental Health Commission to create the list of search terms specific to mental health (Appendix F). We then used these terms to query and identify all the narrative reports to identify events with description fields that contained terms associated with mental health.¹⁶
- **Mobile Crisis Team response.** The data specifies the personnel who responded to each event. We queried the data for all instances in which the Mobile Crisis Team responded to an event. The data includes only Mobile Crisis Team responses that also involve a sworn BPD officer. The data does not document occasions in which the Mobile Crisis Team is unavailable to respond to a request for support. Therefore, the absence of a Mobile Crisis Team response does not necessarily mean that there was no request for their services.

¹⁵ This includes other call types that do not explicitly refer to mental health but correlate with mental health outcomes, such as welfare check, family disturbance, pedestrian stops, and suspicious person.

¹⁶ We used the terms that are more specific to mental health and excluded terms more specific to substance abuse or addiction.

Table 9 below shows the unduplicated events we were able to identify as related to mental health based on the call type, disposition, narrative description, or response by the Mobile Crisis Team. Approximately 12 percent of all events were related to mental health from 2015 to 2019.

Table 9. Results of Scan for Events Related to Mental Health, 2015-2019

		Narrative Report	Disposition Report	Call Types	Mobile Crisis	Unduplicated Count
		Mental Health-related events identified in Narrative Reports	Events with an "MH" Disposition Report	Events with Mental Health-related Call Types	Events with response by Mobile Crisis	Narrative report, disposition, call types, and/or Mobile Crisis response
Identified events	#	29,031	9,555	20,950	992	42,215
	%	8.1%	2.7%	5.8%	0.3%	11.7%
Total Events		360,242	360,242	360,242	360,242	360,242

Note: Call Types includes: 1056 – Suicide, 5150 - Mental Illness and 1042 - Welfare Check

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Table 10 shows how many events of the ten most frequent call types also had a mental health component from 2015 to 2019.

Table 10. Top 10 Call Types and Mental Health Terms in Narrative, 2015-2019

Call Types	Events with Mental Health Term in Narrative Field	Percent of Events	Total Events
1. T - Traffic Stop	70	0.2%	44,797
2. 415 - Disturbance	6,792	19.0%	35,697
3. 1033A - Audible Alarm	100	0.5%	19,921
4. 415E - Noise Disturbance	221	1.4%	15,773
5. SEC - Security Check	199	1.3%	15,268
6. 1042 - Welfare Check	6,032	40.1%	15,030
7. PRKVIO - Parking Violation	107	0.8%	13,613
8. SUSCIR - Suspicious Circumstance	1,244	10.8%	11,547
9. 602L - Trespassing	514	4.6%	11,058
10. 484 - Theft	395	3.7%	10,556

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Identifying Events Related to Homelessness

Similar to mental health-related events, we were not able to identify all events related to homelessness because the information tracked in CAD is limited. While mental health-related events have several call types, lodging in public is the only call type for events related to homelessness. Unlike mental health, events related to homelessness in CAD do not have a disposition identifier. We used the following components of the CAD data to identify 21,631 events involving homelessness which represent 6 percent of all events, but this is an undercount:

- **Call type.** The only call type that is specifically related to events that involve one or more people experiencing homelessness is lodging in public. Events with this call type accounted for 0.6 percent of police-related CAD events we could identify as related to homelessness.
- **Narrative Description.** We queried all the events to identify those with description fields that contained terms associated with homelessness. We consulted with officials from Berkeley's Health, Housing, and Community Services Department, the Mental Health Division within that department, the Homeless Commission, and Mental Health Commission to create the list of search terms specific to homelessness (see Appendix F).

Events related to homelessness may also have a mental health component. The 21,631 homelessness-related events identified may overlap with some of the events related to mental health.

Table 11 below shows the unduplicated events we were able to identify as related to homelessness based on the call type or narrative description.

Table 11. Results of Scan for Events Related to Individuals Experiencing Homelessness, 2015-2019

		Homeless-Related Events Identified in Narrative Reports	Events with Call Type Lodging in Public	Unduplicated Count (Call type and/or Narrative Terms)
Identified events	#	20,694	2,221	21,631
	%	5.7%	0.6%	6.0%
Total Events		360,242	360,242	360,242

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Table 12 shows the ten most frequent call types and events with a homelessness component from 2015 to 2019.

Table 12. Top 10 Call Types and Homelessness Terms in Narrative, 2015-2019

Call Types	Events with Homelessness Term in the Narrative Field	Percent of Events	Total Events
1. T - Traffic Stop	59	0.1%	44,797
2. 415 - Disturbance	3,436	9.6%	35,697
3. 1033A - Audible Alarm	118	0.6%	19,921
4. 415E - Noise Disturbance	284	1.8%	15,773
5. SEC - Security Check	439	2.9%	15,268
6. 1042 - Welfare Check	1,526	10.2%	15,030
7. PRKVIO - Parking Violation	41	0.3%	13,613
8. SUSCIR - Suspicious Circumstance	710	6.1%	11,547
9. 602L - Trespassing	4,760	43.0%	11,058
10. 484 - Theft	518	4.9%	10,556

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Recommendation

To improve access to data, we recommend the Berkeley Police Department:

- 1.1 Identify all calls for service where there is an apparent mental health issue and/or homelessness component in a manner that protects the privacy rights of the individuals involved.

VII. Finding 2: The City can improve the transparency of Police Department activity data on the Open Data Portal.

The City's Open Data Portal provides the public with limited information about events that BPD responds to. There are opportunities for BPD to improve transparency by increasing the type and scope of data available on the portal.

The City of Berkeley launched the Open Data Portal (portal) pilot on December 15, 2014 with the goal of providing non-confidential, public data for unrestricted use. BPD captures events in their calls for service data set on the portal, which was created in March 2015. BPD policy states that reports must be released to any member of the public unless the release of the report would endanger a person, interfere with an investigation, constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, or is otherwise prohibited by law.

However, the data BPD shares on the portal does not include all available data fields. The data fields missing would prevent people using the data from being able to identify the call source, the number of police personnel dispatched, or officer time spent on scene. Without this information, the public may not have a complete understanding of BPD's response to these events.

The calls for service data available on the portal is also limited in scope. It does not include events with certain call types, such as welfare check and noise disturbance, and is limited to data within the last 180 days. The limited date ranges make it difficult to assess trends over time.

Ensuring that all event data has more complete information about the police response, personnel dispatched, time, and call source would help give the public with a more complete understanding of calls for service that the Communications Center receives. Public access to calls for service data enables the community to engage more thoroughly with BPD, elected officials, and city staff to develop a shared understanding of crime and policing in Berkeley. In addition, increased transparency through the portal may decrease requests for BPD data through the Public Records Act.

Recommendation:

To improve access to data, we recommend the Berkeley Police Department:

- 2.1 Make calls for service data available on the City's Open Data Portal for all call types allowable by Berkeley Police Department policy and law, and update regularly to facilitate transparency. This data should be published in machine ready format, and contain as many years of data as is available.

VIII. Recommendations and Management Response

City Management agreed to our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Below is the Police Department's initial corrective action plan and proposed implementation date. We find their plans to address our audit recommendations reasonable, however, we would like to clarify the intent of our recommendations.

With regards to the first recommendation, the goal is to collect and provide additional data on calls for service that have an apparent mental health and/or homelessness component. We do not recommend that the Police Department inquires about individuals' housing or mental health statuses, but instead collects this information in a similar way to how the department collects data on individuals' race for traffic stops. With regards to the second recommendation, the goal is to provide additional data on calls for service to the public. We understand that it may take time to coordinate with the vendor to include new datasets. We suggest that in the meantime, the Police Departments publishes the Calls For Service dataset that was provided to our office for this analysis and covers the past five years.

As part of the follow-up process, the Berkeley City Auditor will be actively engaged with the Police Department every six months to assess the progress they are making towards complete implementation.

- 1.1 To improve access to data, we recommend the Berkeley Police Department identify all calls for service where there is an apparent mental health issue and/or homelessness component in a manner that protects the privacy rights of the individuals involved.

Management Response: Agree with stated limitations which follow.

Proposed Implementation Plan: The Berkeley Police Department can implement steps to capture these issues on calls when appropriate and/or obvious. Disposition codes, which are part of every Call For Service (CFS) offer a tool for data collection. While currently disposition codes for homeless and mental health issues exist, we need to implement training that better defines when these codes should be included in CFS dispositions. We anticipate some challenges with this as we do not routinely inquire about peoples' housing or mental health statuses, especially when it is not directly related to the call for service. It will be important to identify what situations it might be appropriate to inquire about these issues to ensure that personal dignity is respected and privacy rights acknowledged. To ensure these goals are met, further discussion and clarification may be needed as to what data we are attempting to capture by indicating if mental health issues or homelessness was a component of a CFS, and setting more clearly defined definitions as to when each code should be used. Currently standard evaluation tools do not exist to extract this data in situations beyond the most obvious. Developing tools that accurately capture this information where it is more nuanced, and then implementing training that ensures these tools can be applied correctly could be affected by competing resource demands.

Proposed Implementation Date: Between 4-6 months from date of audit completion.

VIII. Recommendations and Management Response

2.1 To improve access to data, we recommend the Berkeley Police Department make calls for service data available on the City's Open Data Portal for all call types allowable by Berkeley Police Department policy and law, and update regularly to facilitate transparency. This data should be published in machine ready format, and contain as many years of data as is available.

Management Response: BPD agrees that the current dataset posted online needs to be updated or replaced.

Proposed Implementation Plan: The new dataset should be able to incorporate additional information that is not currently published. Our staff will need to explore if our current vendor can suffice to provide the requested data, or if we need to seek a new vendor for this work. Implementation timeline is also dependent on the whether this project will require a new contract and budget to accomplish the recommendation. Implementation may require assistance and resources from IT as well, which could further delay implementation.

Proposed Implementation Date: Between 4-6 months if work remains with current vendor, 9-12 months if new vendor selection required.

IX. Methodology and Statement of Compliance

The scope of our audit focused on data for calendar years 2015 to 2019. We performed a risk assessment of the department's data collection and management practices and procedures to identify internal control weaknesses, including fraud risks, within the context of our audit objectives. This included a review of selected policies and procedures, as well as interviews with subject matter experts and BPD staff.

To gain an understanding of BPD operations and internal controls and to achieve our audit objectives, we:

- Reviewed BPD policies and procedures for dispatching units to respond to an event, performing traffic stops, maintaining quality control for data systems, and how patrol officers spend their time to understand the requirements for officers in the City of Berkeley.
- Reviewed local and state laws on police operations and data collection to understand what governs police operations.
- Reviewed national media on reimagining policing, and the collection and analysis of police data to understand the information available to the public.
- Validated and analyzed CAD data from 2015 through 2019.
- Interviewed BPD patrol officers, command staff, dispatchers, police information technology staff, the crime analyst, and the police records manager to understand departmental operations.
- Interviewed mental health and housing officials from the Department of Health, Housing, and Community Services (HHCS), the Homeless Commission, and the Mental Health Commission.
- Interviewed external subject matter experts:
 - AH Datalytics
 - Portland City Auditor
 - San Jose City Auditor
 - Center for Policing Equity
 - Yale Justice Collaboratory
 - NYU School of Law Policing Project
 - Jerry Ratcliffe, Temple University
 - Austin Justice Coalition
 - Jack Glaser, UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy
 - Oakland Reimagining Public Safety Task Force (Data Advisory Board)
 - National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform
 - Berkeley's Police Review Commission
 - Mayor's Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group
- Reviewed the available BPD data sets on the City's Open Data Portal.

Preparing the Data Sets

In this section, we detail the process we undertook to gather, validate, and prepare the data, in addition to the decision points that went into preparing each data set.


Gathered the data. We collaborated closely with BPD on an information request to ensure the data set reflected the breadth of inputs to the CAD system. The validation process resulted in multiple data pulls to resolve substantial discrepancies that we identified in the data. In February 2021, BPD delivered the final source data that forms the basis of this report.

Conducted Data Reliability Assessment. We assessed the reliability of CAD data by reviewing them for reasonableness and completeness, interviewing knowledgeable data owners, gaining an understanding of data access controls, and reviewing data system documentation from BPD and the Communications Center. We also reviewed the Department's policies and procedures, interviewed staff at all levels, interviewed an extensive and varied list of subject matter experts, and reviewed relevant California and Berkeley laws. We determined that the data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Processed the Data to Improve Accuracy. We took the following steps to clean the original data set to improve accuracy:

- We eliminated records for which call types included "NULL" data, as call types are a required entry for dispatchers.
- We eliminated records that represented test calls, such as unit "Mobile08" which represented a test by dispatchers.
- We eliminated events for which there is no response from a sworn officer, due to our primary focus on responses from sworn BPD officers.
- We narrowed the data to events that occurred from January 2015 to December of 2019.
- We organized the data by three separate data sets: event data, stop data, and personnel response data. These data sets reflect different components of the CAD system, and their sample sizes vary due to how they are organized in the data set.

Figure 37. Summary of Data Sets Used in the Report



Source: Berkeley City Auditor

1. Characteristics of Events (sample size 360,242 events). For the purposes of this report, events are incidents that the community calls in or police officers observe that result in a police response. Events range in complexity and the Communications Center categorizes them using call types such as suspicious circumstance, disturbance, petty theft, security check, and anything in between. Appendix G provides the full list of call types that are used to describe events in the City of Berkeley. We highlighted the trends and characteristics for all unique events in the data, including community-initiated calls and officer-initiated stops.

2. Characteristics of Officer-Initiated Stops (sample size 56,070 stops). We examined an additional subset of stops officers initiated that were unrelated to calls for service. Stops may include vehicle, pedestrian, bicycle, or suspicious vehicle stops. All of the stops that we review in this section are initiated by officers.

3. Characteristics of Police Response (sample size 646,958 individuals who responded). The Berkeley Police Department Communications Center can assign multiple officers in response to one event. As a result, there are more police responses in the data than there are events. We provide data for responses from officers and other units, including but not limited to the Mobile Crisis Team, Area Coordinators, or the Traffic Bureau.

Categorization of Data

The data contains categorized fields. These include:

Call Type Classifications. We chose to categorize the data into ten categories as illustrated in our report. We selected these categories based on research of current best practices by university researchers, interviews with subject matter experts, and a preliminary assessment of the data sets. We used the definitions for serious and property crime used by the FBI's Uniform Crime Report statistics.

When developing the categories, we took the following into consideration:

- Call types can fall into several classifications. The definitions below guide our decision to keep one call type under a specific category. For instance, vehicle stops are used to manage traffic flows, but in some instances, they may also be related to an investigation. We chose to keep vehicle stops in the traffic category because they may not necessarily result in a crime report.
- Call types under the same classification may serve different purposes. For instance, call types related to alarms may serve a variety of purposes. Some alarms involve investigation for an alarm going off (1033a), while others are more criminal in nature such as a bank alarm indicating a robbery (1033g).
- Our call type classifications present one model among various approaches for classifying call types. There are other approaches for organizing call types, such as by police functions or penal codes.
- It is possible for call types under any of the categories to result in a crime report. We grouped some events into call type classifications that refer to crimes that may be involved. However, other call types may also involve a crime report.

Mental Health and Homelessness. To capture the extent of these calls, we used components of the CAD data to identify unduplicated events related to mental health and unduplicated events related to homelessness. Components related to mental health include call types (1056 – Suicide, 5150 - Mental Illness, and 1042 - Welfare Check), the disposition code “MH,” response by Mobile Crisis Team personnel, and terms in the narrative data related to mental health. Components related to individuals experiencing homelessness include events identified in narrative reports, and the call type “lodging in public.”

Personnel. We vetted codes that indicate the type of personnel in the data with the Police IT Manager and Communications Center Manager. Through interviews with the Police Records Manager and other BPD command staff, we organized police personnel by categories according to whether they are sworn or non-sworn staff. We additionally categorized staff as patrol units, patrol supervisors, other units, and sworn, non-patrol officers.

Statement of Compliance

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix A. Fields Included in the CAD Data

Table 13. Data Fields Included in Computer Aided Dispatch Dataset Provided by the Berkeley Police Department

Data Fields	Description
Incident Number*	Unique ID for the event.
Call Source	The origin of the call, recoded to include Emergency Line (911), Non-Emergency Line, or Officer-Initiated, or Other.
Call Type*	Call code created by dispatch to describe important information about the event.
Priority	Priority level assigned to the event to determine the urgency of the response.
Occurred Incident Type	Category selected by the officer to organize crime-related calls.
UCR Return A Code	Code selected by the officer and reported to the FBI as a DOJ requirement for all Part 1 crimes.
Unit Disposition	Patrol-reported outcomes of the call. Includes stop dispositions and incident reports.
Call Disposition	Dispatcher-reported outcomes of the call. Includes stop dispositions and incident reports.
Address*	Where the event was reported to have occurred.
Address Location Type	The type of address that is provided by dispatch; includes address, intersection, or longitude/latitude.
Latitude/Longitude	
Police Area	Beat where the event is taking place.
Create Date Time*	The time and date the call was created by either the dispatcher or the officer.
Dispatch Time	The time and date when the officer was dispatched to the incident.
Enroute Time	Time and date in which the officer changes their status to "enroute" after being dispatched.
Onscene Time	Time and date in which the officer arrived to the scene.
Clear Time	Time and date in which the incident was cleared (closed) by a dispatcher.
Primary Unit Flag	The primary officer designated to handle the call. All others are "assisting" officers or units.
Unit Number	The number that corresponds to the police officer and/or other units assigned to the event.
Narrative Data	Further documentation about details of the event used to inform dispatched officers or units.

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Note: Fields with an asterisk are required entries in Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD).

Appendix B. Priority Codes and Call Types According to BPD Policy

Table 14. Berkeley Police Department Priority Codes by Call Types


Priority Code	Call Type
F1 & P1*	Boat Fire, Encampment Fire, Encampment Medical, Hazardous Material, Multiple Causality Incident, Water Rescue, Retrieval of a Patient, Structure Fire, Vegetation Fire, Medical Emergency with Gun Shot, Vehicle Accident, Vehicle vs Ped or Bike
P0	Pedestrian Stop, Suspicious Vehicle, Bike Stop, Vehicle Stop
P1	Person Down, Person Calling For Help, Explosion, Unknown Injury Accident, Priority Code Assist, Officer Needs Help, Hit & Run w/ Injuries, GPS Tracker Alarm, Silent Alarm, Pronet Alarm, Video Alarm, Threat of Suicide, Missing Person at Risk, Missing Juvenile, Injury Accident Complaint of Pain, Ascertain 911, Aid to BFD, Bomb Tech, Officer Flagged Down, Foot Chase, Person w/ a Gun, Vehicle Pursuit, Knock & Talk, Battery w/ grievous bodily harm (GBH), Assault w/ Caustic Substance, Assault w/ Deadly Weapon, Suicide w/ Ambulance, Major Injury Accident, Suicide Attempt, Dead Body Found, Shooting w/ Ambulance, Injury Accident, Injury Accident Inv Ped or Bicyclist
Priority 1/Priority 2	Kidnap, Robbery, Carjacking, Attempted Rape, Shot At Dwelling, Rape, Spousal Abuse w/o Injury, Home Invasion, Attempt Assault w/Deadly Weapon, Child Abuse, Family Disturbance, Shoplifter In-Custody
Priority 1/Priority 3	Battery, Brandishing, Arson, Burglary, Prowler, Bomb Threat, Auto Burglary, Court Order Violation, Loud Report
Priority 1/Priority 4	Temporary Restraining Order Violation
Priority 2	Welfare Check, Reckless Driver, DUI Driver, Shooting Cold Report, Dog Bite, Vicious Dog, Hit & Run w/ Injuries Report, Battery w/ grievous bodily harm (GBH) report, Assault w/ Caustic Substance Report, Assault w/ Deadly Weapon Report, Oral Copulation, Found Juvenile, Found Person, Create New Call, Outside Agency Assist, Unknown Problem, Wireless 911
Priority 2/Priority 3	Child Molest, Forgery, Grand Theft, Animal Cruelty, Mental Illness, Stolen Vehicle, Vandalism to Vehicle, Hit & Run Non-Injury, Speeding Vehicle, Throwing Object(s) at Vehicle, Peeper, Fall On City Property, Hate Crimes, LoJack Stolen Car, Suspicious Circumstance, Suspicious Person, Suspicious Vehicle
Priority 2/Priority 4	Indecent Exposure, Disturbance, Petty Theft, Defraud Hotel/Restaurant, Malicious Damage, Forged RX
Priority 3	Runaway, Missing Person, Transportation, Non-Injury Accident, Audible Alarm, Civil Standby, Injury Accident Report, Child Neglect, Under the Influence, Firearm Destruction, Stolen Vehicle Recovery, Search Warrant, Ticket Sign Off, Traffic Hazard
Priority 3/Priority 4	Possession of Stolen Property, Incurable, Trespassing, Drug Activity, Misc Penal Code Violation
Priority 3/Priority 9	Misc Vehicle Code Violation
Priority 4	Abandoned Vehicle, Stolen Rental Vehicle, Posted No Parking, Barking Dog, Vehicle Blocking Driveway, Vehicle Blocking Sidewalk, Vehicle Double Parking, 5 or More Unpaid Parking Tickets, No Vehicle Identification, Expired Vehicle Registration, Inoperable Vehicle, Noise Disturbance, Identity Fraud, Annoying Phone Calls, Red Zone Cite, Obstructing Traffic, Construction Zone, Advice, Aid to Citizen, Animal Matter, Berkeley Municipal Code (BMC) Violation, Car Alarm, Court Order Report, Found Property, Parking Violation, Security Check, VIN Verification
Priority 4/Priority 5	Gambling
Priority 4/Priority 6	Prostitution, Lodging in Public
Priority 4/Priority 9	Illegal Dumping
Priority 6	Business & Professions Violation, Warrant Arrest

Priority Code	Call Type
Priority 9	Bait Bike, City Manager Report, Property Damage, Demonstration, Extra Surveillance, Information, Lost Property, Mental Health, Repossession, Storm Log, Subpoena Service, Surveillance, Test Call, Temporary Restraining Order Log, Vehicle Release

Source: Berkeley Police Department

Appendix C. Stops by Race, 2015-2019

Figure 38. Officer-Initiated Stops by Race, 2015-2019




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Appendix D. Enforcement Outcomes of Searches by Race, 2015-2019


The graphs below show trends in enforcement outcomes of searches by race during the 2015 to 2019 audit period. Each data point on the trend lines represents the percentage of searches *for that race group* that resulted in the specified enforcement outcome (not the percentage of total searches for *all race groups*). Note that the graphs are intended to allow comparison between race groups, and the percentages on the left (y-axis) vary depending on the range of data in the graph.

Figure 39. Percentage of Searches that Resulted in Arrest by Race, 2015-2019




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 40. Percentage of Searches that Resulted in a Citation by Race, 2015-2019




Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 41. Percentage of Searches that Resulted in a Warning by Race, 2015-2019



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Figure 42. Percentage of Searches that Resulted in No Enforcement by Race, 2015-2019



Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Appendix E. Responses by Units, 2015-2019

Table 15. Berkeley Police Department Personnel Responses by Unit, 2015-2019

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Patrol Officers						
Reserve Officers	993	651	615	208	638	3,105
Team 1	14,053	13,614	14,128	13,395	12,823	68,013
Team 2	11,417	12,084	12,928	12,219	12,125	60,773
Team 3	14,876	13,563	14,708	13,905	13,633	70,685
Team 4	14,136	16,764	16,452	15,240	13,975	76,567
Team 5	15,510	15,926	15,909	15,236	14,840	77,421
Team 6	14,301	16,347	15,590	12,314	13,583	72,135
Team 7	20,180	20,290	21,036	18,680	18,671	98,857
Patrol Supervisors						
Captain	38	26	34	20	17	135
Lieutenant	773	794	788	1,344	1,207	4,906
Sergeant	8,612	8,049	8,617	7,537	7,600	40,415
Other Units						
Animal Control	0	2	1	1	0	4
Area Coordinators	386	273	357	258	1,015	2,289
Bike Unit	3,536	2,596	2,178	0	0	8,310
CSOs	0	1	1	1	3	6
Crime Scene Techs	1,551	1,523	1,497	929	680	6,180
Mobile Crisis	967	1,156	1,185	787	816	4,911
Motor Unit	136	57	3	0	0	196
Parking Enforcement Officers	1,479	2,143	2,388	2,587	2,707	11,304
Police Aides	0	0	0	0	1	1
Special Enforcement	8	2	4	0	6	20
University of California Officers	22	23	12	5	6	68
Sworn Non-Patrol Officers	8,577	7,744	8,189	6,202	9,945	40,657

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Appendix F. List of Terms Applied in Narrative Search

Table 16. List of Mental Health and Homeless Search Terms Applied to Narrative Search

Mental Health Search Terms		Homeless Search Terms
1056	mania	bacs
5150	manic	bfnp
sees things	mct	camped out
antipsychotic	medication	person down
anxiety	meds	berkeley covid respite
bacs	mental	berkeley drop in center
bipolar	mh	berkeley community resource center
bmh	mobile crisis	women's daytime drop-in center
bonita house	nervous breakdown	fred finch turning point
breakdown	paranoi	berkeley food and housing project
case manager	peer support	dorothy day
counsel	pharmacist	encamp
crazy	psych	encampment
crisis	ptsd	harrison house
deliri	residential care	homeless
deluded	schizo	homeless outreach
delusion	seeing things	housing status
dementia	self harm	living on the street
depress	self talk	nomad
disorder	social worker	obstructing sidewalk
dissociat	suicid	shelter
dual diagnosis	talking to self	sleeper
first break	talk to self	street outreach
hallucinat	therap	tent
hear voices	trauma	transitional housing
hearing voices	treatment	unhoused
hears voices	unable to talk	pathways
ideation	warm line	vagrant
john george	warmline	no address
		no residence
		undomicilized
		coordinated entry

Source: Berkeley City Auditor

Appendix G. Summary Data by Call Type, 2015-2019

Table 17. Summary Data by Call Type with Auditor Classifications, 2015-2019

Call Type	2019 Events	Total Events	Average Yearly events	Priorities Assigned in CAD	Average Personnel per Event	Median Time Spent on Event after Dispatch (Minutes and Seconds)
Alarm Classification (n = 21,318)						
1033A - Audible Alarm	4,229	19,921	3,984	0,F1,2,3	1.7	8:39
1033G - GPS Bank Alarm	8	79	16	0	7.1	8:39
1033S - Silent Alarm	234	1,314	263	0,F1	2.4	8:39
1033T - ETS (Bank) Pronet alarm	0	4	1	0	1	7:03
Community Classification (n = 88,128)						
1057 - Missing Person	249	1,326	265	0,F1,2,3	1.5	7:09
1057AR - Missing At Risk	41	289	58	0,2,3	4.9	7:42
1057J - Missing Juvenile	21	122	24	0	5.1	6:46
1062B - Civil Standby	150	822	164	3	1.8	5:37
1067 - Call for Help	180	969	194	0,F1	3.4	8:39
1080 - Explosion	2	9	2	0	2.8	6:59
1091B - Barking Dog	72	454	91	4	1.1	6:46
1091E - Dog Bite	16	101	20	F1,2	1.7	7:09
1091V - Vicious Animal	13	101	20	2	1.8	5:27
415E - Noise Disturbance	2,709	15,773	3,155	F1,4	1.1	7:42
601 - Runaway	46	372	74	0,3	1.6	6:47
601I - Incurable	31	184	37	F1,2,3,4	2.5	5:51
647J - Lodging in Public	33	2,221	444	F1,3,4,6	1.4	6:02
ADVICE - Advice	1,729	8,499	1,700	F1,2,3,4	1.1	6:46
AID - Aid to Citizen	1,356	6,065	1,213	0,F1,2,3,4,9	2.1	6:46
ANIMAL - Animal Matter	194	1,066	213	2,4	1.3	6:02
BART - Bart Tunnel Incident	2	2	0		6.5	4:23
BOAT-FR - Boat Fire	0	1	0		1	14:58
DEMO - Demonstration	7	52	10	9	17.7	5:04
FIRE - Structure Fire	0	35	7	0	1.4	6:46
FLAD - Officer Flagged Down	1,209	5,217	1,043	0,F1,2,4	1.6	6:46
FNDJUV - Found Juvenile	10	74	15	2	2.5	6:02
FNDPER - Found Person	23	134	27	0,F1,2	1.7	5:51
FOUND - Found Property	722	4,204	841	0,2,3,4	1.1	6:47
ILLDMP - Illegal Dumping	54	464	93	4,9	1.1	5:15
LDRPT - Loud Report	183	1,071	214	0,F1,2,3	4.2	8:39

Call Type	2019 Events	Total Events	Average Yearly events	Priorities Assigned in CAD	Average Personnel per Event	Median Time Spent on Event after Dispatch (Minutes and Seconds)
LOST - Lost Property	16	86	17	4,9	1.1	8:27
SEC - Security Check	3,682	15,268	3,054	0,F1,2,4,9	1.8	6:38
SUSCIR - Suspicious Circumstance	2,145	11,547	2,309	0,F1,2,3,4	2.6	6:47
SUSPER - Suspicious Person	1,512	8,247	1,649	0,F1,2,3	2.3	6:59
SUSVEH - Suspicious Vehicle	596	3,353	671	0,F1,2,3,4	1.7	6:46
FBI Part II Crimes Classification (n = 77,822)						
1070 - Prowler	13	119	24	0,3	3.4	7:32
1079 - Bomb Threat	0	6	1	3	4	4:51
10852 - Vehicle Damage	303	1,392	278	F1,2,4	1.5	6:59
148 - Resisting/Obstructing	0	2	0		15.5	4:52
207 - Kidnapping	2	11	2	0,2	6.7	6:46
23110 - Throwing Object(s) at Vehicle	39	210	42	2,3	1.4	10:30
23152 - DUI	72	484	97	0,2,3	2	6:47
242 - Battery	1,383	6,991	1,398	0,F1,2,3	3.1	6:46
243E1 - Domestic Violence	54	205	41	0,F1,2	3.5	6:12
273 5 - Domestic Violence	67	314	63	0,F1,2	3.8	5:15
273A - Child Abuse	51	278	56	0,2,3	1.5	6:22
288 - Sexual molest	5	35	7	2,3	1.7	6:48
300WI - Child Neglect	13	109	22	2,3	1.9	4:52
314 - Indecent Exposure	140	698	140	F1,2,4	2.3	6:59
330 - Gambling	10	101	20	4	1.4	8:39
415 - Disturbance	6,925	35,697	7,139	0,F1,2,3,4	2	6:46
415F - Family Disturbance	583	3,254	651	0,F1,2	3.4	6:02
417 - Brandishing Weapon	187	845	169	0,F1,2,3	4.8	6:46
4390 - Prescription Fraud	2	12	2	2	1.8	4:45
470 - Forgery	28	265	53	2,3	1.6	7:30
496 - Poss. Stolen Prop.	11	50	10	3,4	1.7	8:39
530 5 - Identity Theft	175	1,112	222	4	1.1	8:27
537 0 Defrauding Innkeeper (Hotel/ Restaurant)	28	179	36	2,4	2	5:51
594 - Vandalism	330	1,939	388	0,F1,2,4	1.7	6:59
597 - Cruelty to Animals	23	160	32	F1,2,3	1.8	7:32

Call Type	2019 Events	Total Events	Average Yearly events	Priorities Assigned in CADK	Average Personnel per Event	Median Time Spent on Event after Dispatch (Minutes and Seconds)
602L - Trespassing	1,944	11,058	2,212	F1,2,3,4	1.5	6:46
647AB - Prostitution	2	15	3	4	1.5	1:45
647F - Intoxicated in Public	146	1,018	204	0,F1,2,3,4	1.9	6:46
653M - Harrassing Phone Calls	132	969	194	4	1.1	6:47
BMCVIO - Berkeley Municipal Code (BMC) Violation	1,014	5,934	1,187	F1,2,4,5	1.2	6:46
BPVIO - Business & Professions Violation	18	101	20	6	1.1	9:01
CRTRPT - Court Order Violation	12	98	20	4	1.2	7:15
CRTVIO - Court Order Violation	58	262	52	0,2,3	1.7	7:54
DRUGS - Drugs Inv.	184	1,440	288	0,F1,2,3,4	1.6	6:46
FOOT - Foot Chase	6	46	9	0	4.3	6:46
GUN - Person with Gun	50	237	47	0,F1,2	8.3	6:46
HATE - Hate Crime	4	34	7	2,3	1.3	8:39
PCVIO - Misc Penal Code Violation	450	1,539	308	0,F1,2,3,4	1.3	6:47
REG- Registration for certain criminal offenders	1	2	0		1	16:04
TROV - Temporary Restraining Order Violation	140	601	120	0,F1,4	2.5	6:15
Information or Administrative Classification (n = 12,437)						
CM - City Manager Report	5	18	4	9	2.3	6:40
DAMAGE - Property Damage	60	234	47	0,F1,2,9	2	6:46
FADEST - Firearm Destruction	37	205	41	3	1.1	10:07
FALL - Fall on City Prop.	181	965	193	F1,2,3	1.5	6:59
INFO - Information	205	1,096	219	0,2,9	2.1	6:46
REPO - Repossession	0	4	1		1.2	4:51
SUBP - Subpoena Service	2	14	3	9	1	6:46
TROL - Temporary Restraining Order Log	1	2	0		1.5	8:27
W911 - Wireless 911	2,830	9,899	1,980	F1,2	1.1	6:46
Investigative or Operational Classification (n = 10,351)						
1198- Code 1 assist	91	436	87	0,F1,2	4.4	6:46
A911 - Ascertain 911	995	6,859	1,372	0,F1,2	1.5	8:39

Call Type	2019 Events	Total Events	Average Yearly events	Priorities Assigned in CAD	Average Personnel per Event	Median Time Spent on Event after Dispatch (Minutes and Seconds)
KNOCK - Knock & Talk	73	463	93	0	2.1	6:12
LJ - LoJack Incident	36	96	19	2	3.9	6:50
OUTAID- Outside Agency Assist	287	1,420	284	0,F1,2,3	1.8	5:37
SEARCH - Search Warrant	30	408	82	3	8.9	5:39
SURVE - Surveillance	15	78	16	9	4.1	5:42
UNK - Unknown Problem	44	322	64	0,F1,2	3	6:46
WARARR - Warrant Arrest	65	269	54	0,2,3,6	2.1	7:37
Medical or Mental Health Classification (n = 22,797)						
1042 - Welfare Check	3,065	15,030	3,006	0,F1,2	1.9	6:46
1053 - Person Down	255	1,450	290	0,F1	2.1	8:39
1056 - Suicide	277	1,113	223	0,F1,2	3.6	6:24
5150 - Mental Illness	827	4,807	961	0,F1,2,3	2.4	6:46
DBF - Dead Body	97	397	79	0,F1	3.3	5:51
Property Crime (FBI Part I Crimes) Classification (n = 26,421)						
10851 - Stolen Vehicle	631	3,639	728	0,2,3	1.3	9:02
10855 - Embezzled Vehicle	18	68	14	4	1.1	8:39
212 5 - Residential Robbery	1	5	1	0	7.4	5:51
451 - Arson	37	134	27	0,F1,3	2.9	5:28
459 - Burglary	597	3,911	782	0,F1,2,3	2.1	7:32
459A - Auto Burglary	1,590	6,667	1,333	0,F1,2,3	1.5	6:47
484 - Theft	2,161	10,556	2,111	0,F1,2,3,4	1.7	6:59
484C - Theft In-Custody	72	407	81	0,F1,2	1.9	6:59
487 - Grand Theft	299	1,034	207	2,4	1.9	6:59
Traffic Classification (n = 98,503)						
1124 - Abandoned Vehicle	524	2,393	479	3,4	1.1	6:46
1148 - Transportation	255	623	125	3	1.9	3:40
1181 - Minor Injuries	478	2,635	527	0,F1,2,3	3.4	6:24
1182 - Non Injury	496	2,819	564	0,F1,2,3,4	1.6	6:46
1183 - Unknown Injuries	200	1,261	252	0,F1,2,3	3	6:59
1194 - Pedestrian Stop	1,739	9,157	1,831	0,F1,2,4	1.8	8:39
1194B - Bike Stop	442	2,784	557	0	1.6	8:39
1196 - Suspicious Vehicle	859	4,360	872	0,F1,2	2	6:46

Call Type	2019 Events	Total Events	Average Yearly events	Priorities Assigned in CAD	Average Personnel per Event	Median Time Spent on Event after Dispatch (Minutes and Seconds)
20001 - Hit & Run Injuries	74	330	66	0,F1,2,3	3.3	6:46
20002 - Hit & Run Prop.	917	4,562	912	0,F1,2,3	1.6	7:09
23103 - Reckless Vehicle	553	2,894	579	2	1.3	8:39
23109 - Exhibition of Speed	49	220	44	2	1.2	6:46
HOT - Vehicle Pursuit	0	2	0	0	4	2:30
PRKVIO - Parking Violation	2,797	13,613	2,723	0,F1,2,4	1.1	4:52
RECOVR - Stolen Vehicle Recovery	215	1,326	265	0,2,3	1.5	8:51
T - Traffic Stop	9,130	44,797	8,959	0,F1,2	1.5	6:46
TRFHAZ - Traffic Hazard	799	3,734	747	0,F1,2,3	1.3	6:46
VCVIO - Vehicle Violation	266	864	173	3,4	1.1	5:27
VEHACC - Vehicle Accident	0	1	0		1	7:54
VREL - Vehicle Release	0	1	0		2	10:30
VVER - VIN Verification	15	127	25	4	1.1	4:51
Violent Crime (FBI Part I Crimes) Classification (n = 2,465)						
1071 - Shooting	8	24	5	0,2	11.4	6:46
211 - Robbery	341	1,571	314	0,F1,2,3	5.8	6:12
215 - Carjacking	14	40	8	0,F1,2	7	4:34
220 - Sexual Assault	1	16	3	0,2	2.4	4:51
243 - Serious Battery	5	63	13	0,2	3	6:46
244 - Assault w/ Caustic Substance	13	47	9	0,2	3.3	5:31
245 - Assault w/Deadly Weapon	74	383	77	0,F1,2,3	5.3	6:12
246 - Shots at Dwelling	8	44	9	0,2	2.8	5:15
261 - Rape	55	267	53	0,2	2.5	5:55
288A - Child molest	2	10	2	2	1.9	11:16

Source: Auditor's analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data

Mission Statement

Promoting transparency and accountability in Berkeley government.

Audit Team

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Photographs provided by Berkeley Police Department

Copies of our audit reports are available at
www.cityofberkeley.info/Auditor/Home/Audit_Reports.aspx



BERKELEY CITY AUDITOR



To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
From: Jenny Wong, City Auditor *zw*
Subject: Audit Report: Data Analysis of the City of Berkeley's Police Response

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend City Council request that the City Manager report back by November 16, 2021, and every six months thereafter, regarding the status of our audit recommendations until reported fully implemented by the Police Department.

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS

We analyzed the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data from 2015 to 2019. We analyzed characteristics of events, characteristics of officer-initiated stops, and characteristics of police responses.

From 2015-2019, Berkeley police responded to a total of 360,242 events, or an average of 72,048 events per year. Ten call types accounted for 54 percent of all events—traffic stops, disturbance, audible alarm, noise disturbance, security check, welfare check, parking violation, suspicious circumstance, trespassing, and theft. Officer-initiated responses were 27 percent of event responses, while 55 percent were the result of calls to the non-emergency line and 18 percent were from 911 calls.

During that time, Berkeley police initiated 56,070 stops. We found 78 percent of officer-initiated stops were vehicle stops, the majority of which did not lead to a search and most led to a warning. Mirroring prior findings by the Center for Policing Equity, data we reviewed showed Black people were stopped at a significantly higher rate than their representation in the population (34 percent compared to 8 percent), and Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to be searched following a stop.

BPD dispatched an average of 1.8 patrol officers per event. Three or more officers responded to 40 percent of events. Events designated as (high) Priority Level 0-2 accounted for 56 percent of events, which require a response time of 20 minutes or less, while 44 percent were lower priority requiring a response time of an hour or longer from a call.

We found that the number of events that involved homelessness or mental health and the amount of time police spent responding to these events are not quantifiable due to insufficient data. We also found that The City's Open Data Portal provides the public with limited information about events that BPD responds to. There are opportunities for BPD to improve transparency by increasing the type and scope of data available on the portal.

We recommend BPD identify all calls for service that have an apparent mental health and/or homelessness component. We also recommend BPD expand the current calls for service data available on the City Open Data Portal to include all call types and data fields for as many years as possible. BPD agrees with our recommendations.

BACKGROUND

Following the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police in May 2020, a national conversation ensued about policing, race, and the proper level of resources cities should devote to law enforcement. The Berkeley City Council held several meetings and hundreds of community members provided. Initially proposed by Councilmember Bartlett and incorporated by Mayor Arreguín, analysis of police data was included in Safety for All: The George Floyd Community Safety Act, a broader item on policing that City Council passed in July 2020. We offered to conduct the analysis.

This audit is intended to give decision makers and the public a broad overview of calls for service, officer-initiated stops, and police responses and to help inform the community engagement process around reimagining policing in Berkeley, which is currently underway. Our report examined data from 2015 through 2019.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

There are no identifiable environmental effects or opportunities associated with this report.

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION


Implementing our recommendations will increase transparency and build a richer data set. The audit does not propose recommendations with regard to police activities or personnel allocations. There is a separate community process for reimagining public safety and policing.

CONTACT PERSON






Jenny Wong, City Auditor, City Auditor's Office, 510-981-6750

Attachments:

1: Audit Report: Data Analysis of the City of Berkeley's Police Response



NEW AND EMERGING MODELS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY AND POLICING



NICJR ★
National Institute for
Criminal Justice Reform

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- Black Public Safety Alliance (Chicago Police Department)
- Police Diversity
- Warrior vs. Guardian Mentality
- Training
 - Procedural Justice
 - Implicit Bias
 - De-escalation
 - Community Engagement
 - Data-Driven Risk Management

DRAFT

Introduction

As a part of the City of Berkeley’s Reimagining Public Safety process, the National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) was commissioned to conduct an assessment of programs and models that increase safety, properly respond to emergencies, reduce crime and violence, and improve policing. The New and Emerging Models of Community Safety and Policing report has been prepared in response to that charge. NICJR submits this report to the Reimagining Public Safety Taskforce (RPSTF) for review and feedback, and to inform the RPSTF’s development of recommendations for submission to the Berkeley City Council (Council) on alternative responses and police reforms.

The report comprises a brief overview of several examples of Emerging Non-Enforcement Models of Community Response; Non-Law Enforcement Crime Reduction Strategies; Community Driven Violence Reduction Strategies; and Policing Strategies. As hundreds of cities across the country engage in reimagining public safety processes and launching new programs or altering existing models, this report could not possibly be universally comprehensive; it does however provide the RPSTF and the Council with illustrative examples of key options to consider as the City of Berkeley (City) reimagines its public safety system.

NICJR’s second commissioned report for the City, Alternative Responses to Law Enforcement, will draw from and build upon the new and emerging models outlined herein.

Emerging Non-Enforcement Models of Community Response

Police departments receive a large volume of 911 calls or other Calls for Service (CFS) requesting emergency response. In the past several decades policing has evolved from officers walking beats to departments primarily responding to CFS with patrol officers in squad cars. A number of new assessments of these CFS have revealed that a majority are low-level or even non-criminal in nature, like noise complaints, abandoned cars, and petty theft. Multiple analyses have estimated that less than 2 percent of CFS are for violent incidents.^{1,2} Retired Chicago police officer David Franco explains “We spend entire shifts dealing with noncriminal matters from disturbance and suspicious person calls...With so many low-level issues put on our shoulders, police cannot prioritize the serious crimes.”³

In addition to responding to a high volume of low-level and non-criminal 911 CFS, police have also been increasingly asked to respond to people experiencing mental health crises. Many of these encounters have resulted in uses of force by police, including deadly officer involved shootings. A number of the emerging examples of effective community driven crime reduction and emergency response models focus specifically on mental health incidents.

Eugene Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Streets (CAHOOTS)

Crisis Assistance Helping Out on The Streets, or CAHOOTS, is a mobile emergency intervention service established in 1989 in Eugene, Oregon.⁴ This program is free and readily available twenty-four hours a day for mental health and other non-violent related calls.⁵ CAHOOTS is directed by the White Bird Clinic, a regional health center in partnership with the City of Eugene. Each CAHOOTS unit is comprised of an emergency medical technician (EMT) and a mental health service provider.⁶

¹<https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/understanding-police-enforcement-911-analysis.pdf#page=134>

²<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/upshot/unrest-police-time-violent-crime.html>

³<https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/12/9/22166229/chicago-police-department-911-calls-civilian-community-responders-cpd>

⁴<https://www.mentalhealthportland.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2018CAHOOTSBROCHURE.pdf>

⁵<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2019/10/02/475220/neighborhood-strengthening-public-safety-community-empowerment/>

⁶<https://www.mentalhealthportland.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2018CAHOOTSBROCHURE.pdf>

CAHOOTS staff are required to go through 40 hours of classroom education and over 500 hours of field work that is supervised by a qualified guide. Their education consists of de-escalation methods and emergency response services. CAHOOTS personnel are able to perform wellness checks, offer mental health services and substance use resources, administer medical aid, and provide mediation assistance.⁷

More than 60 percent of CAHOOTS clients are experiencing homelessness and nearly 30 percent have serious mental illness. CAHOOTS received more than 24,000 calls in 2019, with the number of calls having steadily increased since the program's inception. Among all adults involved with CAHOOTS, the average age was 45.5 years.

Numerous evaluations have shown consistent, robust results with the CAHOOTS program. Many calls are diverted from the police, with CAHOOTS taking over 50 percent of non-emergent cases. This reduces a significant portion of the burden on the local police department. Between 2014 and 2017, the CAHOOTS program has saved the

Eugene Police Department approximately \$8.5 million each year. For all calls referred to CAHOOTS in 2019, only 1 percent necessitated police involvement. Furthermore, when factoring in emergency medical expenditures, the program saves Eugene's government an additional \$2.9 million every year.⁸

Several cities have explored or are currently implementing replications of CAHOOTS. In Oakland, the city is preparing to launch the Mobile Assistance Community Responders of Oakland (MACRO) initiative.⁹ The pilot program will be managed by the Oakland Fire Department and will be available twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week in two person teams. The City of Oakland has allocated an initial \$1.85 million to fund MACRO, although the Oakland Reimagining Public Safety Task Force has recently recommended that the budget be increased significantly to support the program expansion and sustainability.¹⁰

⁷Id.

⁸<https://www.mentalhealthportland.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2018CAHOOTSBROCHURE.pdf>

⁹https://urbanstrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/USC-MACRO-REPORT-6_10_20.pdf

¹⁰<https://www.ems1.com/mental-health/articles/calif-city-plans-to-run-non-police-mental-health-response-program-through-fire-department-qk3lf0p2Svqxc1uj/>

Denver Support Team Assisted Response (STAR)

Based on the CAHOOTS program in Eugene, Oregon, STAR is a community responder model created in 2020. STAR is a joint effort between many stakeholders, including the Denver Police Department (DPD), Denver's Paramedic Division, Mental Health Center of Denver, and community-based organizations. STAR provides direct, emergency response to residents of the community who are experiencing difficulties connected to mental health, poverty, homelessness, or substance use. The STAR transport vehicle operates Monday through Friday from 10 AM to 6 PM. The time frame of operation was chosen based on an analysis of CSF data.¹¹ STAR unit staff are made up of unarmed personnel, with each team including a mental health service provider and a paramedic.¹²

Before the implementation of STAR, calls to 911 were either transmitted to the DPD or the hospital system. The majority of calls (68 percent) routed to STAR concerned individuals that were experiencing homelessness. Around 41 percent of individuals who STAR had been involved with were referred to additional services by the STAR unit staff.¹³

¹¹https://wp-denverite.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2021/02/STAR_Pilot_6_Month_Evaluation_FINAL-REPORT.pdf

¹²<https://www.9news.com/article/news/denver-star-program-results-police/73-90e50e08-94c5-474d-8e94-926d42f8f41d>

In just half a year after the program was established, the STAR unit had addressed 748 calls. The DPD was never called to support the unit in responding to these CSF. Moreover, there were no arrests made in any of the calls evaluated during the initial six months of program operation. The City of Denver is planning to invest an additional \$3 million in 2021 to expand the program.

Olympia Crisis Response Unit (CRU)

Incorporating both CAHOOTS principles and crisis intervention teams, the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) was implemented in Olympia, Washington in April 2019, as a result of a 2017 citywide safety measure that allocated an initial half million dollars for an improved crisis response model. The Olympia Police Department (OPD) contracted with a community-based organization to serve as a new option for behavioral health calls for service. The CRU team consists of six mental health professionals that operate in pairs. Along with a state certification in behavioral health, CRU staff must undergo training that includes police patrol exposure, community engagement, and education about available community support.¹⁴

¹³Id.

¹⁴<https://www.vera.org/behavioral-health-crisis-alternatives/cru-and-familiar-faces>

CRU operates from 7 AM to 9 PM daily, supplying clients with supports such as mediation, housing assistance, and referrals to additional services.¹⁵ Police lines of communication are utilized by CRU staff to identify situations that necessitate CRU response. The City's 911 operations hub and law enforcement personnel can also refer callers directly to CRU. Often, 911 callers request CRU assistance specifically, as the team has fostered strong community ties. Moreover, a significant portion of calls for service referred to CRU originate from community-based service providers, as opposed to the 911 system itself. When CRU staff encounter a frequent flyer-- an individual the team has been called on to support multiple times-- they refer the individual to Familiar Faces, a peer navigation program.¹⁶

Most individuals who were assisted by CRU were experiencing homelessness or mental health issues at the time of service. Out of the 511 calls CRU engaged with from April to June of 2020, OPD was only needed 86 times. Establishing and maintaining trust between CRU and residents is an essential part of the initiative.¹⁷ Post-implementation surveys show that many police officers became advocates of the

model after seeing the program in action for six months.

San Francisco Street Crisis Response Team (SCRT)

The City and County of San Francisco has implemented a pilot alternative response program for individuals experiencing a behavioral health crisis. The San Francisco Fire Department, in conjunction with the Public Health Department, responds to 911 calls related to these issues via Street Crisis Response Teams (SCRT). Street Crisis Response Teams include a behavioral health specialist, peer interventionist, and a first responder. Currently, there are two teams that work 12-hour shifts, but there are plans to expand to six teams to provide an around-the-clock response.¹⁸

SCRT collaborated with community-based organizations including the Glide Foundation and HealthRIGHT360 to ensure that community providers and local residents would be able to provide feedback and input about the new program. The proposed SCRT budget for fiscal year 2021-2022 is approximately \$13.5 million, which includes staff training and team expansion. An

¹⁵<https://olympiawa.gov/city-services/police-department/Crisis-Response-Peer-Navigator.aspx>

¹⁶<https://www.vera.org/behavioral-health-crisis-alternatives/cru-and-familiar-faces>

¹⁷<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2020/10/28/492492/community-responder-model/>

¹⁸<https://sfmayor.org/article/san-franciscos-new-street-crisis-response-team-launches-today>

evaluation of the pilot program place is currently underway.¹⁹

When 911 calls come into the dispatch center that are determined to be appropriate for SCRT, SCRT is dispatched; a team responds on average in fifteen minutes. No calls for service routed to SCRT required police action or backup in the first two months of the pilot. Approximately 74 percent of individuals assisted by SCRT had their issues resolved, whether it be through transfers to additional supports or de-escalation techniques.²⁰ Initial analyses show that SCRT could respond to up to 17,000 behavioral health calls each year. Because of the small scope of the initial pilot, only 20 percent of behavioral health calls received during the first two months of implementation were able to be responded to by the SCRT.

Austin Expanded Mobile Crisis Outreach Team (EMCOT)

In order to reduce the burden on the Austin Police Department (APD) associated with mental health calls, the City of Austin, Texas established the Expanded Mobile Crisis Outreach Team (EMCOT) in conjunction with Integral Care, the City's community-based mental health service provider. EMCOT

assists individuals undergoing a behavioral or mental health crisis. Agencies such as APD or the Sheriff's Office are able to call for EMCOT services by way of the 911 dispatch hub. EMCOT provides its clients with supports in the form of therapy, life coaching, rehabilitation, and other services.²¹

Since its establishment in 2013, EMCOT has assisted 6,859 clients. The most recently available data is from FY2017, which shows that EMCOT responded to 3,244 CFS, at a rate of approximately 9 times per day. Each client was served for an average of 21 days and provided three different types of supports. In general, post-crisis services are available for up to 3 months after initial contact.²² Integral Care reported that 86 percent of calls routed to a mental health response did not require police backup.²³

EMCOT is currently available from 8AM to 12AM Monday through Friday and 10AM to 8PM on Saturday and Sunday.²⁴ With the additional funding, EMCOT is now projected to provide around-the-clock availability for calls for service. Expansion of telehealth services for the program is also included in the

¹⁹https://www.sfdph.org/dph/files/IWG/SCRT_IWG_Issue_Brief_FINAL.pdf

²⁰Id.

²¹<https://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=302634>

²²Id.

²³<https://www.kxan.com/news/local/austin/new-911-call-option-offers-direct-mental-health-help-that-one-attorney-says-may-have-saved-one-familys-son/>

²⁴<https://www.fox7austin.com/news/crisis-counselors-responding-to-more-mental-health-calls-in-austin>

new funding.²⁵ For all CFS involving EMCOT, 85.4 percent were handled without police officers.²⁶

In 2020, a new dispatch system was established in Austin and a mental health paraprofessional was permanently stationed in the 911 dispatch center. Callers to 911 now have the option to request mental health services instead of police.²⁷ If the operator determines the caller would benefit from these supports, the call is handed over to a mental health professional. If a clinician is unavailable at the time, an EMCOT staff member is deployed. Currently, the clinicians are present all week for a set number of hours each day. This initiative was funded by the reallocation of \$11 million from the Austin Police Department's budget. The EMCOT budget itself was also recently increased to \$1.3 million, a 75 percent increase in funding for the program.²⁸

Houston Crisis Call Diversion (CCD)

The Crisis Call Diversion (CCD) program in Houston, Texas is a joint effort between the fire department, police department, emergency center, and mental health service providers in the

area. In 2017, the Houston Police Department (HPD) received 37,032 calls for service that involved behavior or mental health problems. When calls for service come in, dispatchers flag any that would necessitate CCD response--non-emergency behavioral and mental health calls. Once flagged, these callers are connected to CCD counselors. The CCD counselor evaluates the situation and the mental health of the caller and attempts to provide assistance over the phone.²⁹

If additional community response or police presence is needed, the dispatcher can request that as well. The call is taken off the police dispatch line when the CCD dispatcher verifies that the CCD team is on the way to the scene. CCD teams can contact the caller while traveling to the specified location in order to collect as much relevant information as possible. Upon examination of the data, each rerouted call generates savings of nearly \$4,500. To date, the CCD program has allowed for a diversion of 7,264 calls from the emergency lines, freeing up valuable emergency resources and resulting in millions of dollars in savings.³⁰

²⁵<http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/pi/document.cfm?id=320044>

²⁶<https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2020/08/integral-care-set-to-address-most-mental-health-emergency-calls-without-involving-apd/>

²⁷<https://www.kvue.com/article/news/health/apd-adds-mental-health-services-to-911-answering-script/269-e7dde2e6-4a65-4d5c-a2a7-a26e57110a81>

²⁸<https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2020/08/integral-care-set-to-address-most-mental-health-emergency-calls-without-involving-apd/>

²⁹<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2020/10/28/492492/community-responder-model/>

³⁰<https://www.houstoncit.org/ccd/>

Ithaca Department of Community Solutions and Public Safety

In February 2021, the Mayor of Ithaca, New York, proposed the creation of a new Department of Community Solutions and Public Safety that would replace the Ithaca Police Department.³¹ This new department would include both armed officers and unarmed workers who focus on crime and neighborhood service. The department would work with a new alternative service provider that provides non-law enforcement crisis intervention and support. All current police officers would have to reapply to be employed by the new department.

The proposal is a part of the Ithaca Reimagining Public Safety Collaborative and a response to the New York State Governor's Executive Order mandating every police department in the state to submit a reform plan by April 1, 2021.³²

The new Department of Community Solutions and Public Safety would be charged with implementing an alternative to the police response system and establishing a pilot program for non-emergency calls, implementing a culturally responsive training program that includes de-escalation techniques, and developing a comprehensive community healing plan.

Other initiatives proposed under this strategy include standardizing a data review process on traffic stops as well as consistent reviews of officers' body camera footage. Minor grievances would be outsourced to neighborhood mediation centers. Adolescent engagement support programs would be broadened in order to reach those at high risk of violence. The new personnel of the Department would be recruited from a more varied body of applicants as well to reflect the residents of the city in which they operate.³³

In order to oversee the recommendations made by the Mayor and Ithaca Reimagining Public Safety Collaborative, the City of Ithaca has arranged for the creation of an operations hub known as the Community Justice Center (CJC). The CJC will have its own full-time staff including but not limited to a project manager and a data analyst. The CJC is set to give progress updates to the Tompkins County Legislature and the City of Ithaca Mayor to ensure each recommendation is properly addressed.³⁴

³¹<https://www.gq.com/story/ithaca-mayor-svante-myrick-police-reform>

³²<https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-new-guidance-police-reform-collaborative-reinvent-and-modernize>

³³<https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1NTZ6j6WRze75m5fTuf-wC4BgC-1ddJnO>

³⁴Id.

*Tiered Dispatch & Community
Emergency Response Network*

NICJR has proposed a tiered dispatch system for CFS, a model that would include a robust, structured, and well-trained team of community responders

– a Community Emergency Response Network (CERN). Based on the type of CFS received, dispatch would deploy CERN and/or police according to the following tiered system:

TIER 1: CERN dispatched only

- Type of calls: non-criminal or low-level with no report of potential violence

TIER 2: CERN lead, with officers present if needed

- Type of calls: non-criminal with low potential of violence or low-level criminal

TIER 3: Officers lead, with CERN present

- Type of calls: low-to-moderate potential of violence; an arrest may be likely
- If officers arrive on scene and determine there is no need for an arrest and violence is unlikely, the officers step back and have CERN take the lead

TIER 4: Officers only

- Type of calls: serious and violent incidents; high likelihood of arrest

Non-Law Enforcement Crime Reduction Strategies

New York City Mayor's Action Plan (MAP) for Neighborhood Safety

The Mayor's Action Plan for Neighborhood Safety (MAP) was launched in 2014 in fifteen New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) properties. MAP was designed to foster productive dialogue between local residents and law enforcement agencies, address physical disorganization, and bolster pro-social community bonds. Disorganized neighborhoods are characterized by dense poverty, a lack of social mobility, and underdeveloped community connections. These factors contribute to circumstances that make a given neighborhood more vulnerable to crime and violence.³⁵ The 15 housing developments chosen for the program account for approximately 20 percent of violence in NYCHA housing.³⁶

MAP's focal point is NeighborhoodStat, a process that allows local officials and residents to communicate directly with each other. Issues in each particular housing development are addressed in local meetings which involve multiple

stakeholders, including residents, community-based organizations, law enforcement, and government officials. NeighborhoodStat allows residents to have a say in the way New York City (NYC) allocates its public safety resources. The process is facilitated by a team of 15 community members who conduct polls and interviews to determine what the residents feel are the biggest issues in their neighborhoods. NeighborhoodStat also utilizes data analyses regarding employment, physical structure, access to resources, and other metrics into its recommendations in order to identify key areas of focus. At community meetings, this data and other benchmarks for performance are presented by community-based partners, allowing for full transparency. Residents and law enforcement also put forward their concerns and ideas. Once problems are pinpointed through meaningful dialogue, residents and NYC officials come together to generate solutions, which are then implemented by the Mayor's Office and assessed over time.³⁷

Other initiatives MAP has undertaken include providing employment and life coaching services to youth who are at most risk for violence. MAP also focuses on addressing major chronic

³⁵http://www.children.gov.on.ca/htdocs/English/professionals/oyap/roots/volume5/chapter04_social_disorganization.aspx

³⁶<https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/map/>

³⁷<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2019/10/02/475220/neighborhoodstat-strengthening-public-safety-community-empowerment/>

disease determinants, including low physical activity levels and nutrient-poor diets. Programs such as NYPD Anti-Violence basketball games and pop-up healthy food stands have been established. In addition, public infrastructure has been improved through enhanced lighting, green spaces, and park improvements.³⁸

Early evaluations of MAP show promising results for a reduction in various crimes as well as increased perception of healthier neighborhoods. Significantly, misdemeanor offenses against individuals decreased in developments where residents expressed a positive change in their neighborhood's condition.³⁹ Furthermore, shootings in MAP sites decreased by 17.1 percent in 2015 and 2016 when compared with non-MAP sites.⁴⁰

Domestic Violence

Every year, an estimated 10 million people in the US experience domestic and family violence. Often a cycle of abuse is perpetuated in these situations, as experience with previous violence is a strong predictor for future abuse.⁴¹ The financial expense of domestic and family violence is projected to be \$12

billion each year. In Berkeley, approximately 2,000 reports related to domestic violence are registered annually; the actual number of incidents is probably much higher.⁴²

Domestic violence is a difficult and complex problem. Laws have been established that mandate arrests even for minor incidents; these same laws have generated a growing movement of survivors calling for non-enforcement responses. The challenges here are significant, as a lack of intervention can lead to serious injury and death, primarily of women and transgender women.

An additional complication in domestic violence work is the re-traumatization of survivors that occurs in the judicial system. When survivors of domestic violence endeavor to obtain recourse through the courts, they are often blamed for the abuse and undergo a disparagement of their character. Moreover, testimony is often given in an open court setting, which requires that a survivor recount the abuse they have undergone while simultaneously appearing composed in order to credibly convey their trauma, often in the presence of their abuser.⁴³ Reliving

³⁸<https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/map/>

³⁹https://johnjayrec.nyc/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MAP_EvalUpdate06.pdf

⁴⁰https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2016/mayors_action_plan_for_neighborhood_safety.pdf

⁴¹<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK499891/>

⁴²https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Health_Human_Services/Level_3_-_General/dvfactsheet.pdf

⁴³<https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/a-justice-system-that-re-traumatizes-assault-survivors/>

one's trauma and facing an abuser can cause feelings of helplessness, anxiety, and PTSD to surface in the survivor. Unfortunately, re-traumatization often results in a major roadblock for survivors to pursue justice in domestic violence cases.⁴⁴

There is a significant overlap in addressing domestic violence incidence and anti-poverty work, as intimate partner violence is correlated with devastating monetary effects on survivors who seek to leave their abusive situations. Interventions such as economic education and employment training can both reduce violence and provide critically necessary financial support.

Major domestic violence support programs implemented by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) include STOP Sexual Violence (SV) and the Preventing Intimate Partner Violence (IPV).⁴⁵ According to the CDC, these strategies focus on promoting social norms that protect against violence; teaching skills to prevent SV; providing opportunities, both economic and social, to empower and support girls and women; creating protective environments; and supporting victims/survivors to reduce harms.

⁴⁴<https://arizonalawreview.org/pdf/62-1/62arizlrev81.pdf>

⁴⁵<http://www.preventconnect.org/2019/08/addressing-poverty-to-prevent-violence/>

⁴⁶<https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipv-technicalpackages.pdf>

Research indicates that IPV is most prevalent in adolescence and young adulthood and then begins to decline with age, demonstrating the critical importance of early prevention efforts.⁴⁶ Analyses of these financial support programs have demonstrated results including increased confidence for survivors as well as decreases in domestic assault incidences.⁴⁷

Another area of focus has been to revisit the mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence calls in place in many jurisdictions.⁴⁸ Alternatives to this approach emphasize coordinated community response teams that maximize the role of community. An effective model integrates other providers, including faith leaders and the courts.⁴⁹

Commercial Sexual Exploitation

Sexual exploitation of minors has historically been difficult to adequately address. This is due to a plethora of factors, ranging from difficulty with identification of adolescents who experience sexual exploitation to a limited understanding of the various methods used to traffic children and the best approaches to engage the victims.⁵⁰ Too often, sexually exploited

⁴⁷<https://vawnet.org/material/economic-empowerment-domestic-violence-survivors>

⁴⁸<https://opdv.ny.gov/help/fss/part22.html>

⁴⁹<https://www.bwjp.org/our-work/topics/ccr-models.html>

⁵⁰<https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/mpg/literature-review/csec-sex-trafficking.pdf>

minors have faced arrest and incarceration instead of intervention and support.⁵¹ More than one thousand children are arrested for “prostitution” annually. However, anywhere from 57,000 to 63,000 individuals are estimated to be involved in commercial sexual exploitation in the United States, a disproportionate number being youth of color.⁵²

The Vera Institute has produced a screening procedure for service providers to follow when encountering an individual who could potentially be a survivor of sexual exploitation. Consisting of a thirty-subject questionnaire, the Trafficking Victim Identification Tool (TVIT), serves to aid in trafficking victim identification. Evaluations have proven that the tool has high accuracy and validity rates.⁵³ Health care providers, social workers, legal aid personnel, and others can use the screening tool to better identify those who have experienced commercial sexual exploitation.⁵⁴

Many community-based organizations have established programs that outreach, support, and provide services to minors who have been sexually

exploited. It is critical that community-based service providers have the requisite training and education to provide appropriate services and interventions to this population who have experienced abuse, trauma, and exploitation. The training should be trauma-informed, and screeners should be focused on establishing trust with their clients.⁵⁵ Organizations like FAIR Girls (Washington, D.C.) and MISSEY (Oakland, CA) have initiatives that intervene directly with girls who have been exploited. At MISSEY, case workers engage at-risk youth in the Alameda County foster system and offer them support and services in the form of financial resources, life coaching, and housing.⁵⁶ In Washington DC, young girls that stayed at the FAIR Girls group home had a 58 percent higher likelihood of permanently withdrawing from commercial sexual exploitation when compared with those who were not provided housing.⁵⁷

Traffic Enforcement

Data from The Stanford Open Policing Project shows that Black men and women are stopped at a higher rate than white drivers and are more likely to be fatally shot during the course of that

⁵¹<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/05/child-prostitutes-arent-criminals-so-why-do-we-keep-putting-them-in-jail/>

⁵²<https://www.vera.org/publications/out-of-the-shadows-identification-of-victims-of-human-trafficking>

⁵³<https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/human-trafficking-identification-tool-summary-v2.pdf>

⁵⁴<https://www.vera.org/publications/out-of-the-shadows-identification-of-victims-of-human-trafficking>

⁵⁵Id.

⁵⁶<https://missey.org/foster-youth-program/>

⁵⁷<https://fairgirls.org/vida-home/>

traffic stop.⁵⁸ To significantly lessen the exposure of the general public to the police and instead address transportation violations without law enforcement involvement, a number of strategies have been employed: reallocation of certain traffic services to non-law enforcement organizations; the implementation of automation; and elimination of certain police responses.⁵⁹

In the City of Berkeley, the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) performed approximately 11,000 traffic stops in 2019. Black people were stopped by BPD at a rate 4.3 times than their representative population in the City.⁶⁰ This disproportionate traffic enforcement highlights the need to change policies and practices regarding traffic stops.

Reducing the use of police officers in traffic enforcement is one potential solution; this approach can be greatly enabled by technology. Speeding and red-light violations are two areas that constitute a large portion of traffic enforcement. There are 19 states that allow speed cameras, and 21 states that allow red-light camera usage.⁶¹ Implementing automatic speed citations

along with red-light cameras could allow for a reduction of up to 20 percent of police interactions. It is important to note that although this technology is successful at reducing the need for police, it can generate other issues such as enforcement problems and privacy concerns.⁶²

As Berkeley is considering through the Berkeley Department of Transportation (BerKDOT) initiative, transferring traffic enforcement duties to an agency of unarmed staff can limit problematic police contact with motorists.

Another potential strategy is illustrated by a pilot program in Staten Island, New York, aimed at reducing the number of calls for service related to minor car accidents.⁶³ When a call comes in regarding a car accident, dispatch will determine if the accident is minor or serious enough to merit police response. If an accident is deemed to be minor, all individuals involved in the crash simply complete an accident report and then exchange contact and identification information.⁶⁴

Lastly, ending pre-textual stops for minor traffic infractions, as proposed by the Berkeley Mayor's Fair and Impartial

⁵⁸<https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/>

⁵⁹<https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/non-police-enforcement-of-civil-traffic-violations.pdf>

⁶⁰<https://sites.google.com/view/saferstreetsberkeley/home>

⁶¹<https://www.ghsa.org/state-laws/issues/speed%20and%20red%20light%20cameras>

⁶²<https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-cities-hit-brakes-red-light-cameras.html>

⁶³<https://www.silive.com/news/2019/03/nypd-dont-call-911-for-crashes-without-injuries.html>

⁶⁴<https://abc7ny.com/traffic/nypd-rolls-out-pilot-program-wont-respond-to-every-accident/5205383/>

Policing Workgroup and approved by the City Council in March 2021, could significantly reduce traffic stops. This issue is addressed in more detail in the Policing section of this report.

Neighbor Disputes

Police officers are frequently the first personnel called in when there is a dispute, even a minor one, between neighbors. These events can encompass a broad array of issues, from property damage, blocking a driveway, to noise complaints. Even if police do intervene, the solution is often only temporarily, rather than resolving the root problems that caused the conflict. Police response wastes time and resources and can lead to escalation and violence.⁶⁵ Furthermore, neighbor conflicts in low-income and communities of color have a higher likelihood of resulting in an arrest.⁶⁶

Community mediation is a strategy that has proven to reduce police calls for service and decrease the burden on police for nuisance complaints. Several cities have implemented community medication programs to utilize non-enforcement options to resolve neighbor disputes. In areas where community mediation is prioritized,

neighborhood social ties are strengthened, and communities are more harmonious. Moreover, residents who participate in community mediation use less court and police resources. In a study analyzing mediation's effect in Baltimore, Maryland, for example, researchers found that community mediation for neighbor disputes decreased calls for service to the Baltimore Police Department. For a single mediation session, the Baltimore Police Department produced cost savings between \$208 and \$1,649. Among individuals who went through a mediation, the likelihood of arrest and prosecution was lower when compared to those who did not participate.⁶⁷

Neighbor disputes can also be triaged through a 311 system. Priority is given to complaints based on frequency and the potential to escalate into violence. Outsourcing responses to neighborhood organizations and associations that can operate in conjunction with police officers can be valuable in order to promote a peaceful resolution to violent disputes. These organizations can also conduct sweeps through neighborhoods in order to gain valuable information regarding any disputes.⁶⁸

⁶⁵<https://mdmediation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Quantitative-Analysis.pdf>

⁶⁶https://mdmediation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Giving_Police_and_Courts_a_Break.pdf

⁶⁷Id.

⁶⁸https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/default/files/2020-spi_spotlight_series-retailiatoryviolentdisputes_final.pdf

Community Driven Violence Reduction Strategies

Gun violence is a stubborn problem with sometimes unexplainable rises and falls in the rates of shootings in cities across the country. Violence is often concentrated in low-income neighborhoods, with Blacks and Latinos disproportionately experiencing the impacts. These 'hot spots' of violent crime experience a complex array of challenges, ranging from high rates of poverty and incarceration to poor quality education and a lack of trust in government institutions. Unfortunately, the effects of exposure to violence are widespread, affecting the health and development of not only those directly involved but also that of their families and communities. Even for those not directly impacted by gun violence, the [enormous financial costs](#) affect all taxpayers.

A small number of effective strategies highlighted in this report have however demonstrated success. When implemented with fidelity, these interventions have been successful at reducing violence, with many initiatives showing improvements in the first six to twelve months of implementation.

The four strategies highlighted below – 1) Group Violence Reduction Strategy (Ceasefire); 2) Hospital-Based Violence

Intervention; 3) Office of Neighborhood Safety/Advance Peace; and 4) Street Outreach – all incorporate similar best practices:

- Identifying and focusing on individuals, groups, and communities at the highest risk of being involved in violence;
- Employing Credible Messengers/community outreach workers to engage those individuals/ groups in a positive and trusting manner; and
- Providing ongoing services, supports, and opportunities to high-risk individuals.

These core elements are essential to the success of any violence intervention strategy.

Group Violence Reduction Strategy

Group Violence Reduction Strategy (GVRS) is known by many other names: Ceasefire, Focused Deterrence, and Gun Violence Intervention. GVRS is a comprehensive strategy that utilizes a data-driven process to identify the individuals and groups at the highest risk of committing or being involved in gun violence and deploying effective interventions with these individuals. Initially developed in Boston, where it was referred to as the “Boston Miracle”, GVRS has evolved as it has been implemented in cities including [Oakland](#) and Stockton, California, to include more

in-depth and intensive services and supports.⁶⁹

GVRs has four core components: Data-driven identification of those individuals and groups at highest risk of gun violence; direct and respectful communication to those at high risk; intensive services, supports, and opportunities; and as a last resort, Focused Enforcement.

Identification of Program Participants

GVRs employs a data-driven process to identify the individual and groups who are at the very highest risk of being involved in a shooting. This involves an initial Gun Violence Problem Analysis, which provides a thorough examination of the shootings and homicides in a city in the past two to three years in order to produce information about victim and suspect demographics, group conflicts in the area, prior history of violence, and general trends. The Problem Analysis provides a critical understanding of the dynamics of gun violence in a particular jurisdiction.

Due to the ever-evolving dynamics of gun violence, in addition to the detailed look back at gun violence, regular Shooting Reviews are also necessary. Shooting Reviews usually are weekly reviews by law enforcement and community violence intervention specialists (often these are two different

meetings) to review every shooting that has occurred in the past seven days and identify the shootings that have a likelihood of retaliation. For those shootings that have a likelihood of retaliation, the individuals who are likely to retaliate or be retaliated against are identified. For those who will not be arrested imminently, they are referred for intervention services.

Engagement: Direct and Respectful Communication

Once high-risk individuals and groups are identified, the GVRs strategy requires immediate engagement. This engagement involves direct and respectful communication to inform identified individuals of their risk and offering them services. There are two primary formats for these discussions: Group meetings, referred to as “Call-Ins” and individual meetings, sometimes referred to as “Customized Notifications”. At Call-Ins, the recently identified very high risk individuals are invited to attend a meeting with community leaders, law enforcement officials, formerly incarcerated individuals, survivors of violence, and service providers. All of these different stakeholders deliver the same message in their own way: based on your risk factors, you are at very high risk of being shot or being arrested for a shooting; the violence needs to end and we will do all we can to achieve that; we care about

⁶⁹<https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/dec/06/bostons-miracle-how-free-nappies-and-a-little-mentoring-are-curbing>

you; we want to offer you real and intensive services if you are interested. Treating the participants with dignity at a safe, neutral location is essential to a successful Call-In. Custom Notifications convey similar messages about the risk of violence and the availability of services. However, Custom Notifications are individual meetings where a high-ranking police officer and a community leader directly make contact with an individual at their home or community. Custom Notifications are frequently employed when the risk of violence is imminent or when individuals are unable to attend group meetings.

Provision of Services

Subsequent to a Call-In or a Custom Notification, individuals identified as being at very high risk of gun violence are directly connected to available services, supports, and opportunities. The first and primary service is a positive and trusting relationship with a Life Coach or Violence Intervention worker, someone with similar lived experiences as the people they are serving. These individuals are often known as Credible Messengers. The Life Coach or Intervention Worker is an intensive and personal relationship – which is the most important aspect of the services. Unlike service brokering based case management, contact between the Life Coach and the client must be frequent, flexible, consistent, and on-going for a long period of time. Life Coaches should have daily communication with every client on their

caseload, see each client in person 3-4 times per week, work with clients for at least six months but preferably 18 months, and develop a positive and trusting relationship. Once an initial rapport is established, Life Coaches then work with each client to develop a Life Plan. Life Plans include short and long-term target goals, desired outcomes, specific referrals to services/supports for the client, and specific educational resources regarding violence.

Though a client may need and want a particular service or resource, i.e., job placement or housing, the most important and potent aspect of the engagement is the relationship between the Life Coach and the client. Once a positive and trusting relationship is established, the Life Coach can gain influence with the client and use that influence to help the client make better decisions, leading to improved outcomes.

In Oakland's GVRS, clients are also eligible to receive monthly, modest financial incentive stipends for achieving certain milestones. Through two of the primary community based organizations that are contracted by the City of Oakland's Department of Violence Prevention to provide Intensive Life Coaches to GVRS clients – Community and Youth Outreach (CYO) and The Mentoring Center – they are also offered weekly cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) sessions to help clients

improve their decision making. CYO partners with NICJR to provide the innovative [Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise](#) CBT program.

Focused Enforcement

One of the overt goals of GVRS is to reduce the footprint of police by focusing enforcement on serious and violent crime, which officers spend a very small portion of their time on. Police departments are encouraged to forgo enforcement of minor infractions or engage in saturation or “scorched earth” tactics that are both ineffective and cause further distrust between communities and police.

For those individuals and groups who do not respond to the GVRS message and continue to engage in violence, there is follow-up supervision and focused enforcement by police, probation, parole, and prosecutors. Because a chief priority of the GVRS is elective agreement, these enforcement options are clearly communicated to high-risk individuals up front and are only instituted once violence occurs.⁷⁰ What this means in practical terms is that a GVRS client is not penalized for simply deciding to not participate in services. Enforcement comes as a last resort only

after someone has committed an act of violence.

Current Programs and Evaluations

The implementation of GVRS strategies typically results in a significant reduction in community-wide levels of homicides as well as nonfatal shootings. Positive results are magnified when the strategy is instituted in relation to a specific, highly victimized demographic. In Boston, Massachusetts, for example, where Operation Ceasefire was instituted with a specific focus on youth, a 63 percent reduction in the number of youth homicides was achieved.⁷¹ Other cities that have implemented GVRS-type programs have experienced similar results.⁷²

Oakland’s GVRS, which was launched at the end of 2012, and concentrated on high-risk individuals likely to be involved in violence, resulted in six consecutive years of reductions in shootings and homicides culminating in a 49 percent reduction in fatal and non-fatal shootings.⁷³ Toward the end of March 2020, before Covid-19 shelter in place restrictions were imposed, homicides were down by 38 year to date from 2019. Had Oakland maintained that low rate, it would have achieved the lowest

⁷⁰<https://nicjr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Oakland's-Successful-Gun-Violence-Reduction-Strategy-NICJR-Jan-2018.pdf>


⁷¹https://nnscommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/LE_Case_Studies.pdf

⁷²<https://nnscommunities.org/our-work/faqs/#7>

⁷³<https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Oakland-Ceasefire-Evaluation-Final-Report-May-2019.pdf>

murder rate in the city's history. But like nearly every city in the country, Oakland experienced a spike in shootings and

homicides once the Covid restrictions caused outreach and services to cease operation.



Hospital-Based Violence Intervention Programs (HVIPs)

Hospital-Based Violence Intervention Programs (HVIP), view violence through a public health-centered lens. Analogous to the spread of an illness, violence has been shown to proliferate with increased proximity and exposure to others.⁷⁴ That is, contact with violence itself increases the probability that those exposed will be directly involved in violence themselves.⁷⁵

Identification of Program Participants

Under the HVIP model, the physical location of a trauma center or emergency room is seen as valuable in the fight against violence. One of the major risk factors for future violence is a history of previous violence. Due to this, hospital workers pinpoint patients that are at highest likelihood for repeat injuries. This is done through initial intake screenings by hospital staff that test for previous trauma and linked effects such as PTSD, as well as

⁷⁴<https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/fatal.htm>
|

⁷⁵<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK207245/>

discharge screenings.⁷⁶ Although all HVIP programs employ a screening strategy, there is no standard protocol for assessing patient risk.⁷⁷

Engagement Strategy

HVIPs make use of the distinct cross-section of time—known as a “teachable moment”—in which after an injury an individual is open to making changes in their behavior and circumstances. During this time period, specialized hospital staff and community-based partners come together in support of the patient in order to diminish the chance of retaliation and further violence. HVIPs are especially important right now in the fight against violence, as injury recidivism rates have been shown to be as high as 60 percent in certain areas.⁷⁸

Many individuals are often entrenched in a cycle of violence that is nearly impossible to escape. Research has found that in these cases, a lack of social support and connections to the community were the largest drivers of the spread of violence.⁷⁹ HVIPs work to address these health determinants by connecting each patient with a highly trained Intervention Specialist. These professionals quickly engage the individual and their family by gaining

their trust in the hospital setting.⁸⁰ The most successful Intervention Specialists not only possess robust interpersonal skills and demonstrate cultural competence, but also reflect the diversity of their clients and the communities from which they originate.

Provision of Services

Once this initial bond is created, Intervention Specialists construct a comprehensive plan with their clients to spur on meaningful change. This plan includes non-violent crisis management methods, counseling for both the client and their family, information on risks and outcomes associated with violence, as well as access to community services including employment assistance, mentoring, education, and court assistance. Consultation with family and health providers is necessary to develop a plan that is feasible and trauma-informed. It is important to note that the plan can change, depending on what is best for the client. Ongoing management and follow-up with the client and their family for up to two years is necessary in order to attain long-term reductions in violence.⁸¹

Current Programs and Evaluations

⁷⁶<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d6f61730a2b610001135b79/t/5d83c0d9056f4d4cbdb9acd9/1568915699707/NNHVIP+White+Paper.pdf>

⁷⁷<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5647140/>

⁷⁸https://journals.lww.com/jtrauma/Abstract/2020/08000/Recidivism_rates_following_firearm_injury_as.17.aspx

⁷⁹<https://nyaspubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.05333.x>

⁸⁰<https://www.thehavi.org/what-is-an-hvip>

⁸¹<https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/spt/Programs/4186>

Analyses of HVIP programs have demonstrated considerable success, as evidenced by substantial reductions in repeat hospitalizations, an increase in employment rates for those involved in the programs, and cost savings from reduced injuries.

Caught in the Crossfire, an HVIP program based in Oakland, CA, is among the original HVIPs in the country. Through the use of Intervention Specialists who connect with injured youth at Oakland's Highland Hospital, Caught in the Crossfire resulted in a 70 percent lower probability of re-arrest six months after injury in an evaluation conducted in 2004.⁸² Due to its robust success, the model has been recreated in a multitude of cities.

Baltimore's Hospital-Based Violence Intervention Program (VIP) also demonstrated similar benefits in re-arrest numbers during a 3-year evaluation completed in 2000. With violence being the leading cause of mortality for youth in Baltimore, the VIP program uses risk factors to pinpoint patients who fit the intervention criteria.⁸³ This evaluation illustrates that individuals involved in the program had lower rates of both re-arrest, conviction, and subsequent incarceration.⁸⁴ VIP has

been a cost-effective intervention with positive outcomes. As such, VIP has plans to expand, with 7 more hospitals in the area committing to the program.

Abundant evidence has established that a decrease in the incidence of repeat injury would result in large monetary savings. The typical HVIP intervention would generate savings in health care damages, criminal justice expenses, and lost productivity costs. Studies project those estimated savings could be in excess of \$3.9 million annually per average HVIP.⁸⁵

Although more comprehensive research is necessary on the long-term outcomes of HVIPs, it is evident that they are critical in the effort to address interpersonal violence in communities. By reexamining violence as a public health issue, we have the potential to truly invest in communities.

Office of Neighborhood Safety/ Advance Peace

In 2007, the City of Richmond, CA launched the Office of Neighborhood Safety (ONS), amid escalating homicide rates and increasing numbers of firearm cases. Prior to the establishment of the ONS, the Richmond City Council

⁸²Id.

⁸³<https://www.dchealthmatters.org/promiseppractice/index/view?pid=3743>

⁸⁴https://journals.lww.com/jtrauma/Abstract/2020/08000/Recidivism_rates_following_firearm_injury_as.17.aspx

⁸⁵https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266785304_A_Cost-Benefit_Analysis_Simulation_of_a_Hospital-Based_Violence_Intervention_Program

analyzed violence in Richmond and found that gun violence disproportionately affected Black men aged 18-24, with that population constituting 73 percent of homicide fatalities.⁸⁶ This finding served as the basis for the creation of the Office of Neighborhood Safety; its main focus is achieving tangible reductions in firearm-related assaults and deaths and the subsequent founding of Advance Peace, a non-profit organization that replicates the ONS' Peacemaker Fellowship in cities across the county.

This goal is achieved through the implementation of strategic partnerships and interventions that strengthen neighborhood ties and promote community welfare. ONS works to provide resources including life skills training and mentoring to individuals who are at greatest risk of being involved in a gun violence incident. Currently, ONS assists 250+ individuals annually.

The ONS is composed of nine staff members including an Executive Director, four Neighborhood Change Agents (NCAs), and two Senior Peacekeepers.

Identification of Program Participants

The ONS employs a data-driven approach in identification of individuals at highest risk. Leveraging their

relationships in the community, NCAs conduct daily sweeps of their communities, an effort that provides a continuous flow of critical information that informs staff response. Staff are able to gather information regarding those individuals that are most prone to violence, current conflicts or family issues that may result in violence, and other information that is used to directly inform subsequent intervention activity.

In addition, ONS obtains data from the Richmond Police Department (RPD). This is facilitated through a police officer that serves as a liaison between RPD and ONS. This officer supplies ONS with homicide data each month, which includes demographic information. There is no information given from ONS to RPD whatsoever.⁸⁷ This assists ONS to identify those individuals at highest risk based on the data from law enforcement.

Provision of Services

ONS's main program is the Peacemaker Fellowship.® The Peacemaker Fellowship interrupts gun violence by providing transformational opportunities to young men involved in lethal firearm offenses and placing them in a high-touch, personalized fellowship. By working with and supporting a targeted group of individuals at the core of gun hostilities, the Peacemaker Fellowship bridges the gap between anti-violence

⁸⁶https://www.evidentchange.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/ons-process-evaluation.pdf

⁸⁷ Id.

programming and a hard-to-reach population at the center of violence in urban areas, thus breaking the cycle of gun hostilities and altering the trajectory of these men's lives. The Peacemaker Fellowship works with both public and community-based stakeholders to establish responsive community-driven strategies that achieve high-impact outcomes for those caught in the cycle of urban gun violence.

The Fellowship provides life coaching, mentoring, connection to needed services and cultural and educational excursions, known as Transformative Travel, to those deemed to be the very most dangerous individuals in the city. Fellows travel across the country and to several international destinations. Fellows can also receive significant financial incentives for participation and positive behavior as a gateway to developing intrinsic motivation that arises from internal and not external rewards.

The Seven Touch Points in the ONS/Advance Peace Peacemaker Fellowship include:

- Daily in-person check ins

- Development of LifeMAP and goals
- Social services navigation
- Transformative Travel
- Elders Circle (CBT)
- Internship Opportunities
- LifeMAP milestone allowance (monthly stipends)

Current Programs and Evaluations


Since the establishment of the ONS, Richmond has experienced a substantial decrease in violence. Firearm-related homicides have declined in Richmond by more than 70 percent. With respect to those individuals enrolled in the Peacemaker Fellowship program within ONS, 77 percent have not been involved in any gun violence activity.⁸⁸

Advance Peace has replicated the Peacemaker Fellowship in the cities of Stockton and Sacramento, CA and Fort Wayne, TX. Advance Peace is also working with the cities of Fresno, New York City, and several others to launch Peacemaker Fellowship programs there.

Initial evaluations of the Advance Peace programs in Stockton and Sacramento have shown very promising outcomes.⁸⁹

⁸⁸<https://www.advancepeace.org/about/the-solution/>

⁸⁹<https://www.advancepeace.org/about/learning-evaluation-impact/>



Street Outreach

Referred to by a variety of names and long seen as the primary entry point for violence reduction programs, Street Outreach can be an effective intervention when implemented correctly. A number of organizations and programs throughout the country have successfully operated Street Outreach initiatives, including [Urban Peace Initiative](#) in Los Angeles, who also provide a Street Outreach training academy; the [Newark Community Street Team](#); and the [Professional Community Intervention Training Institute](#).

Popularized by the documentary *Interrupters*, the Cure Violence Epidemic

Control Model was created in Chicago to provide Street Outreach and violence interruption through a public health approach. This model utilizes the main components that are currently used to control outbreaks of epidemic disease to address violence, namely uncovering and breaking up transmission, pinpointing those with the highest risk of infection, and reforming local norms.

Identification of Program Participants

Street Outreach programs are designed to address the manner in which violence spreads from person to person. Studies show that those who have been continually in contact with violence can

be thirty times more likely to commit a violent act in the future.⁹⁰ Moreover, violence often has ripple effects in the community, whether it be in the form of retaliation or further escalation of conflict.⁹¹

Because of this pattern in violence, Street Outreach programs recognize potentially lethal conflicts in the community by utilizing trained Violence Interrupters. A system is devised and maintained for collecting and verifying homicide and injury data from the community. This data includes prior history of homicides and injuries, hot spots of violence, neighborhood affiliations, etc. These Violence Interrupters also identify ongoing conflicts by speaking to key members of the community about ongoing disputes. Information regarding arrests, prison releases, and prior criminal history are also utilized to pinpoint violent outbreaks.⁹²

Engagement and Services Strategy

Engagement is primarily facilitated by the work of trained Violence Interrupters that engage the community through meaningful dialogue. Following a shooting, these individuals immediately operate in the community and at hospitals to pacify heightened emotions

and prevent retaliations. This involves coordination with local groups and business owners to hold constructive dialogue around community violence and the appropriate actions to take in response. Events are then organized by Violence Interrupters to promote a change in overall neighborhood attitudes towards violence. This enables the de-normalization of long-standing attitudes around violence by way of constant community engagement and input.⁹³ Events include community education initiatives, gun buyback projects, and sports programming. The main focus on these events is to provide a safe space in the community when violence is at an all-time high.⁹⁴

It is important to note that some applications of this model incorporate collaboration with HVIPs to help aid in the identification of high-risk individuals.⁹⁵

Current Programs and Evaluations

Street Outreach programs have been rigorously evaluated by numerous independent think-tanks, with strong, statistically significant outcomes observed in most analyses. Reductions in shooting have ranged from 40 to 70 percent, with some cities even able to maintain multiple years without any

⁹⁰<https://1vp6u534z5kr2qmr0w11t7ub-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Infographic-Top-10-v1.pdf>

⁹¹<https://www.lagryd.org/mission-comprehensive-strategy>

⁹²<https://cvg.org/what-we-do/>

⁹³Id.

⁹⁴<https://www.lagryd.org/summer-night-lights>

⁹⁵<https://johnjayrec.nyc/2020/11/09/av2020/>

shootings at all. Analyses have also shown a large ROI (return on investment) associated with investment in this model: anywhere from \$3,500-\$4,500 is saved for every act of violence stopped.⁹⁶ Apart from these tangible results, supplementary benefits in the form of increased employment rates and more faith in law enforcement personnel are also realized.³³

The City of Los Angeles established the Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) in 2007 in order to effectively incorporate Street Outreach into Los Angeles' violence reduction strategy. GRYD's initiatives include intervening in violent situations and proactively promoting communication between various groups through the use of the "triangle protocol," which helps determine appropriate responses to a crisis.^{97,98} This protocol is the main pathway in which information is facilitated between three main stakeholders: the Los Angeles Police Department, GRYD coordinators, and community programs. Ultimately, the collected information assists GRYD to properly respond to violent shootings.

After launching in 2010, New York City's Cure Violence program demonstrated strong success, with a 63 percent reduction in shooting incidents.⁹⁹ Radical transformation in neighborhood attitudes towards the use of violence also occurred, as reflected in community surveys.¹⁰⁰ This shift in norms illustrates a decrease in the willingness of community members to turn to and allow violence as a means of dispute resolution.

Street Outreach programs that simply canvass high crime neighborhoods without any focus on very high-risk individuals or don't have structured, intensive follow-up, have proven to be ineffective. In a meta-analysis of Street Outreach evaluations, a John Jay College study noted: "The most promising outcomes result when streetwork programs focus their efforts on the small networks of people at highest risk for violent victimization and offending—rather than on narrow geographic areas, such as the neighborhoods with high rates of violence."¹⁰¹

⁹⁶<https://cvg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020.03.05-US-Handout.pdf>

⁹⁷<https://www.lagryd.org/mission-comprehensive-strategy>

⁹⁸<https://nnscommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NNSC-streetwork-final-2.pdf>

⁹⁹<http://www.cureviolence.org/results/scientific-evaluations/nyc-evaluation-johnjay/>

¹⁰⁰<https://johnjayrec.nyc/2017/10/02/cvinsobronxeastny/>

¹⁰¹<https://nnscommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NNSC-streetwork-final-2.pdf>

Policing Strategies

The following strategies have shown to be effective in reducing crime, resolving incidents, and improving the quality of policing without a focus on heavy-handed enforcement.

SARA Problem Solving Model

The Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) model was created in Virginia in 1987 to facilitate the problem-oriented policing procedure.¹⁰²

The cornerstone of this model is a priority on outcomes; the model outlines four steps that are necessary for a proper police response to problems within their jurisdictions. To ensure proper implementation, a significant facet of this method is that officers must be ready to build trust between the community and the police department through the growth of interpersonal relationships.¹⁰³

Scanning. This step consists of pinpointing and then triaging repeated issues that necessitate a response from the police department.¹⁰⁴ Frequent problems that occur in the community should be given priority. Relevant outcomes of the problem should be matched to their corresponding cause.

The police department's ability to significantly affect that outcome should also be studied. For instance, examining which properties in a given area have the highest number of calls for service in a year or given time period is an important initial step in the SARA model.

Analysis. Here, law enforcement officers examine the root causes of the issue, community sentiment regarding the problem, and gather needed contextual data.⁴⁸ This step also involves assessing the status quo response to the problem and identifying the shortcomings of that strategy. Ultimately, the cause of the problem and potential solutions are determined during this phase.

Response. Officers utilize collected data to ascertain potential intervention strategies. When determining strategies, a thorough review of implemented interventions in different areas with comparable issues is critical. Once a strategy is selected, clear goals must also be established. Execution of the chosen plan is the last part of this step.

Assess. After a plan is implemented and officers have attempted to address a problem, the police department must analyze the efficacy of their strategy.

¹⁰²https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297556988_Police_innovation_Contrasting_perspectives

¹⁰³<https://movementforward.org/a-look-inside-strategies-contributing-towards-community-policing-sara-model/>

¹⁰⁴<https://www.evidence-basedpolicing.org/refresher-sara-model-and-problem-oriented-policing/>

Continued evaluation of the intervention is necessary to guarantee lasting success. Alternatives or additions to the strategy are considered as well. This is often a step overlooked or undervalued in police departments.¹⁰⁵

Many police departments have incorporated the SARA model into their interventions. In San Diego, the police department reported that a trolley station was the location of gang fights, violent crimes, and narcotic activity. A squad of officers collected information to show the local transit board that the design of the station contributed to crime. Based on the information provided by the officers, the transit board agreed to provide funds to redesign the station.¹⁰⁶

Ethical Policing Is Courageous (EPIC)

The EPIC program is a peer-to-peer intervention strategy that was created by the police department in New Orleans, Louisiana in 2016. EPIC involves training officers to be accountable to each other and intervene before an unlawful act takes place, irrespective of hierarchy. This initiative aims to alter the culture surrounding policing in order to limit police misbehavior and promote a collaborative environment.¹⁰⁷

The EPIC program is founded on active bystandership psychology, which explains that active bystanders intercede when they are made aware of problematic behavior. EPIC training allows officers to overcome factors that may prevent them from intervening. These factors include a lack of confidence in their skills to deescalate a situation, uneasiness about potential retribution, and worry about breaking an unwritten code of silence.¹⁰⁸

Leadership in police departments who participate in the EPIC program must be committed to changing their organizational culture. Police departments implementing EPIC must provide education, training, and on-going learning and support to officers for the initiative to be successful. EPIC can also integrate with other initiatives to boost officer well-being, including counseling and trauma assistance as well as stress reduction education.¹⁰⁹

Data has shown that police departments where EPIC programs have been implemented have better community relations, lower rates of misconduct, and lower rates of public grievances. The majority of the feedback from New Orleans police officers has also been

¹⁰⁵<https://movementforward.org/a-look-inside-strategies-contributing-towards-community-policing-sara-model/>

¹⁰⁶<https://www.sandiego.gov/department/problem-oriented-policing>

¹⁰⁷<http://epic.nola.gov/home/>

¹⁰⁸<http://epic.nola.gov/epic/media/Assets/EPIC-Overview.pdf>

¹⁰⁹Id.

positive.¹¹⁰ Moreover, there is strong research that peer intervention is effective when successful strategies for interceding are provided.¹¹¹

Project Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement (ABLE)

Project ABLE is a joint effort between the Georgetown Innovative Policing Program and the Sheppard Mullin law firm to train officers to be able to properly intervene in a crisis situation and promote a policing atmosphere that reinforces peer intervention. Project ABLE is based on the principles of the New Orleans EPIC Peer Intervention Program and curriculum created by Dr. Ervin Staub for California law enforcement. Through Georgetown, law enforcement agencies are able to receive training in Project ABLE along with a host of other resources to assist them in advancing their own bystandership strategies.^{112,113} The training consists of a minimum of a one-time eight hour ABLE-specific training along with a minimum of two hours of annual refresher training.¹¹⁴ All of these resources are provided to law enforcement agencies free of charge.

Project ABLE's aim is to reduce police misconduct and errors and assist in improving officer health and well-being. In order to prevent any retaliation from occurring to those officers who intervene, police departments must implement stringent anti-retaliation guidelines. Since its inception, over 70 police departments have enlisted in Project ABLE.¹¹⁵

Research has shown that there are many advantages to the implementation of significant bystander training. This is critical because most police departments have a culture that dissuades officers from intervening when they see problematic behaviors.¹¹⁶ Identified benefits include a decrease in violence to civilians, a decrease in violence to police officers, enhanced relationships between community residents and the police officers, and growth in officer well-being.¹¹⁷ Evidence also suggests a strong correlation between departments that maintain robust duty to intervene protocols and decreased rates of police deaths per capita.

¹¹⁰<https://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/10/polic-e-misconduct>

¹¹¹<https://epic.nola.gov/epic/media/Assets/Aronie-Lopez,-Keeping-Each-Other-Safe.pdf>

¹¹²<https://www.law.georgetown.edu/innovative-policing-program/active-bystandership-for-law-enforcement/>

¹¹³<https://www.law.georgetown.edu/innovative-policing-program/active-bystandership-for-law-enforcement/our-mission/>

¹¹⁴<https://www.law.georgetown.edu/innovative-policing-program/active-bystandership-for-law-enforcement/able-program-standards/>

¹¹⁵<https://www.wsj.com/articles/nypd-officers-to-get-training-on-speaking-up-against-bad-policing-11611838809>

¹¹⁶https://assets.foleon.com/eu-west-2/uploads-7e3kk3/41697/pdf_-_duty_to_intervene.6e39a04b07b6.pdf

¹¹⁷<https://www.law.georgetown.edu/innovative-policing-program/active-bystandership-for-law-enforcement/able-program-standards/>

Community Safety Partnership (Watts)

Established in November 2011, the Community Safety Partnership (CSP) is a joint effort between the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), the Housing Authority of the City of LA (HACLA), and local residents.¹¹⁸ The program was created in order to address the high violence levels in housing developments in the Watts area and offer residents there supports and services. The broader goal of the CSP is to implement “relationship-based policing.” This process involves police officers creating legitimate relationships with residents of their precinct in order to meaningfully benefit community wellness for the long-term.¹¹⁹ One of the major stakeholders in the project is the Watts Gang Task Force, a team of neighborhood residents, local faith leaders, and other community-based organizations.

Along with high violence rates, the community was also grappling with concentrated poverty, low education

quality, and deteriorating physical infrastructure. Community engagement initiatives the CSP implemented in response include a football team coached by police officers, Fun Runs, health fairs, and organized walks for residents to interact with officers in a non-confrontational setting.^{120, 121}

In 2020, the CSP Bureau was formed within LAPD to expand the work that was achieved in Watts citywide. The LAPD also consolidated CSP programs creating a centralized point of contact and engagement for the community. The main objectives of the CSP Bureau were to serve as a resource for officer--community interaction and promotion of neighborhood safety.¹²²

The CSP Bureau is also responsible for certifying and training officers for 5-year terms. CSP officers undergo over 100 hours of education from the nonprofit Urban Peace Institute. The training centers on cultural competency, de-escalation skills, and understanding community data.¹²³

Originally formed for one housing site, CSP has spread to ten additional

¹¹⁸<https://www.lamayor.org/mayor-garcetti-announces-new-expansion-community-safety-partnership>

¹¹⁹<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55b673c0e4b0cf84699bdffb/t/5a1890acec212d9bd3b8f52d/1511559341778/President%27s+Task+Force+CSP+Policy+Brief+FINAL+02-27-15updated.pdf>

¹²⁰<https://lasentinel.net/hundreds-of-south-la-residents-attend-launch-of-community-safety-partnership-in-harvard-park.html>

¹²¹<https://empowerla.org/lapds-community-relationship-division/>

¹²²<https://www.lamayor.org/mayor-garcetti-announces-creation-lapd-community-safety-partnership-bureau>

¹²³<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55b673c0e4b0cf84699bdffb/t/5a1890acec212d9bd3b8f52d/1511559341778/President%27s+Task+Force+CSP+Policy+Brief+FINAL+02-27-15updated.pdf>

developments. In 2017, the program was broadened to the Harvard Park area due to its efficacy. During the initial three years after the CSP's formation, both violent offenses and arrest rates decreased by over 50 percent in the Watts housing developments. One Watts location even had three consecutive years without a homicide. Residents of these Watts developments have even reported increased perceptions of safety along with greater trust in the police.¹²⁴ An evaluation of CSP by UCLA found that this effort reduced crime, arrest rates, and use of force grievances from residents.¹²⁵

Focused Deterrence

Focused Deterrence strategies involve the communication of risks, ramifications, and avenues of support to individuals involved in gun violence. This strategy is based on the fact that a very small number of people are responsible for a large portion of gun violence.

One of the most prominent implementations of focused deterrence is Boston, Massachusetts's Operation Ceasefire. Experiencing an increase in violence, Boston police identified and communicated with individuals and groups that were pinpointed as most at risk of engaging in violence.¹²⁶ Boston police also partnered with the Boston Ten Point Coalition, a group of faith and

community leaders, in order to provide support and services to these targeted individuals and groups. Oakland has also implemented a version of Focused Deterrence that is profiled in the Gun Violence Reduction section of this report.

Focused Deterrence strategies are often tailored to the location in which they are being implemented. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Lowell, Massachusetts, instituted this strategy in areas of high crime. Lowell dealt with a significant Asian gang presence largely comprising youth involved in illicit gambling operations. In order to address the youth violence, the City of Lowell worked with older Asian males in charge of the gambling. The older Asians intervened in youth violence in order to prevent their gambling enterprise from being destroyed. Lowell experienced a major decline in adolescent violence following the implementation of this Focused Deterrence strategy.¹²⁷

After Ceasefire was implemented in Boston, evaluations found a 63 percent drop in youth homicides and a 32 percent decline in calls for service

¹²⁴Id.

¹²⁵<https://www.lamayor.org/mayor-garcetti-announces-creation-lapd-community-safety-partnership-bureau>

¹²⁶<https://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-works-in-policing/research-evidence-review/focused-deterrence/>

¹²⁷Id.

related to gun violence.¹²⁸ A meta-analysis of several Focused Deterrence strategies found steady reductions in violent crime of up to 60 percent, particularly for group and gang related violence.¹²⁹

Elimination of Pretextual Stops

Pretextual or pretext traffic stops occur when police officers stop a driver for a minor violation, like vehicle equipment failure, and then try to leverage that opportunity to find evidence of a more significant crime. A recent evaluation of 100 million traffic encounters demonstrated that Black and Latino drivers experience higher rates of pretextual stops and searches.¹³⁰ However, most of these stops do not actually yield any contraband or weapons.¹³¹ Because the nature of pretextual stops relies heavily on officer discretion, there is high likelihood that implicit racial biases come into play. Such stops that end in violence or death disproportionately affect Black and Latino drivers.¹³²

Elimination of pretextual stops does not negatively affect crime. An analysis by the police department in Fayetteville, North Carolina showed that violent crime was not affected after the police department reformed its use of pretextual stops.¹³³

Pretextual stops are in the process of being regulated in many states across the country. Oregon's Supreme Court ruled in November 2019 that it was unconstitutional for police to stop a driver and proceed to ask unrelated questions, thereby effectively banning pretextual stops.¹³⁴ Virginia policy makers are also considering restricting pretextual stops.¹³⁵ The Berkeley City Council has already approved the formation of BerkDOT in order to address and decrease the frequency of pretextual traffic stops.¹³⁶ The City Council also approved the Mayor's Fair and Impartial Policing Workgroup's recommendations, which includes elimination of pretextual stops.

¹²⁸<https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188741.pdf>

¹²⁹<https://prohic.nl/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2020-03-31-FocussedDeterrenceBraga.September2019.pdf>

¹³⁰<https://www.vera.org/blog/ending-pretextual-stops-is-an-important-step-toward-racial-justice>

¹³¹<https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7898-rudovskyoslj>

¹³²<https://www.berkeleyside.com/2021/03/02/opinion-for-berkeley-to-reimagine-public-safety-we-must-grapple-with-traffic-enforcement>

¹³³<https://injepijournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40621-019-0227-6>

¹³⁴<https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-supreme-court-bans-police-officers-random-questions/>

¹³⁵<https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/09/03/police-pretext-traffic-stops-need-to-end-some-lawmakers-say>

¹³⁶<https://www.berkeleyside.com/2021/03/02/opinion-for-berkeley-to-reimagine-public-safety-we-must-grapple-with-traffic-enforcement>

Ethical Society of Police (ESOP)

Instituted in 1972 by Black St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department officers, the Ethical Society of Police (ESOP) is a police union that was created in order to combat systemic racism within the department and greater community. The group is composed of 220 members, who are either police officers or civilian contractors.¹³⁷ The organization recently scaled up to include the St. Louis County Police Department. ESOP has been particularly outspoken in cases of police wrongdoing. The group places a higher premium on ethical decision making, even though openly criticizing actions of their fellow police officers can be difficult.

Most recently, ESOP condemned the actions of a police officer in Brooklyn Center, MN that resulted in the death of Daunte Wright, expressing that the officer was irresponsible in upholding her duties.¹³⁸ ESOP has also sponsored many events in order to improve relationships between police officers and their community including Pizza with a Cop, community clean-up days, and basketball games. In August of

2020, ESOP released a groundbreaking report that details systemic racism throughout the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department.

Chicago PD Black Public Safety Alliance (BPSA)

A group of Black Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers created the Black Public Safety Alliance (BPSA) in 2021.¹³⁹ The organization serves to give Black police officers a voice amidst the deep-rooted issues between communities of color and the CPD. The BPSA was created in response to concerns with the broader Fraternal Order of Police (FOP).¹⁴⁰ Officers in the BPSA have explained they “...do not feel supported or comfortable at the FOP,” especially after the local police union refused to undergo mandated precinct reform to promote trust in the community.¹⁴¹

The formation of the alliance is a reflection of the national conversation that was ignited by George Floyd’s death. The members of BPSA have expressed that advocating for the Black community is one of their main goals, even if that involves challenging the

¹³⁷https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/64ce42b7-f768-43ed-9590-dbd611afb7b6/downloads/1c6lj3b8j_482336.pdf?ver=1618276018416

¹³⁸<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/14/opinion/police-officer-unions.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage>

¹³⁹<https://www.wbez.org/stories/black-chicago-police-officers-form-new-group/abb12a96-1103-4ced-a068-0ffbfb158da9>

¹⁴⁰<https://movementforward.org/a-look-inside-strategies-contributing-towards-community-policing-sara-model/>

¹⁴¹<https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-black-chicago-police-organization-20210225-dvbzcs4z3feqvix4sumhcbgru-story.html>

status quo. Currently operating as a nonprofit, the BPSA has established working groups on diversity policies, adolescent coaching, and police reform. The group will also offer services to Black officers who are having difficulties with their overall well-being.¹⁴²

Police Diversity

With the recent demands for law enforcement to address racial injustice and the disparate impact of policing on communities of color, diversity in the ranks of officers has emerged as a potential area of reform. In a New York Times analysis of federal Bureau of Justice Statistics data on nearly 500 police departments across the country, more than 66 percent of the departments experienced a reduction in diversity and became more white from 2007 to 2016. Although the share of police officers of color has risen in that time period as well, the demographics of police departments do not reflect the demographics of communities they serve.¹⁴³ Black officers are twice as likely than their white counterparts to espouse the belief that the deaths of people of color at the hands of police officers are a legitimate problem.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴²<https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-black-chicago-police-organization-20210225-dvzbzcs4z3feqvix4sumhcbbgru-story.html>

¹⁴³<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/23/us/bureau-justice-statistics-race.html>

Diversity in law enforcement is correlated with stronger bonds between a department and the community they serve, particularly communities of color. Use of force grievances have also been shown to decrease when there are more non-white officers in leadership positions.¹⁴⁵ A new comprehensive study of police diversity in Chicago, Illinois was conducted by a group of academics from Princeton University, Columbia University, the Wharton School of Business, and the University of California at Irvine. Their research concluded that, “Relative to white officers, Black and Hispanic officers make far fewer stops and arrests, and they use force less often, especially against Black civilians. These effects are largest in majority-Black areas of Chicago and stem from reduced focus on enforcing low-level offenses, with greatest impact on Black civilians. Female officers also use less force than males, a result that holds within all racial groups.”¹⁴⁶

Warrior vs. Guardian Mentality

The mentality of a warrior going to battle and the police force being an occupying army has been referred to as the “warrior mentality” for many years. Instilled, or reinforced, in police officers

¹⁴⁴<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/12/black-and-white-officers-see-many-key-aspects-of-policing-differently/>

¹⁴⁵<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/23/us/bureau-justice-statistics-race.html>

¹⁴⁶<https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/bkmr.pdf>

at the academy, the warrior concept is saturated throughout police culture. The guardian mentality is a newer idea that promotes community engagement, the establishment of meaningful relationships, and providing support to residents.¹⁴⁷

“From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American Police Culture to Democratic Ideals,” a report by the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government and the National Institute of Justice, directly addresses the problems of the warrior culture in policing. The report states: “In some communities, the friendly neighborhood beat cop – community guardian – has been replaced with the urban warrior, trained for battle and equipped with the accouterments and weaponry of modern warfare.”¹⁴⁸

The report goes on to highlight problems with police academies and the aggressive, warrior type manner in which new recruits are trained: “Another, more insidious problem in a military-style academy is the behavior modeled by academy staff. Those without power

(recruits) submit without question to the authority of those who have power (academy staff). Rule violations are addressed by verbal abuse or physical punishment in the form of pushups and extra laps.”¹⁴⁹

A novel initiative has been implemented at the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission (WSCJTC) to try to instill the guardian culture in police departments in the state. The WSCJTC conducts and implements training of over 10,000 police officers annually. Curricular and approach changes include the removal of salute requirements for recruits, motivating instead of criticizing recruits during training, and the incorporation of behavioral education into the curriculum. Early longitudinal evaluations of the WSCJTC program show that the officers that participated in the training felt more comfortable responding to behavioral and mental health crises when compared with officers that did not receive the training.¹⁵⁰ Gains in emotional intelligence and peer support were observed as well.

¹⁴⁷<https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/02/190226155011.htm>

¹⁴⁸<https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248654.pdf>

¹⁴⁹Id.

¹⁵⁰https://www.seattleu.edu/media/college-of-arts-and-sciences/departments/criminaljustice/crimeandjusticeresearchcenter/documents/Helfgott-and-Hickman-2021_Longitudinal-Study-of-the-Effect-of-Guardian-Training-for-LE.pdf

Police Training

Increased training and education programs are frequently promoted to police departments to help improve the quality of policing and support officers in gaining new skills. As noted by two Columbia Law School professors in an article on police reform, "... training does not take root unless officers are held accountable for obeying the rules and practicing the skills they are taught."¹⁵¹ Training alone is not adequate to transform a police department or change the behavior of an officer. But combined with culture change, new policies and accountability, training can be an effective tool to improve and reform the police.

Procedural Justice

Procedural Justice in policing improves police-community relations and emphasizes police departments and officers being transparent in their actions, fair in their processes, allowing community voice, and using impartiality in decision making.

According to the Department of Justice's Community Oriented Policing Services, "Procedural justice refers to the idea of fairness in the processes

that resolve disputes and allocate resources. It is a concept that, when embraced, promotes positive organizational change and bolsters better relationships."



A comprehensive evaluation of procedural justice training found that "training increased officer support for all of the procedural justice dimensions. . . . Post-training, officers were more likely to endorse the importance of giving citizens a voice, granting them dignity and respect, demonstrating neutrality, and (with the least enthusiasm) trusting them to do the right thing."¹⁵²

Several evaluations of procedural justice have found the education has been correlated with an improvement in relations between a community and a police department.¹⁵³ In Oakland, the

¹⁵¹<https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/19/the-new-new-policing>

¹⁵²https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269723704_Training_police_for_procedural_justice

¹⁵³https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Police/Level_3_-_General/Principled%20Policing_outline.pdf

police department trained all officers in procedural justice and provided specialized procedural justice training to the department's gun violence reduction unit. Oakland's police department was also the first department in the country to have members of the community teach a portion of the procedural justice training.

While also suggesting procedural justice training as a way to combat the "warrior mentality" in police departments, a Harvard University Kennedy School of Government report advises that "Police leaders dedicated to establishing practices in their agencies based on procedural justice principles must ensure that their organizational culture is not in conflict with these same principles."¹⁵⁴

Implicit Bias

Implicit bias, as the name denotes, is an unconscious belief, attitude or bias against another race, ethnicity, or group. When Stanford University psychologist Jennifer Eberhardt conducted a large-scale study of policing, she discovered that the unconscious link between Black individuals and criminality is so high that even contemplating lawlessness can cause someone to fixate on Black

people.¹⁵⁵ These societal biases end up affecting the judgment of police officers whether they are aware of it or not. In Oakland, Professor Eberhardt and her team reviewed body camera footage from 1,000 traffic stops to elucidate the difference in officer language in encounters with Black versus white drivers. The research found that Oakland Police Department (OPD) officers consistently communicated with Black drivers in a less civil manner when compared with white drivers they addressed.¹⁵⁶ Various programs to address implicit bias were then recommended for implementation in OPD in response to these findings. Short, repeated education periods were found to be associated with higher levels of officer comprehension and knowledge.¹⁵⁷ The training was accompanied by more community engagement and data transparency in order to allow officers to start the process of unlearning implicit biases.

A novel approach to implicit bias training is the Counter Bias Training Simulation (CBTSim). This strategy utilizes shooting automation and video sequences to demonstrate the risks of implicit bias in a realistic setting.¹⁵⁸ In the curriculum, officers are forced to

¹⁵⁴<https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248654.pdf>

¹⁵⁵<https://psychology.stanford.edu/news/we-understand-implicit-bias-now-what-conversation-stanford-psychologist-jennifer-eberhardt>

¹⁵⁶Id.

¹⁵⁷<https://news.stanford.edu/2016/06/15/stanford-big-data-study-finds-racial-disparities-oakland-calif-police-behavior-offers-solutions/>

¹⁵⁸<https://www.npr.org/2020/09/10/909380525/nypd-study-implicit-bias-training-changes-minds-not-necessarily-behavior>

deal with potentially explosive situations without reacting in a way that reflects preconceived notions.¹⁵⁹

De-escalation

With an increase in the number of deadly interactions between police and unarmed civilians going viral, there has been an on-going call for officers to be required to utilize effective verbal de-escalation strategies. Law enforcement officers in the United States kill nearly 1,000 civilians annually, many of whom are unarmed.¹⁶⁰ However, many law enforcement agencies provide little to no de-escalation training to officers, and 34 states have no mandate for de-escalation training.

Successful de-escalation programs operate to assist law enforcement personnel in relaxing the situation in order to gain valuable time in a crisis. Ideal guidance for officers suggests that 40 hours of de-escalation instruction is needed. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) de-escalation training is a program that has seen substantial reductions in use of force complaints and civilian injury. The training includes active listening, forming physical space between the individual and officer, and education regarding mental illness and well-being.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹<https://www.faac.com/milo/cognitive/cbtsim/>

¹⁶⁰https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/deescalation-training-police/2020/10/27/3a345830-14a8-11eb-ad6f-36c93e6e94fb_story.html

¹⁶¹Id.

When the Dallas Police Department implemented a training curriculum involving de-escalation tactics, use of force grievances declined by 18 percent the following year. After the San Francisco Police Department incorporated de-escalation training into their curriculum, use of force incidents dropped by 24 percent annually.¹⁶²

Community Engagement

A tense relationship between police and the community, especially communities of color, has been a long, intractable problem. Mistrust of law enforcement is not just theoretically problematic; it has also been proven to be linked to an increase in crime and violence.¹⁶³ Police officers should work to develop meaningful and positive relationships with members of the community by taking measures including regularly and actively attending community meetings, special events, neighborhood gatherings, positively communicating with area youth, and participating or hosting local sporting events. Law enforcement should convey the message that residents have a voice and that their input matters. Police should also connect with individuals in the community who advocate for greater social cohesion, such as faith

¹⁶²https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/deescalation-training-police/2020/10/27/3a345830-14a8-11eb-ad6f-36c93e6e94fb_story.html

¹⁶³<https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Giffords-Law-Center-In-Pursuit-of-Peace.pdf>

leaders, in order to successfully engage a broad swath of residents.¹⁶⁴

Crime Prevention Through Community Engagement (CPTCE), an extensive training guide for improving relations between police departments and the community, was recently developed by The American Crime Prevention Institute (ACPI). The training consists of strategies to engage communities of color, employ social media to interact with residents, coordinate with faith-based leaders, and partner with community-based organizations.¹⁶⁵

In New Haven, Connecticut, the police department implemented 40-hours of community engagement education for its recruits, including education about the area's history as well as continuous outreach activities. Officers overwhelmingly supported the initiative and reported having positive interactions. After the pilot, the police department expanded the program to partner with the local community-based organization, Leadership, Education, & Athletics in Partnership (LEAP).¹⁶⁶ Community engagement training for law enforcement in general is correlated with increased trust and stronger social ties in neighborhoods.

Open Policing is a research-based strategy that incorporates elements of procedural justice to improve police-community relations. Residents of communities are able to offer their comments and observations regarding their exchanges with police officers anonymously. All comments are collated into Agency Pages, which can be explored by residents and officers.¹⁶⁷ In addition to the Open Policing policy, some departments have initiated CFS reviews. After any call for service, community members are able to give details about their interaction in a three-minute review without any fear of consequence.¹⁶⁸

The four main components of procedural justice have been assimilated into Open Policing, including promotion of vocalization from the community, serving individuals with respect, objectivity in decision-making, and credibility with the community. Open Policing has been correlated with a 35 percent decrease in resident grievances and increased trust in police departments.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴<https://courses.acpionline.com/community-engagement/>

¹⁶⁵<http://acpionline.com/seminars/cptcelou/>

¹⁶⁶https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IAP_Outside-the-Academy-Learning-Community-Policing-through-Community-Engagement.pdf

¹⁶⁷https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/pl_police_commun%20engage_121714_c.pdf

¹⁶⁸<https://www.openpolicing.org/how-open-policing-works/>

¹⁶⁹<https://www.openpolicing.org/try-open-policing/>

Data Driven Risk Management

The Oakland Police Department (OPD) recently implemented VISION, a Microsoft Power BI dashboard that allows for a precise review of police behavior. Working with Slalom, a data consulting firm, OPD has increased transparency and accountability through data analysis. Patterns of enforcement, historical activity, and performance over time are all monitored in close to real-time.¹⁷⁰

The dashboards were created with input from OPD staff and leadership, community-based organizations, other law enforcement agencies, and Stanford University's SPARQ (Social Psychological Answers to Real-world Questions). Each dashboard can be accessed by OPD leadership, depending

on security clearance. The dashboards have a simple interface, allowing supervisors to access and understand the data easily. Police supervisors can access a variety of data, from long-term information to arrests made within the last 24 hours.¹⁷¹ Dashboards allow for an easy breakdown of incidents by factors including race, gender, ethnicity, and officer. This permits police departments to monitor problematic patterns and address them quickly.¹⁷² Early Intervention Systems (EIS) such as these dashboards have been correlated with increased personnel safety, improved officer welfare, and an increase in police accountability.¹⁷³ One needed improvement with these systems is allowing public access to the information.

¹⁷⁰<https://www.slalom.com/case-studies/city-oakland-creating-police-transparency-and-trust-data>

¹⁷¹<https://medium.com/slalom-data-analytics/data-is-the-new-sheriff-in-town-but-is-it-biased-4aa140904dd7>

¹⁷²<https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Police-Commission-7.23.20-Agenda-Packet.pdf>

¹⁷³<https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/PIJPSM-02-2020-0027/full/html>

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7. Id.
8. <https://www.mentalhealthportland.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2018CAHOOTSBROCHURE.pdf>
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13. Id.
14. <https://www.vera.org/behavioral-health-crisis-alternatives/cru-and-familiar-faces>
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